Speculate Ethnic Federalism for Political Stability in Afghanistan

M. R; H. A

Afghanistan

Abstract

Ethnic identity is a key player in the country's political structure, spatially in multiethnic societies. The relationship between ethnic groups and the central government in Afghanistan has been based on ignoring and sometimes even eliminating. and the reaction of ethnic groups has been evasive and centrifugal. The government formation of Afghanistan is back to 18th century along with the power of the Durrani tribal. Political history showed that the centralized political system has not been leading to political stability in Afghanistan. The question is that; what is the speculated ethnic federalism for political stability in Afghanistan? The aim of the study is to explore the speculated ethnic federalism for political stability in Afghanistan. And this study was conducted by the qualitative method. The result of study shows that Afghanistan is the multi ethnic country and it has more than 50 identified tribes. Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek are the major ethnic groups. The major issues of contemporary history Afghanistan are instability of governments. It is having been back to central political system. And ehtno-federal form of governance will lead to political stability in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Federal; Political Stability; Central Government; Ethnic Federalism; Self-Government

Introduction

In multiethnic societies such as Afghanistan, ethnic identity can play a prominent and influential component in the country's political structure. The dominant form of relationship between ethnic groups and the central government in Afghanistan has been based on ignoring the diversity of ethnic groups and sometimes even eliminating them by the central government. As a result, the reaction of ethnic groups has historically been evasive and centrifugal.

The formation of the government in Afghanistan in the 18th century, along with the power of the Durrani tribal, was widespread (Saadat, 1396; Vartan, 2016). After that, the Durrani's Pashtuns maintained their power dominance, which was impossible without the suppression of tribes and in some cases Pashtun tribes or other ethnic groups. As a result, differences between the central government and the provinces and consequently between the government and non-Pashtun ethnic groups continued during different periods; And the ethnic supremacy of governments had led Pashtuns in general and, in some cases, Durrani's in particular, to have specific government privileges. However, during periods such as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the opportunity to participate and pay attention to ethnic

groups that were previously on the sidelines of power was more favorable than ever before. During this period, the language and culture of different ethnic groups were recognized, and the, government implemented cultural programs in this regard the start of opposition and uprisings against the Democratic Party of the Afghanistan government, people in different cities and provinces protested against the presence of Soviet forces (Saadat, 1396; Vartan, 2016). Although the issue of ethnicity among these groups was initially diminished due to the existence of a common foreign enemy, after the Soviet withdrawal, the ethnicity of these groups was highlighted and sparked strong differences. After the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government and two months of rule by Sebghatullah Mujadidi, the central government was taken over by the mainly Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami party (Saadat, 1396).

After the fall of the First Islamic Emirate of the Taliban period, with the cooperation of the forces of the international coalition led by the United States of America, an interim government was formed and a new constitution was approved.

Taliban political leadership has not remained idle. Taliban forces have continued waging an insurgency against the government of Afghanistan, the United States, and the NATO-led coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. They have taken advantage of leadership and governance gaps by establishing their shadow -governments. Many areas controlled by Taliban. At the end, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was collops by Taliban. Now Afghanistan going into a De facto situation in international relations.

Afghanistan's political history background shows that the centralized political system has not been leading to political stability in Afghanistan. Now what is the speculated ethnic federalism for political stability in Afghanistan? The objective of the study is Investigating to explore the speculated ethnic federalism for political stability in Afghanistan.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the speculated ethnic federal system of political stability in Afghanistan, which has collapsed from the bad establishment of all political systems one after the other, and most importantly, the experienced one-ethnic systems. The study attempts to show that the federal system is the only system that all ethnic groups in Afghanistan have seen in their political system and, most importantly, that political stability in Afghanistan prevails. On the other hand, with a federal system of power, it is divided into several small states, and each state is trying to take better steps toward progress than the other, which is how Afghanistan reaches political stability. And this study was conducted by the qualitative method. or resurrection of secondary Data including (journals, magazines, books, and articles).

Background of the Study

Various scholars from all over the world have studied ethnic federalism, state reforms, and political stability in different periods and perspectives.

Khan (2014) confers about the role of ethnic groups in achieving political stability, stating that the political system based on ethnicity persists in certain ways. Since time immemorial, humans have inherited to adopt the identity. Ethnic identities based on language and religion. The dominant themes in the history and evolution of the multiethnic countries of the former Soviet states, Afrika, Eastern Europe, and South Asia. The writer argues that when the culture of a group that resides within a particular locality is safe in a neighbouring jurisdiction. The issue being referred to isn't the survival of a solitary culture, yet the political, economic, and cultural needs of individuals. A major of concerns in the political systems of multiethnic countries is the fear of domination of certain ethnic groups and assimilation by other ethnic groups. The problem is real. And with the emergence of modern secular nation-states, ethnic

considerations have been eliminated from the formulation of public policies by states. Pakistan is the country that are parts of different ethnicities. Since the first day of the creation of Pakistan, inter-ethnic political competition has become fashionable. Moreover, ethnic leadership and sensitive cultural intelligence playing a key role to improve ethnic behaviour, particularly during the political process.

Ahmad (2010) discussed that ongoing endeavours by political leaders to correct the elements of inequality among the provinces ought to be bolstered and supplemented by endeavours to improve the capacities of the provinces. Federalism must be viewed as a regulation of deep power. The utilization of resources and function at the local, provincial, and federal level, as per the necessities of sub-national units, instead of the benefits of granting and 'supports' consented to subordinate subject's form part of the centralized state. Considering the reforms have given more autonomy to the local and provincial levels, the capital response to such reforms turns into the way to its achievement. The highest level of government is necessary to be restructured. However, this does not imply a comprehensive transfer of authority and control to local levels. Despite what might be expected, this requires a continuous shift from power, obligation, and legitimacy from the centre to local levels, with the centre assuming the main job in local political processes. Moreover, the centre must permit the development of self-rule at the local level and turns out to be increasingly responsive toward it.

Khalid (2013) contends that the 18th amendment gives power and support, yet at the same time produces complications for provinces to demonstrate the ability to take responsibility for improved power. It limits the authority with the undertaking of maintaining state integrity together with the self-governance of the units in the federation. He likewise contends that ethnic arrangements and political uncertainty in Pakistan are the consequence of the disparity in the theory and practice of federal government understandings. Although the Pakistani federation meets the basic principles of federalism, it operates progressively like a unitary system. It is regularly believed that if a federal system works as a unitary system, it loses its ability to host ethnic and regional divisions. These communities sense progressively uncertain and reactionary.

Mistaffa (2016) studied ethno federalism in Iraq after 2003. He explained alternative explanations for political instability in Iraq. After 2003, political instability in Iraq is easily detectable even by an inexperienced observer. However, why Iraq has become politically unstable is a question that has received controversial and sometimes contradictory responses. The result shows the ethno federalism formalizes the identities of antagonistic minorities and empowers them with institutional capacities. By extension, the formalization of identity and institutional empowerment mean that minorities move towards secession. Three defences are paramount and constitute most of my arguments in support of ethno-federalism in Iraq.

Waseem (2010) studied federalism in Pakistan. In his research, he discussed the evolution of federalism, the relations of the centre and provinces, namely the division of power and fiscal federalism, Baluchistan and its reform packages. The informal system of federalism of Giligit Baltistan (2009 orders) and the 18th constitutional amendment of 2010 are also explained. The point of observation the author refers to the legitimate, institutional, historical and ethical bases of legality for operational and key elements of federalism in Pakistan. in contrast, 30 tendency of centralizing policy basically submerged in the country restructuring program. there is an image of federalism that shared power, remains to more or less complicated, notwithstanding when Pakistan has continuously moved towards an overall liberalization of the standards of coordination and collaboration between the centre and provinces.

Amira Allo (2023) written ethnicity and ethnic federalism in Ethiopia by qualitative research method. The aim of this study is to examine the debates on ethnicity and ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The result of research shows that Ethiopia is an indigenously diverse and multicultural country. Ethiopia is home to over 81 languages and 86 ethnic groups. The relationship between different ethnic groups is

deteriorating, and people are dying daily because of their ethnic background. and, the peaceful coexistence of communities has been affected.

Theoretical Framework

Federalism

Federalism concept root in the Latin word foedus, meaning "treaty, pact or covenant". Federal governments can be divided into two major categories:

The opening category is federal governments, which are found on geographic division and do not consider ethnic-linguistic divisions. The United States, Australia, and Germany are belonged to the oldest western federal governments. This group of federal governments is called national federal governments. The majority of these governments were created by amalgamate units that already existed independently, and the reason for the creation of these governments was to unite people who lived in different units and at least shared a common culture or language. The number of constituent units be contingent on the geographical distribution. As a consequence, they have different names. For some countries, states, provinces, regions, or autonomous or self-governing governments are named.

The second category not only recognizes linguistic differences and ethnic but as well includes these differences in their ideology and foundations. Such federal governments are called ethnic federal governments. Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Iraq are examples of federal governments. In this research, the desired federalism is the second type.

Historical evidence shows that, the Israeli tribes in the second century BC, the Greek states in the third century BC, and the Swiss cantons in the 13th century, all practiced federalism to unite against external enemies for mutual survival (Kumar, 2001). However, The United States is founder of modern federalism that evolved from the federal type of government. In 1787-1788, the Federalist Papers, a series of articles written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, outlined the federalist ideas underlying the United States Constitution (Maggs et al., 2007). The contemporary federal system of government is bag to the American Revolution (Maggs et al., 2007). Currently, from 193 countries in the world, 30 countries are known as countries that adopt a federal system of governance. These countries whereby the practice of federalism looks exemplary in terms of power-sharing, public trust and effective service delivery (Bierman & Rosen, 2005).

Federal government has a multi-order structure, with each order having both independent and joint decision-making powers, whereby highlights the "holding together" or "coming together" concept (A. Shah, 2012). The concept of "coming together" denotes that the independent states join together on their own to form a larger unit whereby the subnational governments the national government and always seem to have equal powers (A. Shah, 2012). USA, Australia, and Switzerland etc are a few examples of 'coming together' federalism(A. Shah, 2012).

The experience of various countries shows that federalism is practiced in a variety of different ways. Germany, Russia, and the United States have demonstrated that they practice federalism to come together as a force against many external challenges. Afghanistan, on the other hand, should have federalism to manage internal political and social issues as well as provide space for political cadres. Currently, the federal system in Afghanistan well introduces a three-tier democratic government. Confirms door-to-door service delivery, identity politics, mainstreaming of all castes and regions, politically stable government, inclusiveness in policy and programs, meaningful participation in decision-

making, autonomy, and self-determination to the sub-national entities, and institutional development of local democracy.

Ethnic Federalism and power-sharing

Ethnicity as discussed above uncovers that it is an extremely tricky and complicated subject both at the theoretical and pragmatic levels, as in this condition the errand of developing a political structure such as federalism utilizing, this complicated concept would be challenging. The discussion beneath will endeavor to bring a portion of the major hypothetical contentions concerning the issues of suitability/unsuitability among federalism and ethnicity. It will likewise attempt to analyze the conceivable connection between ethnicity and federalism.

Correspondingly, Lijphart (1977; 2002) likewise supports some sort of political design that can give a political or regional sphere to ethnic groups where they can practice some type of self-rule inside the setting of the bigger political structure just as involved in the political decision-making process inside the superior political system. Lijphart's theory of consociationalism in which he assumed that "group autonomy" and "power-sharing" as two basic components in building up a joint political structure in profoundly divided nations(Lijphart, 1977b). In this regard, "group autonomy", and "power-sharing" might be equal to "self-rule", and "shared rule" separately which stand as the basic components in the federal framework. As needs are, 'power-sharing methods the support of the representatives of every single noteworthy gathering in making a political decision, particularly at the administrative level, and, the autonomy of the group means that these communities have the power to manage their very own inner activities, particularly in the sphere of culture and education'. He likewise trusts that gatherings would discover pleasure in the capability to deal with their very own activities, and that would be good for firm democracy(Lijphart, 2002).

On the off chance that ethnic gatherings are topographically focused, Lijphart contended federalism could offer a brilliant chance for gathering autonomy or self-rule. Hence, by tolerating the certainty of illustration of federal plans dependent on ethnic parameters in the event of topographically focused ethnic gatherings, he suggested that a federal system with generally numerous and lesser constituent units might create the federal dividing lines match however much as could reasonably be likely with the ethnic parameters(Lijphart, 1994). In any case, Lijphart suggested that the assignment of protecting group self-rule and minority privileges in federal frameworks ought to likewise hold the accompanying four extra qualities: 'The bicameralism, including two chambers both, have equal and are diversely organized as the strongest structure—judicial review as durable and dynamic, constitutional inflexibility (which is hard to alter, however not unamendable), and the autonomous central bank'.

If ethnic gatherings are topographically scattered and coordinated, (Lijphart, 2002) suggests "convocational democracy" which incorporates four basic characteristics: segmented autonomy, grand coalition, proportionality, and minority veto. Segmented autonomy involves an allocation of decision-making power to each noteworthy community. The great coalition involves power sharing of every noteworthy gathering in political power, especially in official power. Proportionality involves that political portrayal, appointments of civil servants, allotment of public assets, and so forth ought to reflect the proportion of each noteworthy gathering. Finally, the veto power to the minority is given to them to refuse any choice that can put the minority's interest in question because of majority community outvotes.

Largely, Lijphart aimed at the significance of raising constitutional and convocational arrangements incorporating ethnic federalism in profoundly divided nations where persistent ethnic, religious, or social gatherings might be signified. According to him, profound societal and ethnic divisions have turned into a serious reason for fierce clashes and keep on introducing a grave issue to the

foundation and sustainability of democracy in diverse societies due to the disappointment of constitutional designers to manage the issue.

Federalism could offer opportunities for group autonomy if ethnic groups are geographically concentrated. Even though, by accepting the inevitability of drawing federal arrangements based on ethnic boundaries in case of geographically concentrated ethnic groups, the federal framework with relatively many and small constituent units could make the federal covered up lines coincide as well as possible with the ethnic boundaries (Lijphart, 2002, p. 51).

However, if ethnic groups are geographically dispersed and synchronized, 'convocational democracy' which includes four essential attributes: grand coalition, segmented autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto. Grand alliance entails power-sharing of all significant groups in political power, particularly in executive power. Segmented autonomy entails a delegation of decision-making power to every significant group. Proportionality entails that political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, etc. should consider the proportion of each significant group. And finally, minority veto entails the power for minority groups to veto any decision that can put their vital interest stake due to majorities out votes.

Empirically, Lijphart enumerates a variety of more or less functional power-sharing models in deeply divided societies. Some of the models were such as executive power sharing in a form of a grand coalition cabinet of ethnic parties such as South Africa and Malaysia; equal representation of ethnolinguistic like in the Belgian cabinets; and proportional shares of ministerial positions to the different linguistic groups, states and regions like in India (Lijphart, 2002, p. 46).

Self-government and Federalism

Federalism can be conceptualized as an extended system of self-government among overlapping human communities (W. Khan, 2020). This implies features of a common civilization and rule-ordered relationships grounded in similar principles of moral judgment. Federalism is grounded in a quest for enlightenment. Alexander Hamilton raised a critical question about human potential, in the opening paragraph of the first essay published in *The Federalist Papers*. Transposed from an indirect to a direct question, the issue can be stated in the following way: "A they forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force or are societies of men capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice?"(W. Khan, 2020), If human beings can establish something that it should called "good government" by reflection and choice, such a possibility implies of societies that people have the potential for functioning as artisans capable of creating systems of order as artifactual constructions.

This would a potential for the exercise of self-governing capabilities among a people who seek to establish and bring to realization the constitution of "good government"(W. Khan, 2020). It can reflection, choice, and critical scrutiny. The first order of inquiry in *The Federalist Papers* was a diagnostic assessment of what was viewed as the failure of the government created under the Articles of Confederation. Such a diagnostic assessment was necessary for conceptualizing the remedial efforts that would need to be taken to achieve good government from reflection and choice. The diagnostic assessment was undertaken by Alexander Hamilton, who identified the constituent units as residing in the states. This implied that failure to address enactments of the Congress of the United States to achieve enforcement would require the application of sanctions to a state in its collective capacity.

The new Constitution of U.S is beginning with a declaration of "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States." The debate over ratification among the people of the several states which is focused on the failure of the Philadelphia Convention, to address the standing of individuals as persons, resulting in their

adoption of the first ten amendments as a Bill of Rights to be adopted before the ratification of the Constitution had been fully achieved by the last of the states to complete the ratification process.

The systems of federal governance involve concurrent jurisdictions exercising limited authority that all persons and citizens have standing to set up and delimiting the authority of officials capable of taxing and enforcing collective decisions.

The initial focus on constitutions implies that processes of constitutional decision-making are available to people in their exercise of self-governing capabilities. Decision-making by Constitution involves the choice of rules rather than the expenditures of funds or the choice of individuals to exercise governmental prerogatives.

Federalism in Multi-ethnic Societies

This paper I focuses on the federal government framework established on the ethnic etymological basis or ethnic federalism, at that point a hypothetical argument regarding the utilization of federalism presents ethnic societies. The sensibility and reasonability of ethnic federalism are dubious. USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia are an example of loose ethnomedical arrangements, reverberating the negativity about the possibility of federalism dependent on an ethnic-linguistic base (W. Khan, 2020). In generally effective federal arrangements based on ethnic lines, like Switzerland and India, have exhibited the plausibility of ethnic federalism in segregated societies.

There are two kinds of scholars which is critics and supporters of ethnic federalism have their explanations. The promoters of Ethnic federalism argued that it would decrease the divergence of groups, assure self-rule, strengthen ethnic amicability through coexistence and diminish inclinations to withdrawal or breakdown (Kymlicka, 2006; Lijphart, 1977a). Despite what might be expected, critics contend that ethnic federalism might institutionalize ethnic segregation, discouraging citizens' rights, strengthening centrifugal forces, familiarizing ethnic zero-sum rivalry, and causing perilous ethnic elimination, dismissal, and collapse (W. Khan, 2020).

The present study investigates the implementation of the federal ethnic arrangement in Afghanistan, which is fundamental for understanding the theoretical discussion and the principal conclusions found regarding the matter. The hypothetical arguments present in this section on ethnic federalism for the most part center around the relationship between ethnicity and federalism. Investigate the connection between ethnicity and federalism endeavoring to see whether ethnicity and federalism are good or not. Thus, hypothetical investigation plans to create a comprehension of tensions, clashes, or factual or assumed concomitance between federalism and ethnicity. This implied helping the analysis build up an explanatory structure or a research instrument to comprehend the federal arrangement in Afghanistan based on an ethno-federal structure. Nonetheless, before looking at the connection between federalism and ethnicity, a theoretical ethnic understanding will be displayed.

Federalism and Political Stability

Federalism represents a distinctive form of governmental agreement. This is because; it involves the organization of the state in such a manner as to promote unity while at the same time preserving existing diversities within an overarching national entity. As a device for the containment of Intra societal pluralism, federalism offers a good prospect for achieving political stability of especially heterogeneous societies (Muhammad, 2007). Federalism is a system that mediates the potential and actual conflict that often arises from the heterogeneity within a political entity. To this extent, the relationship between federalism and political stability is axiomatic. Perhaps this informed why long (1991:192) holds that "federalism is an institutional solution to the destructive tendencies of Intra societal ethnic pluralism, the

relevance of the federal system encapsulates all forms of societal diversities be it ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religion".

The dominant viewpoint, therefore, tends to equate federalism with political stability. True federalism can exist only where there are political stability and democracy. The absence of political stability and democracy and the absence of federalism even if we can observe the constitution and operation of a political system as being federal, for the regional governments is must be able to affect the policymaking activity of the central government (Okolie, 2019).

It needs to be stressed that, while a situation of absolute stability may not be attainable in any society, the relative stability of all organs, as well as general acquiescence to rules, is quite essential for the nation to achieve its desired end. The essentials of the federal system in this regard can, therefore, not be overlooked. This informs why various conceptions of federalism have revolved around the management of actual and potential conflicts within a nation state (Muhammad, 2007).

Experiences of Ethnic Federalism in Other Countries

Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

By ethnic federalism ethnic groups received rights to self-government (Aalen & Hatlebakk, 2008), the states were given autonomy in executive, legislative, and judicial functions (Teshome, 2008), while there were supplies for ethnic groups to be represented in central institutions. Ethnic groups were granted the "unconditional right" to secession (Selassie, 2003), while it is doubtful whether any group could in fact achieve this (Habtu, 2005; Teshome, 2008). The government was aiming not only to reduce inter-ethnic conflict but also to equalize living standards in different areas and add to the working of public institutions locally (Cohen, 1995).

It is positive views on the success of the ethnic federalism system. The federal system produced stability relative to the previous situation of conflict between ethnically which is based on "liberation fronts" and a centralized state (Aalen, 2011).

Zenawism contradicts the political philosophy behind the African Union, in that every African nation agreed to keep the colonial boundaries after independence despite multiple tribes being placed together within national borders according to political analyst Teshome Borago.

Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan

Following the secession in 1971 of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh, the Pakistani government sought ways to accommodate the ethno-nationalist demands of the different groups within what had been West Pakistan. According to 1973 Constitution imposed a federal structure giving autonomy to the four main provinces, each historically identified with an ethno-linguistic group: the Sindhis, Punjabis, Pakhtuns, and Balochis. The political identity of these groups recognized by Constitution, giving them a status distinct from other groups. The provisions for autonomy were, in whatever, fully implemented only in the province of Sindh (M. Khan, 2014)

In 2010 the Constitution was re-introduced, with amendments. This time all four provinces received "formidable autonomy in terms of both financial powers and legislative"(M. Khan, 2014). All in all, the changes were marked by increased "ethnicization", encapsulated in the renaming of North West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ("land of Pakhtuns"). The changes were seen as "an important step forward" in strengthening the provinces, but there seemed to be little willingness to go further towards a fully multi-ethnic structure catering for all groups (Adeney, 2012). This system has been described as "highly counter-productive"(M. Khan, 2014). It has also evoked demands for separate provinces on the part of Hazarewals and Saraikis. Indeed, it has been asserted that "Pakistan is seldom acknowledged as an ethnic federation"(M. Khan, 2014).

A major factor accountable for the federal unit issue in Pakistan is the growing role the Pakistan army has played in the country's politics. In Eric Nordlinger's classification of praetorian role in country's politics (Nordlinger, 1977). the ascendancy of military rule in Pakistan does not preclude the fact that politicians and political parties are key players in the Pakistani political system. Military regimes have always found it useful to rely on the support of politicians and political parties and every military regime in Pakistan has tended to do so (Akbar, 2002).

The role of the federal agencies and central government have dominated the affairs of units under both military regimes and constitutional governments. Since 1947 the constitutional framework in the country has placed the balance of power predominantly in the favour of the Centre. The control of the Centre over the legislative, administrative powers, and economic has bred discontent among the small provinces of Pakistan.

The state is a set of institutions most commonly associated with the bureaucracy–military, while the government functions as an institution, where representatives of the people are chosen directly by the people themselves. The interdependence of Conclusion the relationship between state and government is manifest and the balance between the two institutions is fundamental in newly emerging democracies.

Acceptable distribution of powers between the units Centre is an essential feature of the federalism (Akbar, 2002). Federalism being a popular and practical form of government between the Centre and units is largely supported by an edge of the Centre over the units. The Pakistan constitutional frameworks, the concentration of powers tilted towards the Centre. In all the three constitutions, the federal list was "the richest in terms of the number of subjects and their importance" (S. M. H. Shah, 1994).

Governmental history of Afghanistan

"Traditional inequality" political system, in the form of monarchical governments since ancient times, has been the model of governance in many parts of the world, including Afghanistan. In contemporary Afghanistan, Zahir Shah's kingdom is considered the turning point of the traditional political system of inequality; On the one hand, his reign is the longest and most stable period in the history of contemporary Afghan political developments. On the other hand, for the first time, the traditional system of government was overthrown during the reign of this king with an unprecedented transformation and another type of political system took place.

Zahir Shah introduced a new constitution in 1343 and forbade the royal family from interfering in political affairs, "Members of the royal family cannot be members of parties and engage in political activity" (*Constitution*, 1343).

The political system of "traditional inequality" in Afghanistan was ended by the bloodless coup of Mohammad Dawood, the son of the Shah's uncle and former prime minister, with the announcement of the "Republic of Afghanistan". First, by overthrowing the king, Dawood called himself the first president of the Afghan Republic and by revising the constitution, he declared that the government should be governed by the people. Second, he wanted to create "Pashtunistan" including the Pashtun population on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In 1358, Dawood was ousted from power in the bloody coup by the communists who had helped him in the coup against the Shahi regime. This time, the leaders of the coup, Noor Mohammad Turki and Hafizullah Amin, sought to reform the political system in the name of the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan". (*Basic Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*, 1366). The "authoritarian equality" system in Afghanistan has experienced four tense periods under the leadership four

controversial figures, and finally Najibullah, the last leader of the communist system, was overthrown by Mujahideen groups.

Mojahedin's attempt to establish an Islamic state eventually led "authoritarian inequality" system the contemporary of the Taliban rule. By occupying Kabul, the Taliban consolidated their military power over parts of the country, established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and ruled the country from 1357 to 1380 with the direct support of Pakistan (Saadat, 1396).

After the fall of the Taliban in 1380, the new government of Afghanistan was established with the direct intervention of liberal democratic countries, including the United States of America and its allies. In 1383, the new constitution of the country was prepared based on the constitution of 1343 to facilitate the democratic transition after the Taliban. In general, the governments system in Afghanistan can be seen in the table below.

Table 1: Governments system in Afghanistan

Classification of systems	Governments system in Afghanistan
Liberal democracies	The Kingdom of Zahir Shah (from 1312 to 1352)
Egalitarian authoritarian systems	Muhammad Dawood Republic (from 1352 to 1357)
Traditional inegalitarian systems	Communist regimes (from 1357 to 1371)
Populist systems	The Mojahedin government and the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban (from 1998 to 1998)
Authoritarian inegalitarian systems	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (1381 to 1400)

Source: (Rashed & Asna, 2023).

Social and cultural context

Afghanistan is one of the most ethnic countries. In this country, more than 50 identified tribes (Riphenburg, 2005) these groups and ethnic groups are four ethnic groups Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek the majority (*Minorityrights*, 2023; *World Fact Book*, 2023). So far, there are no accurate statistics on the population of each of the four main tribes in Afghanistan to show what the classification of ethnic groups is, in terms of population, but what is important is that the relationship between these tribes has always been accompanied by hostility and tensions, indicating deep social divides in Afghanistan. The concept of the gap "is a transient conflict that is derived from the conflicts and discriminations in the heart and text of society" Social gaps in Afghanistan, which are sometimes active and sometimes inactive, have always affected socio-political life and developments in this region. The most important of these gaps are the ethnic, religious, and linguistic gaps briefly described.

Ethnic and Cultural Background in Afghanistan

There are seven distinct and ideologically conflicting ethnic groups in the history of Afghanistan. They are "the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimack, Turkmen, and Baloch"(*Constitution*, 1382). Each of them identifies strongly with a country other than Afghanistan. Pashtun ethnic group heavily identifies with their Pashtun brethren in neighboring Pakistan. Individual association leads to Afghans not seeing themselves as citizens of Afghanistan but shows as members of a specific ethnic group (Young, 2007).

Each major ethnic groups are divided in sun categories. for example, the Pashtun is divided between the Ghilzai and the Durrani super tribes. These super tribes have ancient conflicts with each another. The root of serious internal conflict in Afghanistan is back to these two tribes. The country is divided by each conflict in many times across the history of Afghanistan. We see recurring evidence of the same type of internal friction among the other main ethnic groups within the country. Warlords and competition amongst smaller elements within the ethnic groups create this strife. This element has led to a highest degree of ethnocentrism in Afghanistan, causing ethnic groups to look for leadership that only from those within their particular ethnic group.

Many of these sub-ethnic groups have grievances towards each another that lead to sporadic warfare between them. Furthermore, according to history, and culturally, Afghans' see themselves in a reverse western order of hierarchy of belonging. On the contrary, within the western world, people generally see themselves as a member of their country, state, town, and family. It is clear that Afghans understand this in complete reverse order. It is clear that they see themselves as first belonging to their family, extended family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, and then part of Afghanistan. These further compounds ethnic boundary within the country and creates an atmosphere necessitating strong local governance. This has led to local governance and a dislike of external influence upon local authority. Local governmental system in Afghanistan is based on family, clan, tribal, and ethnic backgrounds (Saadat, 1396). In many of its dynamics, it is very similar to a federal system in its makeup. It is a resolution of routine issues at the lowest level of government, raising major issues to a Jirga or meeting of the clan leaders.

Political instability

Afghanistan is a volatile country. While instability is a major issue for the government, the process of governance in Afghanistan and rising ethnic divides exacerbate this instability. Instability in any society is a huge dilemma. In a state of instability, all values, progress, and development processes are at stake and many social norms are slipped. As mentioned before Instability in Afghanistan has been rooted in political system (Rashed & Asna, 2023). In the contemporary history of Afghanistan, power and government have been shared by 29 rulers. It should remind four people (Shah Mahmud, Shah Shuja, Dost Muhammad Khan and Shir Ali Khan) have ruled twice. So, a total of 32 times power has changed hands. in these 32 times, 24 times, power has been violently transferred from hand to hand.

Among these period, eleven rulers have been killed (Taimur, Shah Shuja, Abdul Rahman, Habibullah, Habibullah Kalkani, Nader Shah, Mohammad Dawood, Noor Mohammad Turki, Hafizullah Amin, Najibullah, and Burhanuddin Rabbani); One person has been blinded due to the rod being pulled from both eyes (Shah Zaman), nine rulers have fled the country (Azam Khan, Yaqub Khan, Amanullah, Inayatullah, Zahir Shah, Babrak Carmel, Mullah Omar and Ashraf Ghani) and six people They have taken power based on inheritance (Taimur, Shir Ali Khan, Azam Khan, Yaqub Ali Khan, Inayatullah and Zahir Shah). It is remarkable just only two of the rulers were non-Pashtuns.

Escalation of internal disputes and conflicts

One of the indicators of instability is the disintegration of norms. The government will be weakened and its sovereignty will also be severely slipped, and that is how it loses its dominance in its territory. When the government loses its stability, the mechanism in which the affairs of society are managed, political and social disputes and disputes are resolved, the security of citizens is ensured and the public interests are protected.

Afghanistan has had at least a terrible experience of regulatory and civil wars, it is clearly understood that if ethnic divides deepen and pave the way for an escalation of hostilities and historical knots, one of the consequences is the outbreak of civil war and civil war as it has hit us in all areas in the

past, once again if we enter this vicious and detrimental round, the disasters of the past will be repeated. However, the heads of state have a historical and legal mission to reconsider their domestic policy, Avoid any decisions that lead to internal disputes and exacerbate ethnic divisions, resolve the issue of corruption, refrain from miss elections and displacement of individuals in important decision-making and executive positions and inputs, consider the principle of meritocracy in hiring and appointing people in key positions and other sectors, according to the Constitution Stop discrimination in any case so that Afghanistan can be free from the current crisis.

The Afghan community has ethnic and tribal support in terms of Bakhtiari. Ethnic in this drawer is also among the historical achievements. This gap has always affected the political life of this society, ethnic in Afghanistan has sometimes been active and sometimes inactive, even in passive situations, like volcanoes, which, with the least context, have led to violent conflicts. By examining the history of Afghan supremacy, we will find that these ethnic tensions and conflicts occurred more at the time of the strengthening of central sovereignty, the conditions of the transfer of power or the vacancy of power, the civil wars of jihadi parties in 1992 are one of the examples(Sajjadi, 1391, pp. 61–71). During the post-Bonn government period. In Afghanistan, since the emergence of this group, the Afghan rulers' method of governing other ethnic groups and races and countering the insurgency has been implemented in two or three years: 1- Based on force and threat 2- based on taming 3 - a mixture of the two methods mentioned above. In fact, as Afghanistan's history reviews, it will be clear that the rulers have taken advantage of the authoritarian model of managing ethnic divides in all three forms and its strategy, namely forced homophobia, forced expulsion, and genocide in dealing with ethnic groups. In this regard, Abdul Rahman Khan's actions against Hazaras can be explained, so it can be said that the actions of the ruling group in exacerbating the ethnic divide in Afghanistan have always been one of the main factors. At the moment, the ethnic gap is visible at different levels of Afghan society.

Language gaps

The linguistic gap in Afghanistan, like all other gaps, has affected the country's structures. Pashto, Farsi Dari, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluchi, Mosquito, and ... Each of them has its unique values in the corner of Afghanistan, and the linguistic norms and requirements of the Sake tribes in Afghanistan make serious and significant differences that affect the developments and events of this extraordinary region. Ethnic, religious, and linguistic affluence that has been formed and existed in Afghanistan for years has been considered one of the main obstacles to stability and development in the country. Political systems also usually not only tried to solve it, which itself was one of the factors that intensified it.

The advantages and opportunities of the federal system in Afghanistan, as mentioned earlier, each political system has characteristics, and the success of any particular type requires certain social conditions and contexts. In this section, we will discuss what opportunities federalism will have for Afghanistan and what problems it will solve. According to federal supporters of Afghans, this political system decentralizes power, resolves ethnic crises, ensures public rights and persuasion, and makes it easier for people to support their representatives, it also prevents the dominance of a particular ethnic group and ethnicity over other Groups and ethnicities of Afghans and eliminates the hereditary mentality of power- and the ground for studying in the mother tongue and choosing local officials to develop local people.

Potential Positives of ethnic federalism for Afghanistan

Afghanistan could gain by adopting a federal form of governance with autonomous areas. Grievances harbored by the local populace have shown to be positively affected by moving to this form of government. Afghanistan could effectively use a federal system of governance to negate the effects of the insurgents within their own country.

Ethnic tensions are an inherent issue in Afghanistan, as well as the case study countries. A significant percentage of ethnic tensions were alleviated in all the case study countries following a movement to a federal system of governance with autonomous areas. Success in defusing ethnic tensions resided in the creation of power-sharing and conflict-resolution institutions. This same success can be achieved by separating Afghanistan's ethnic groups into areas with independent jurisdiction over governance, lifestyle, and economic activity.

Afghanistan is in dire need of a viable economic model that promotes enduring development. It is currently struggling with ways to create economic growth with its limited endowments. The autonomous system of governance provides a means to best capitalize on area resources while accommodating local ethnic norms and economic priorities. Such a system has shown the ability to generate enough revenue, in the long run, to share amongst area governments and the central government, advancing the social welfare of all.

Afghanistan needs to increase government penetration throughout the country. The lack of government penetration is a catalyst for insurgencies and secessionist tendencies. Within all three case studies, secessionist activities were decreased by the movement to a federal system of governance with autonomous areas. Insurgent groups became irrelevant through the strengthening of local responsive governance. Secessionist feelings and tendencies were similarly reduced by increases in local sovereignty. And local governance begets lower ethnic tensions and grievances, economic activity, and revenue sharing, and helps increase the level of overall government penetration.

Conclusion

Federalism is a modern inclusiveness concept popularized by the United States of America. There are two categories of Federalism; open federalism and ethnic Federalism. Protecting group self-rule and minority privileges in federal frameworks is possible. federalism offers a good prospect for achieving political stability of especially heterogeneous societies (Muhammad, 2007). As Afghanistan is the most ethnic country and there are more than 50 identified tribes. The major ethnic groups are Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek. Ona the other hand, according to contemporary history of Afghanistan, instability is a major issue for the government, the process of governance and rising ethnic divides exacerbate instability. Instability of Afghanistan has been back to central political system. Afghanistan can be adopting on ehtno-federal form of governance with autonomous areas. the local populace has shown to be positively affected by this form of government. Afghanistan could effectively use a federal system of governance to negate the effects of the insurgents within their own country. And speculate ethnic federalism will lead to political stability in Afghanistan.

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