A Comparative-Analytical Approach to Political and Judicial Review of the Constitution in France and the United States: From the Constitutional Council to the Supreme Court

Abstract

This article aims to provide a comparative examination of two prominent models of constitutional review—political review in France and judicial review in the United States—by analyzing the structures, theoretical foundations, and social implications of these two systems. The research methodology employed is a comparative, descriptive-critical analysis that, drawing on primary sources and contemporary legal developments, clarifies the differences and commonalities between the two models. The findings reveal that political review in France stems from the tradition of parliamentary supremacy and a concern over “judicial government,” whereas in the United States, ex post judicial review is considered a tool for controlling majority power and protecting fundamental rights. The article also demonstrates that France has moved toward greater flexibility by combining both ex ante and ex post review (since 2010), while the U.S. emphasizes judicial interpretation within the context of concrete cases. Finally, through a functional comparison of institutional status, voting procedures, and social impact of rulings, the article analyzes the strengths and limitations of each system and offers recommendations for designing effective constitutional review mechanisms.