Relation of Power in Ratio Decidendi

Abstract

Modern scholars (mostly in Western part of the world) agreed to the meaning of “deciding beyond a reasonable doubt” when judges hold their judgment upon a case. This view brings us to the theory of Beyond a Reasonable Doubt saying that an accused is presumed innocent until the conviction is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. When any doubt occurs and the prosecution cannot prove otherwise, the defendant should be acquitted. Is the concept of ratio decidendi limited only to the principle of beyond a reasonable doubt as applied in the Western law? Or, on the contrary, the ratiocination held by the judges has more wide and open meaning? This writing discusses the ratio decidendi of the judges in a more open perspective by presenting the main issues such as first, how judges constitute the reasons through the relation of power and how judges can make a leap of reason in holding their decision. Through philosophy and critique of text, we can draw conclusion on that the ratio decidendi of the judges is not pure, neutral, and absolute. The affirmation is constituted through none other than a relation of power and is a social construction whose existence is determined by many factors.