Analyzing the Position of Mystical Intuition, Imagination and Reason in Mola Sadra and Ibn Arabi Theosophy

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Abstract

The discussion about mystical intuition, imagination and reason has been a main problem for philosophers and mystics and some discussions has been made about the limits of understanding and perception of each concept. Ibn Arabi is one of the biggest Islamic mystics and has remarkable views in this field and his works in the field of mystic are of great importance. Sad Aldin Shirazi, Iranian philosopher from the Safavi era, known as Mola Sadra, which is one of the illuminated philosophers, has done lots of research about Ibn Arabi’s works. In this study, we compare the point of views of these two philosophers and their perception about the understanding the nature of God, while analyzing the opinions of them about reason, imagination and mystical intuition. We have concluded that Mola Sadra, as same as Ibn Arabi, considers reason the first being and the Mohhamadi truth and categorizes it and says that the reason of creatures is limited for understanding God. In his opinion, reason gets help from feeling and imagination to compensate for this flaw which helps it in the form of mystical intuition. Therefore, reason is not in contradiction with imagination and mystical intuition but mystical intuition grows with the help of reason and imagination.

Keywords: Ibn Arabi; Mola Sadra; Reason; Imagination; Intuition

Introduction

1. problem

Reason and imagination and delusion are of important philosophical expressions which are in constant discussion of philosophers. Reason is the most important thing that separates human from other beings. Scientists use interpretations such as self-power, self, wisdom, philosophy and science as the theoretical and practical reason. Ibn Maskooye uses “perceptive power and operative power (1410 lunar: 57) Ibn Sina uses “perceptive power and propulsive operative power (1363 lunar: 96) And Ghazali uses “Knowing and operative power” (1963: 359) To point to these two types of reason. He categorizes wisdom to two type of theoretical and practical reason (same: 134). Ibn Meysam Bahrani considers the self-evolution as wisdom while considering two theoretical and practical power for the human self and calling it “reason”. (Same: 17). Some say they are different in their understandings. Philosophers such as
Ibn Sina in Shafa book, Naraghi in Jame’olsa’adat and Shahzadi Zoori in Resaelolshajara have stated that theoretical reason is related to precepting things that their existence and non-existence is not in the limits of human understanding, while practical reason is in the field of creatures and things which exist and vanish by human choice. Some consider theoretical reason for general science and practical reason for particular affairs to elaborate this subject. Ibn Sina believes that general affairs, though related to action, are related to theoretical reason, such as the knowledge for building a house which won’t lead to its construction but when this thought is put into action, then it’s in the field of practical reason. (See: Ibn Sina 1404 lunar: Second volume: 184, 1413 lunar: volume 2:387) Also, Khaje Nasir-al-din Toose elaborates the relation between the theoretical and practical reason as followed: That the practical mind obtains the particular thought with the help of theoretical reason via deducing the general thought. (Ibid)

Ibn Arabi is one Muslim philosopher who has some views regarding this field. From his perspective, reason has levels and the reason which is near to perfection could enclose to the must-be truth and remove its flaws via mystical intuition. Mola Sadra considers the practical reason as the servant of theoretical reason. Because it’s the theoretical reason which deals with the practical mind to turn the thoughts into actions. So, theoretical reason is the ruler and practical reason is the servant.

So, regarding the relation of imagination and reason, Farabi says that the power of speech is responsible for reason’s understanding and the imaginative power is responsible for imaginative perception and the senses are responsible for sensory perception. (Farabi, 1379: 85) So the imaginative power is a power which preserves and parses and fuses the feeling figures and uses them in the trials of the tangible and reasonable affairs. Farabi uses other interpretation such as appropriate comparison and allegory for trials. (Farabi, 1384: 68)

Therefore, any being is drawn in the imagination at first and then finds his way into the reason and then is put into action.

In this study, we seek to elaborate the perspective of Ibn Arabi and the Persian philosopher via comparing the views of Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra and we answer some questions in the end.

1-1. Study Questions

1- what are the positions of the reason and imagination and feelings in the opinions of Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra?

2- what are the opinions of Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra about the company of reason and mystical intuition?

1-2. Research History

Mehran Rezaei et al, (1392) have discussed the human perception and action in his article “the analysis of the position of the imagination and delusion in the spectrum of human perception and action from the perspective of Sadra-ol-mote’alehin” and has concluded that imagination in the view of Mola Sadra is just store and is not evidence.

Alavi Zade and Taghavi (1388) has described Molana and Ibn Arabi’s opinion in their article “the comparative analysis of the concept of imagination in the perspective of Ibn Arabi and Molana” and has concluded that imagination in related to the pantheism and is very wide and anything with a truth inside is imagination and Molana’s views in Masnavi about imagination are not match with his.
1-3. Research History

This study is done descriptive-analytical and via library method. We first study the books and articles about Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra to find out their views about the matters in hand and then compare them and conclude from them.

2- Discussion

2-1. Imagination

The imagination realm is the medium between the tangibles and abstractions in a middle world which is only perceivable through solid reason in the opinions of mystics and the world which is perceived by the senses is the medium world which is the imaginative figures world, high forms world, soft treasure world, and the abstract matter world. This world is a medium in which the soul becomes material and the matter becomes immaterial. (Carbon, 1380: 279). Aristotle, in his article “On Self”, after analyzing the nature and features of imagination, elaborates the reason of its naming (Aristotle, 427). In his opinion, imagination is along with feeling and doesn't exist without it. Therefore, imagination is something like feeling, except that feeling is along with matter and imagination is without matter. (Aristotle 432).

Imagination provides the possibility for common sense so it could particularly deduce that something with a particular feature is the same thing with that color. If imagination doesn't preserve the face of the subject, it will vanish when the common sense wants to perceive predicates. (Sabzevari: 1383 297).

The power of delusion and conqueror manipulate the imagination and imagination gives them raw data (particular figures) to realize real and mental actions. The conqueror power sometimes combines and lengthens the figures in the imagination and sometimes combines the figures in the imagination and the meanings in the mind (memory). (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1360: 194, Mosleh, 1389: 293, Sabzevari, 1369-1379, volume 5: 71).

2-2. Reason

Reason (Intelligentia in Latin, Ratio and Raisan in France and reason in English and intelligence commonly in France and English (Saliba, 742)), is used for wisdom, cause, mind and Deduction. (Babaei, 235, 237, 381).

Paul Folkier believes that reason is fact calculating and in time, it became knowing math and reasoning and deducing. (Folkier, 79).

2- 3 -1. Imagination and reason in the opinions of Mola Sadra and Ibn Arabi

2-3-1-1. Mola Sadra’s opinions

2-3-1-1-1. Reason

Mola Sadra, in his interpretation of “Osule Kafi”, while talking about the reason, names it as the first creation which is the closest thing to the primal truth and the biggest and the most complete of them. Its unity is numerical and it’s now individual. Mola Sadra has obtained this interpretation from the prophetical quotes: “The first thing God created was the pencil” and “first, God created my soul” and considers reason as the Mohammedi truth (the interpretation of Osule Kafi, 1388: 216).
He uses the Shi’a resources to describe the unity of reason with the Mohammedi truth. Imam Baqer: “When God created reason, he interrogated it. Then he said: “Come forth” so it came forth, then god Said: “Go back” so it went back. Then God said: In the name of my greatness, I haven’t created a creature which I like more than you and I haven’t completed you, except in the human whom I love. So, I only command and forbid and punish and reward thee.”” (the interpretation of Osule Kafi, 1388: 215). The nature of reason is in its divine punishment and responsibility which itself has levels. (Kalini, 1388: 219). According to this interpretation, the highest level is the Mohammedi truth. After that, in a descending order, we have self, nature, figure and face. Therefore, humans’ actions are measured based on their reason and unintelligent people have no responsibility.

The fate of reason which is interpreted by Mola Sadra in this quote of Imam Baqer, is getting closer and closer to God after its descending process which has seven levels.

The monster reason, the first reason (particular reason), the ready reason, the self-passive reason, the useful reason, the potental reason, the active reason. (Ibid: 404).

In the opinion of Mola Sadra, reason is all the reasonable things and the goal is to tie every being which are many with many forms and in reason are many too, to a reasonable being which includes all the meanings, with expansion and unity.

The reason unity is not as same as the numerical unity which is the source of numbers but it is different. The unity in the things and matters becomes more or bigger when something alike is created, because two things are bigger than one of those two things and the result is a change in those two beings. But in reasonable unity, it is the other way. For example, if we consider the letter a, any a is same as this a regarding its quantity (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1383: Volume 3: 338).

The categorization of perception has levels. Just as the categorization of light, our perceptions have a unique truth and their types don’t differ. Its weakest level is sense, its medium level is imagination and its highest level is reason.

Categorization of perception levels in Mola Sadra’s opinion:

Reason
imagination
Sense

The imagination power is a medium which transfer what is presented from the senses to the reason. Therefore, reason has to seek help from senses and imagination. Therefore, perception has three rules: first the matter must exist near sensual power, then enclosing the figure and then the particularity of the evidence.

Reasoning is understanding things regarding their nature and limits and not regarding other things, either by creditability of its own or through other things features. He says the following to differentiate the theoretical and practical reason:

The unity of the wise and the reasonable is one the problems that Mola Sadra has provided some proves to deny it. The unity between the reasonable figure and the unity of two beings itself is not a natural result, and the unity is not the conceptual unity of the reasonable figures with the wise nature but at first, self is a non-concluding affair coming from the unity with reasonable and sensual and imaginative powers and will be illuminated with any figure. The unity of non-concludable with concludable is permitted only by reasonable regulations and there is no cause to refuse it. Sheikh denies the nature movement and particular skepticism; therefore, he denies the unity of the wise and the reasonable. (Ashtiani, 1380: 151).
Sheikh’s prove in summary: there is no difference between a things reason or non-reason if the nature unity between the wise and the reasonable is the same thing before the unity, and if something has been reduced from it, it’s the Wise’s nature. In this case, it must be destroyed, or the reduced part is a state from Wise’s nature states. (Ashtiani, 1380: 153).

There are two theoretical and practical power for self. One for identifying right and wrong and one for good and evil. That is used to identify the obligatory, possible, neutral and this is used for beautiful and evil and permissible. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1382: 240).

The apparent meaning of this expression is that the right and wrong and true and false only exist in the field of theoretical reason’s perceptions and the perceptions of the practical reason seeks to find good and evil which is presumably other than right and wrong. Therefore, Mola Sadra thinks that the general things mean the things which are in the field of identifying the right and wrong and general knowledge of creators and creations and the details are in the field of quality and good and evil.

He considers the movement of the face from the sensual phase to the reasonable phase as a function of nature and self-nature movement from the sense level to the reasoning level. The meaning of sensual abstraction until it’s reasonable is not removing and delaying some of its features and proving others, but its meaning is moving it from the material being to the reasonable being, first moving it to sense and then imagination and then reason. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1382: volume 3: 435).

Therefore, the various tools together could strengthen perception and lead to truth discovery. So, Mola Sadra thinks of reason and imagination as two wings of flight and along and convertible to each other.

Reason is transferred to the natural evolution and connected to the reasonable world via observing details and obtaining numbers and observes the particular truths uniquely and fluently. The observance of trying is the condition of generality. The general meaning of evidence of try existence relies on outer meaning. At the beginning of creation, the meanings and truths are vague an because it’s weak at first because it looks at things from a far place and tries to interpret them with the mind. Self understands truths vaguely and non-concludable which is a condition of imperfect existence. (Ashtiani, 1380: 142).

In Sharh-ol-hedaya, he considers the nobility of theoretical mind only subjectively and says: The theoretical reason is related to the divine sciences, therefore is higher than the practical reason, but basically, the level of science us less than action because science is tool and action is the goal and tool is always less than goal. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1422 lunar: 7).

It’s possible to take practical reason and wisdom higher than theoretical reason and wisdom, because although the theoretical mind stabilizes the thinking and knowledge basis, but through the path of practical mind one can reach a level of evolution that can get a better and higher understanding of god and reach the truths by observing. (Modaresi, 1376: 13).

Calling the thinking talent which is empty of any reasonable perception reason, is probably based on imagery, but the present mind and two recent levels of it truly have perceptive features. Some philosophers remove the ready reason due to its similarity with the potential reason, and name three levels for theoretical reason. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1383: Volume 3: 421) ready reason means the reason with the ability to perceive primal reasonable such as primal, experiences, ... To be able to deduce other reasonable.

The active mind is an abstract being of self which is the subject of human selves and superior to them. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1432 lunar: 578/3). Regarding this, the active mind has two independent and mediumistic natures and exists by itself and also has a being inside ourselves. (Same) but we can’t imagine that everyone could unite with the active mind but this feature is only available for someone who
has followed the path to reach the useful mind. Meaning that the human self in a nature action get past the imagination and sense world and arrive at the reason world.

Mola Sadra, based on mystic point of views and his own observance, categorizes the truth level into three levels and says reason is unable to know two of them. The first level is the weak level, meaning that level of existence but itself which is weak and has stingy ink, such as monster mind and the other one is the full level, which is that level of being which is complete, like God (sadr-al-din shirazi, 1354: 48).

He says about the complete level: Know that knowing Gods name and features which are at the edge of greatness is not possible via philosophical thoughts and discussions. (Ibid, 1363: 609).

Therefore, considers the reasonable knowledge insufficient to obtain the truths and says: “Know that while the human self doesn't go through the filter of imitative knowledge which has come from the speech and doesn't get rid of the theoretical thoughts which are get by using logic with the tool of delusion and imagination for the theoretical reason, it won’t be ready for divine conquer and it’s out of mind to get anything out of the human knowledge. There is a gift in the selves who haven't educated. (same: 48).”

In another place, he says that while human is attached to matter is far from God and his mind and reason are not ready to perceive, even if it’s ok by God. The far he gets from the materialistic attachment, the more he perceives God and the more his reason’s reception. Even so, the human perception towards the truth won’t ever be complete, because the reason power is limited and God is unlimited. In his view, any of scientists and mystics discover and observe with their tools and none of these tools are unlimited.

Mola Sadra says that if human could understand God, then the truth would change, meaning that it’s no more what it has been before. Therefore, it’s impossible to understand God. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1354: 44).”

Therefore, Mola Sadra agrees with the mystics when they say that reason is limited for understanding truth and knowledge about something is for that thing itself or its cause. (Sadr-al-Din Shirzai, 1354: 10).”

Heartily intuition observes a truth from the meaning’s truth and the truth itself but reasonable intuition in the reasoning power appears without the need of the order of deduction. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1363 lunar: 825), Mola Sadra believes that some truth only could be understood by intuition:

و وجوديه معایینات و سریه مشاهدات و باطنیه بمکاشفات الا البها الوصول يمكن لا الموجودات حكم من امثالها و الدقيقه هذه ان واعلم عن شديد توختع مع خلوات في میاهو و برياپوتس الا تحصی لا المشاهدات و المکاشفات هذة... البحیبی القواعد حفظ فيها يکفی لَا الكاذبی امانیه و الوعییه تعا تریعا و الباطنیه شهوتیها و الیبیا اعیاض غن و الانقطاع الخلق صحیحه (Mola Sadra, 1379: v9 108-109.)
2-1-1-2. Imagination

Mola Sadra divides human senses into two groups of inner and outer senses:

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+-------------------+                         +-------------------+
|                  | senses                  |                  |
| Outer             |                         | Inner            |
|                  |                          |                  |
| Common sense,     | evidence, keeper,       | imagination,     |
| imagination,      | conquerer               | delusion,        |
| memory,           |                          | conquerer power  |
| conquerer power   |                          |                  |
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He divides the inner senses into three general categories: He says that imagination is as same as memory but he doesn’t call it memory so it wouldn’t get mistaken for what is the store of delusion. (See: (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1363 lunar: 506).”

The figures which enter the common sense and get precepted enter a store to keep them there. The store to keep these figures is imagination. After vanishing from the outer senses, the figures of tangibles remain in the common sense but it’s not the direct storage for outer senses. (Ibid: 1354 244.)

Mola Sadra says that the abstract concepts are understood by imagination. (See: (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1354 lunar: 361). Therefore, the first evidential power is the imagination, and then they are transferred into the reasoning power. He says that another perceptive power serves delusion as well as imagination: The conquerer power serves delusion and by that, serves imagination (sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1981 lunar, v8: 215) in this expression, Mola Sadra says that the conquerer power serves delusion and delusion is the medium between the reason and conquered power.

He says that imagination is only the store and not evidence and its only performance is to keep figures. In Asfar, to elaborate that imagination is not perceptive, says: If it’s not only the keeper of figures (but evidence), then anything in it must be observant, while they are not. (Ibid, 210)

The nature of self in its early stages of beings is like the nature of being of the weak monster and even weaker, because it’s just power. (Ibid, 1383: 517).”

In the eyes of Mola Sadra, self is something which moves by its nature and its wide from sense to reason, and therefore it could unite with any level of the levels. If human self doesn't achieve full reasonable abstraction and remains in the stage of delusion or imagination, it won't stop here and will keep moving until arriving at the human self-world and the self-level. (Akhavan nabavi, 1393: 238).”

Self is Dependent on potential and action just like other beings. (Mola Sadra, v3: 193) but it’s all in it and exists just like it’s original. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1363 lunar:522). On the other hand, the sensual and imaginary perception of self are the creator of these figures without appearing in the self (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1352 lunar: 34-35) while the reasonable perceptions of self evolve towards those perceptions and
connects with them, the self doesn't create them because these figures are greater and better than self. (Javadi Amoli, 1375: 1/162).”

Imagination is the presence of the quantitative figures with their size and quantity near self, not appearing but standing by him with self-unity with them from the perspective of imaginative power. (Sadr-al-Din Shirazi, 1382 lunar:Volume 3:382) in fact, the sensory perception leaves an effect on the mind after vanishing, or as old ones say, after sensing a figure with the sensory perception, it becomes another figure in the imagination or memory and remains and human can call back that figure any time he wants and imagine that thing.

2 -2. The opinions of Ibn Arabi

2-2-1. reason

In the book “Fosus-ol-hekam”, after some discussions about the unity and the face of God, he talks about fixed eyes and say and the first eye, the sum of fixed eyes appears as reason which is the first God created. (Parsa, 1366: 6-7) therefore, the talking self is the same as reason which is in the high world and percepts generalities and abstraction therefore it's called reason and it also percepts details and belongings, therefore called self. (Same: 9) Therefore, Ibn Arabi has used the word talking self instead of theoretical reason. Meaning that anything which appears in the world of generality perception becomes details which is called the world of forms.

Despite this, the general mind which is in the first eye, is different from the reason that makes human and animal different. Ibn Arabi says: “The reason imitates imagination and imagination imitates senses and imagination needs memory to keep affair, because imagination is not able to keep perception, and all their powers could make mistakes.” (Ibn Arabi, 1329: 1/94) he describes inspiration and the knowledge coming from it in “fotoohat Makie”. In this description, he talks about the features of reason because science is an inspiration beyond reason, and he says:

Reason and thought are imitators just human itself. God created other senses than reason in human which serve the reason and reason imitates what is given to it by these powers and these powers have limits and non could act on other powers. Such as memory, imagination and sensory perceptions such as touch, smell, hearing, seeing and each and every one of these powers are limited. Reason imitates these powers to gain knowledge and needs them in order to sentence and it’s not naturally able to give any sentence about something not felt. 1329). 1/94.)

The theoretical mind, is not only unable to understand the higher truth, but also unable to know about the obligations, sins and allowed things, because this knowledge is exclusive for prophets who narrate the news of truth.

While the sight power is not able to understand reasonable, the reason can't see without the sight power, and reason can't know the nature and the features of God and his wisdom without the medium of truth. Therefore, reason relies on the sight power, while the sight power is in a lower position than reason, so how can it be able to understand a creature higher than him? Ibn Arabi says: “therefore reason needs God in order to understand the higher truth and his features and sentences which are higher than reason” (Ibid 1/94 95.)

Ibn Arabi divides the knowledge of reason into two parts of necessary and theoretical and believes that only necessary things are for natural reason, but theoretical knowledge is for Adventitious reason and comes after cause. Since the necessary knowledge of reason is limited, it could not understand God with them. on the other hand, while presenting several reasons for this inability, there is a solution for this problem and based on his intuitive findings, he believes that reason, when exposed to the divine
light, will be enlightened with this light and accepts divine truth. In this position, with all the limitations
and flaws, the reason has no limitations for accepting.

The reason could discover truths with divine interference, and is not unlimited regarding
acceptance. (Ibid: 1329: 94/95.)

2-2-2. Imagination

Ibn Arabi says the world represents the name of Allah and Allah sums up all the divine names,
therefore the world includes all the names and the darkness of world is because of that the shadow must
exist so things could be revealed in it. World is the shadow of God. (See: Kharazmi, 1376: 101).”

Ibn Arabi says that the imagination world is the limbo because it’s the most precise interpretation
for what is between the world phenomenon’s and their truth. He considers this limbo in each of five
worlds and says it’s the link between the bipolar worlds which are the tangible and reasonable world.

Any imaginative figure which sums the quantity of the outer world and the unity of the evidence,
is a limbo between the darkness of the material world and the light of the spiritual world. Imagination is
referred to the self-realm, which is the level of being and perception which is between the soul and the
body. Self is awareness and perception, but we can’t separate the meanings of these perceptions from the
vagueness which comes exactly from its nature. (Chitik, 1384: 89).”

This world, in Ibn Arabi’s opinion, the real world is the world in which the things figures are
created between the softness and density and between the just spirituality and just materialism. “The
imagination world is a world in which the truth appears in symbols or cipher, spirits become bodies and
bodies become spirits. On the other hand, there is the just form or separate imagination world which is the
spectrum of human imagination which reflects the figures of the forms world and just imagination like a
mirror.” (Ibn Arabi, 1370: 18).”

He says that dreams and imagination are linked because both are paraphrasable. As said by the
holy prophet, people of this world are asleep and death is awakening. All the world is imagination and we
must pass the appearance to get to the meaning. (Jahangiri, 1361: 319) Ibn Arabi says about Ibrahim’s
dream that what God meant by sacrifice is the great slaughter. (See: Khajavi, 1381: 272).”

Imagination is used in two meanings in the limitations of the small world. One meaning is the
self, because it’s both one and many. It’s similar to demon and evil for the same reason. The second
meaning, in the small world of imagination, matches one the self-powers.Body and soul have no common
side, and are connected via self which is the limbo between these two. Imagination, in this sense, is the
special power which makes tangible affairs abstract and save them in the memory, on the other hand,
gives body to the abstract affairs which are precepted by heart and gives them face and figure. (See:
Chitik, 1384: 116).”

Ibn Arabi says that we have four minds: Divine mind, spiritual mind, self-mind and evil mind
(ibn Arabi, 1381:263) he differentiates the dream which is not real and the dream which is. (Kakaii, 1382:
525).”

In his opinion, imagination, in its most limited meaning, is a particular power of self which is the
integration of tangibles with face and figure and reasonable which don’t, therefore, though imaginative
figures come from the knowledge without faces, but they are percepts sensually and as Sheikh often says,
they show meanings which are extrasensory. (Chitik, 1384: 89).

The mystic who observes the word with presence science and sees the phenomena with his eyes is
closer to the truth than the scientist who seeks to find the truth using science and deduction tools. Mystic,
in the highest levels of intuition, finds out that there is no relation of cause and effect, but all the
perceptions and thoughts and subjects and thinker, are a demonstration of God and the preceptor is God who sees himself in the mirror of creation and mystic looks at things with the eye of truth. (Ibn Arabi, 1361: Forth chapter)

In a sense, imagination is the opposite of god. The world against God equals void but on the other hand, it exists. Therefore, when sheikh says that world is but imagination, he means the things other than God. In the second meaning, imagination is a medium inside the heart of the great world, between the tangibles and reasonable or light and dark. Therefore, there is a limbo in between which relatively has both sides features. (See: Chitik, 1384:114).

3. Comparing the Opinions of Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra and Conclusion

In general, Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra don’t consider the particular reason as the reason and say that reason is only worthy when used with mystical intuition. In Ibn Arabi’s opinion, reason has a special realm and has its own special perceptions but mysticism and mystical intuition is the same as educated and deduced reason. Mola Sadra and Ibn Arabi’s mysticism is not against reason but accept it to find the truth and arrive at the destination.

There is no difference in the categorizations of the reason worlds in the eyes of their two thinkers and consider the reason as the first creation and in the same level with the Mohammedi truth which quantity happens after that and the descending begins and reason is divided into lower levels.

Ibn Arabi believes that the discoverable meanings find a reasonable frame in the form of theoretical mysticism. He says that reason is limited regarding thinking but unlimited regarding acceptance: “Reason accepts the divine knowledge without limitation and it may consider an affair impossible because of its thinking but it admits that it’s not impossible related to God” (See: Ibn Arabi. Bi ta, v1: 41).

Mola Sadra also says: Reason has the ability to understand mystical discoveries but on the other hand, it’s limited to understand some hidden truths through some lower power called sense. Reason understands the mystical knowledge after arriving at the destination, such that it understands sensual knowledge after precepting them, therefore it understands the intuitional knowledges with a higher power and sensual knowledges with a lower power. The secret to this discoveries and observances is the purity of human nature and balance of body and spirit. And “abstract soul” creates lean reason and wisdom in “soul abstraction” and gives causes to the Islamic knowledges in the divine wide knowledge. (See: Sadral-Din Shirazi, 1379 lunar: 234-237.)

In Ibn Arabi’s opinions, imagination is the limbo between the tangible and reasonable worlds which could intuit God in its demonstration. While reason understands God in its limits. Imagination has clarity and is like mirror which reflects figures, therefore what is precepted by senses reaches the reason through imagination which is like a mirror. Mola sadra, as same as Ibn Arabi, Considers imagination as a medium between sense and reason. Therefore, the connection of imagination and reason needs sense and this shows the limit of reason.

To demonstrate the relation of sense and reason and imagination in the eyes of Ibn Arabi, we can draw the following graph:
As seen in this graph, the convergence point of sensual power and discovery and inspiration is imagination, therefore we can conclude why imagination is called a limbo. On the other hand, Ibn Arabi says reason discovers and gets inspirations, therefore he admits the importance of the relation with religion. Therefore, it’s obvious that Ibn Arabi and Mola Sadra have got close to mysticism under the light of east thoughts, and consider reason and imagination as a tool to reach the higher truth.

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