A Contemplation on Avicenna’s Arguments on Immateriality of the Soul

Abstract

Total intellectual immateriality of rational soul is one of the major subjects in philosophy and anthropology among Muslims, especially Avicenna. Avicenna has provided several arguments to prove the intellectual immateriality of rational soul, using the position and insensibility of intelligible forms, the unlimited power of the soul in the perception of intelligible forms, and rational soul being needless of physical tools in some of its perceptions. In the present study, the mentioned arguments are explored and criticized, demonstrating that they cannot prove the total intellectual immateriality of the rational soul, that is, its complete lack of matter and the properties of matter (volume and mass). Therefore, it seems that other viewpoints such as the materiality of soul in the time of creation and its singularity after creation due to substantial motion(point of view of mulla sadra shirazi) or imaginary immateriality of soul since the creation humans until his death, replace the Avicenna's and his followers viewpoints.