



Social Movement based on Religiosity as a New Model of Social Movements in Jakarta (The 212 Social Movement in Jakarta 2016)

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Abstract

Social movements can be understood as a group of people organized in self-awareness that continuously challenges the existing system and values. This study aims to read the phenomenon of the 212 Movement (2016) in Jakarta, Indonesia using the perspective of the theory of social movements (1848-2013). This research used qualitative approach with descriptive methods. Data collected through observation, interviews and analysis of literatures and news media. This case study found the Movement 212 was able to mobilize millions of people including the category of the Social movement Based on Religiosity because militancy that mingled with voluntary attitudes that were seen in the behavior of the figures and the mass of the action. The religious basis is the main motive for the new social movement 212. The 295.8 km long march carried out by the Ciamis community led by K.H. Nonop Hanafi towards the Jakarta National Monument which later inspired the Bogor and Bekasi people to do the same is a fact of militancy and voluntary which is carried out with a high and sincere awareness on the basis of their religiosity. There are five main actors of this movement, K. H. Nonop Hanafi, Bachtiar Nasir, Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, Muhammad Alkathath, and Habieb Rizieq Shihab. This movement has a semi-moderate Islamic ideology with the Islamic model Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah. The implication of this research is the New 212 Social Movement can uphold Islamic values by upholding the law against what they call the Islamic oppressors. And the other side, the New 212 Social Movement can be strengthening ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic brotherhood), ukhuwah wathoniyah (nationalism), and demanding justice for all the people of Indonesia.

Keywords: Movement 212; Social Movement; New Social Movement; New Social Movement based on Religiosity

Introduction

In this social movements nowadays, global phenomena and local political present two entities that cannot be separated from each other (Caoutte & Tadem, 2013). According to Lee and Shin (2015) social movements can originate from a form of social tension interpreted as income polarization indexes, it is quite common to include income polarization indexes and indexes as special cases. This research is based on Social movement theory. A sociological theory that developed from research related to the collective phenomenon of society that has been moving to overcome the surrounding social problems since the 19-

M century. As we know, social movement is the Black Lives Matter which began by protesting Ferguson in the form of lines (Clayton, 2018). The term "social movement" was introduced in 1848 by the German sociologist Lorenz von Stein (1848) in his book *Socialist and Communist Movements* since the Third French Revolution (1848). Lorenz von Stein (1848) introduced social movement to the current academic discussion. Historically social movements were born from situations faced by society because of injustice and arbitrary attitudes towards the people (Comas, Shrivastava, & Martin, 2014). In other words, social movements are born as a reaction to something they don't want or want to change policies because they are considered unfair. Like social accountability as a social movement outcome as a protest in a Chinese city (Almen & Burell, 2018). In the other side, Charles Tilly (2004) in *Social movements: 1768-2004* defines social movement as a series of actions that are sustainable, showing and conveying to ordinary people to make joint claims against other groups. In addition, social movement study exists largely in the field of sociology area and concern on social cause (Daellenbach & Parkinson, 2017).

According to Tarrow (1994) social movement, collective action and politics defines as a joint challenge (for certain political elites) by people with a common goal and solidarity with continuous interaction against their political opponents. Specifically separates social movements from political parties and defense groups. In addition, the study of political sociology such as social movement is often understood as a phenomenon of social participation in community relation to external entities (Parra, & Baez, 2016). In general, it can be seen as an instrument of power relations between society and more powerful entities. Society tends to have power compared to dominant entities, such as state or private (business). In certain situations, social movements become efficient instruments in voicing the interests of the community. For the movers, social movements are often positioned like community loudspeakers so that people's interests and desires are heard (Durac, 2015).


Herbert Blumer (1969) formulated Social movement as a large number of people acting together on behalf of a number of goals or ideas. Based on Misel (2004) in his book about the theory of social movements explained that social movement as a set of non-institutionalized beliefs and actions carried out by a group of people to advance or hinder change in society. In the other side, Meyer and Tarrow (1998) from their work about social movement society, incorporate all the features mentioned above and propose a more inclusive definition of social movements, namely: shared challenges, based on shared goals and solidarity, in ongoing interaction with elite groups, rivals or enemies, and authority holders. Habermas (2009) explained the phenomenon of social movements argues that social movements are understood as defensive relations to defend the public and private sphere of individuals against the inroad of the state system and market economy. Habermas's perspective illustrates that something is called a social movement if there is a defensive relationship between members of the community who are consolidated to protect their public and private spaces by resisting pressure from the state (state system) and the market economy (market economy).

According to Giddens (2013), social movements are interpreted as collective efforts to pursue shared interests or movements to achieve common goals or joint movements through collective action (action collective) outside established institutions. To bridge the weaknesses of each of the social movement theories stated above, in 1995 Mc Adam, Tarrow and Tilly met and tried to collaborate in integrating a series of discussion series and seminars absorbing the opinions and criticisms of Social movement academics about existing concepts and concepts Contentious Politics that they will submit. And in 2001, their work *Dynamics of Contentious* was published. In their work, they offer a very dynamic approach in analyzing a large series of events of the movement, both new social movements, the Revolution, Nationalism, and Democratization wherever they occur.

In the book, the components of mechanisms and processes such as the structure of political opportunity, the structure of mobilization and so on serve as subjects. Not an object. In other words, these components are used as verbs, not nouns. Based on the above notions, there are several things that need to

be noted as characteristics inherent in Social movements (Sadikin, 2005). According to sociologists, the term collective behavior literally refers to the behavior and forms of extra-institutional (non-institutional) social events. This sentence is used by the American Sociological Association to refer to collective behavior and social movements. Social movements always have a goal to make social change or to maintain a condition. That means, the purpose of a group of people to carry out social movements is not always realized by the motive for change, because it can be realized or not, social movements are carried out to "maintain" the situation (status quo). Social movements are not identical with political movements involved in the struggle for power directly. Social movements are organized collective behavior, both formal and not. Social movements are symptoms that are born in conflicting social conditions.

Social movements do not seem to be continuous because they have cycles, like a life cycle. The cycle of social movements by sociology scientists is described more or less as follows: (1) created, (2) growing, (3) achieving the ultimate goal or following (4) failure, (5) being co-opted and (6) losing enthusiasm. The following are the dynamics of the stages or cycles of social movements which were adapted from the perspectives of Blumer (1969), Mauss (1975) and Tilly (1978):



Adapted from Blumer (1969), Mauss (1975), and Tilly (1978)

The new social movement is essentially the development of previous Social movement theories. This theory is based in Western Europe. As Laclau and Mouffe consider in (Fakih, 1996) the new social movement as an alternative search capital for "stagnation" or "congestion" from the Marxist approach. In the new social movement, there is a slogan that reads "There are many Alternative" (Pulungan and Abimanyu, 2005). The new social movement began to emerge and develop since the mid-1960s. The new social movement exists as an alternative to the principles, strategies, actions or ideological choices of the views of traditional Marxist theory which emphasizes the problem of class struggle.

The New social movement is a movement separate from the previous Social movement which is colored by the traditional class politics of the labor movement. The fundamental difference is in terms of objectives, ideology, strategy, tactics, and participants. Social movements tend to be thick with class dimensions (Marxian) which are divided into dichotomies of the bourgeois and proletarian classes; moves around the economic problem / economic re-distribution which is closely related to the times when the economic dynamics of western countries entered the industrial period and thick with the aim to change the system (overthrowing power) radically and revolutionarily.

What makes a new social movement? Most theorists see it in terms of conflictual collective behavior that creates new cultural and social spaces. According to Offe (1985) the new social movement was seen as a politicized civil society institution, and because it redefined institutional political boundaries, Alberto Melluci in Vahabzedah (2001) saw the new social movement as a new way of understanding the world

and defying the cultural rules of domination based on symbolic reasons; also as a creation of a new identity that contains demands that cannot be negotiated, as expressed by Coehan in Outhwaite (1992) while Ulrich Beck declared the New social movement as a new social articulation that crystallizes new experiences and problems experienced and faced together, as a result of general disintegration experience based economics. The significance given to these notions to the New social movement is that the Social movement gains new awareness of its capacity to produce new meanings and new forms of life and social action.

Within the theoretical framework above, social movement is put into two perspectives. As an expression of communicational rationalization, the new social movement questions the validation of existing world life patterns, such as norms and legitimacy, and then expands public space. As a defensive movement, the new social movement opposes pathological disturbances to world life, which are colonized based on systematic political and economic mechanisms. The new social movement paradigm rests on two main claims: first, the new social movement is a product of the transition from the industrial economy to the post-industrial one. Second, the new social movement is unique and different from the Social movement in the industrial era. Whereas the Traditional Movement usually places more emphasis on economic-material goals as the Labor Movement, while the New social movement tends to avoid those goals which set goals that are non-economic-material.

Social tension and political tension rose one year prior to Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta 2017. Social and political dynamics appear to coloring the social and political life of Jakarta. A number of social consolidations by Jakarta citizens and political consolidations by a number of political parties took place. In fact, a number of media reported on a large scale in the previous year, especially in 2016. The heightening of social and political tension in the context of social consolidation can be seen from the emergence of a number of communities that were formed ahead of the political contestation of Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta 2017. For example, it can be observed from the emergence of the Jakarta Muslim Governor Movement (GMJ) as well as the National Movement for Guarding the Indonesian Ulama Council (GNPF MUI). The Islamic organization of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) also found its momentum to be actively involved in Jakarta's socio-political dynamics in 2016.

Meanwhile, the heightening of political tension in the one year before Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta 2017 can be seen from the consolidation of political parties by holding several meetings. For example, starting from the emergence of the Family Coalition for the Governor of Jakarta, which was driven by all political parties driven by the *Partai Dekomrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDIP). This coalition seems to be carried out to face the steps of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) who will advance through independent or individual channels. Then came the Cikeas meeting (the residence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY, leader of the Democratic Party), the Hambalang meeting (the residence of Prabowo Subianto, leader of the Gerindra Party). In the middle of 2016 and the end of September 2016 the political tension was increasing along with the increasing social tension. This was triggered by three important events. First, incidents of social and political consolidation of Jakarta's Muslim community in response to Ahok's intention to re-nominate as a candidate of Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta 2017. Third is the thousand island incident when Ahok gave a speech in front of the Thousand Islands Regency government officials at the end of September 2016 related to his words about Almaidah Sur'ah in Muslim Qur'an paragraph 51.

The event of the Thousand Islands then triggered a number of Muslims to make a protest movement by stating that Ahok had blasphemed the Qur'an and Ulama by saying "do not want to be lied to using almaidah paragraph 51". After the Thousand Islands incident, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa related to the Non-Muslim Governor. A number of Muslims moved to protest the blasphemy and the rejection of the non-Muslim governor through a number of demonstrations. The Muslim protest movement was driven by GNPF MUI Movement (GNPF MUI). The protest movement

took place in October and expanded into a large social movement in November (4/11) and December 2016 (2/12). The socio-political situation in Jakarta is experiencing tension because the large protest movement has then dragged a number of national political elites, national figures and even the former President of the Republic of Indonesia. The socio-political situation in Jakarta for certain business people and ethnic groups is quite tense. The issue of intolerance becomes a national issue. A number of investors and foreign citizens' concerns have arisen along with the tension between the political elite. No half-hearted, tensions occur between the President in power with the former President 2004-2014.

By using the perspective above the 212 Movement that occurred in Jakarta at the end of 2016 does not appear to have a specific economic-material purpose but rather an immaterial purpose. Preliminary data obtained by researchers from secondary sources of the mass media show that the purpose of the 212 Movement is more visible in religious goals than economic-material and also political objectives. With this analysis the 212 Movement is possible to be positioned as a new social movement Based on religiosity. The basis of religiosity appears to be more visible in the patterns of movement, goals and actors. In this context the researcher will dig deeper into the research. From the point of view of the actors of the movement when quoting Offe (1985), the 212 Movement meets three sectors of the movement actors. As according to Offe in Putra (2006) which states that the actors or participants of the New social movement come from three main sectors, namely: (1) New Middle Classes, (2) Old middle class elements (farmers, shop owners and art producers) , and (3) People who occupy peripheral positions who are not too involved in the labor market, such as students, housewives, and retirees.

Secondary data shows that the 212 movement actors belong to the new middle-class category (Badrun, 2018). With the perspective of the theory, this study among others will reveal more deeply about the 212 movement actors along with the objectives to be achieved. The interesting of this research that has attracted the attention of researchers related to the above phenomenon is the enlargement of social movements that occurred on December 2, 2016 or known as the 212 Movement because the movement was able to present millions of periods without riots and was effectively able to force President Jokowi to attend in the midst of millions of Muslims. This is a phenomenon of new social movements that is interesting to study. Observing the phenomenon of the 212 movements in Jakarta that are enlarged is able to move millions of people without violence is encouraging researchers to ask a number of important research questions. (1) Why did the 212 Movement appear in Jakarta? (2) How did the 212 Movement emerge? (3) What did 212 Movement can be categorized as a new social movement? (4) what category position does 212 Movement be placed in the context of Social movement by using social movement theory in? What are the indicators? (5) What ideology is behind the 212 Social movement? (6) Who are the 212 social movement actors? (7) What are the Objectives of 212 social movement?

Methods

This study used a qualitative approach with case study research (Walker, 2002). According to Gogdan and Guba in Moleong (2006) stated that the qualitative approach is a research procedure that produces descriptive data in the form of narrative words, images and not numbers. The narrative of words is based on research findings through the stages of data collection, making field notes, making interview transcripts, coding, making research memos, mapping findings, finding schemes, analyzing findings and narrating them. Case studies show how the new 212 Social Movement appears in Jakarta (Hazen, 2009). The selection of informants is carried out by selecting informants who represent representatives of social movement actors, organizers of the organizations involved and sympathizers involved in the Jakarta 212 movement. Data collected through in-depth interview techniques, observation, and study of media documentation and other documents. Data triangulation was also carried out to determine the validity of the research findings data.

Result and Discussion

Findings

Based on the interview and observation in social movement 212, author find the answer of the research questions are (1) Why did the 212 Movement appear in Jakarta? (2) How did the 212 Movement emerge? (3) What did 212 Movement can be categorized as a new social movement? (4) what category position does 212 Movement be placed in the context of social movement by using social movement theory in? What are the indicators? (5) What ideology is behind the 212 social movement? (6) Who are the 212 social movement actors? (7) What are the Objectives of 212 social movement?

The Dynamics of the Emergence and Development of the 2016 Protest Movement

The 212 movement did not emerge suddenly but through a dynamic related to the socio-political and economic conditions that occurred in Jakarta. The socio-political reality that had taken place before had an influence on the emergence of the 212 movement. What happened before the 212 movement? There are at least three conditions that contributed to the birth of the 212 movement namely social conditions, political conditions and economic conditions. Jakarta's social conditions did experience high social tension before 212 movement. The increase in social tension was triggered by the steps of the Governor of Jakarta 2014-2017, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama alias Ahok who carried out evictions in a number of urban slums and urban areas in Jakarta.

Ahok step later triggered the presence of the Community Village Forum (FKK) community which was driven by an influential Catholic figure, Father Sandyawan. Even supported by eccentric figures, business people, as well as artists, Jaya Suprana. The most prominent protest in the Community Village Forum (FKK) was carried out against Bukit Duri district who led to forced evictions and then pushed FKK to bring the case to court and eventually the Bukit Duri district were won and Bukit Duri district rights paid by elected Governor Anies Baswedan on behalf of the Jakarta government. The social reality (conflict of Bukit Duri district) triggered the high social tension of the people face to face with the authorities of Jakarta. This rising social condition then led to the emergence of consolidations between social groups in Jakarta and triggered the emergence of protest movements in the urban village community both directly and through social media. Such a pattern also occurs in fishing communities on the north coast of Jakarta, as happened in Muara Angke district of Jakarta when the process of building the island of Reclamation was permitted by Jakarta government and implemented by the private sector. The protest movement of the Muara Angke society and surrounding fishing communities was shown by the boat people movement and they chose to stay in their boats after their seafront houses were evicted, this also happened in the North Jakarta at Penjaringan Fish Market area. The people of the fishing village of the north of Jakarta also staged a protest movement by throwing stones at Ahok and other officials when they came to meet the fishermen at Muara Angke district. This pattern also happened before in North Jakarta which is in Koja district, even Ahok's car was hit by a stone thrown by residents.


Actually, Muara Angke society protests have occurred since February 2016 because more than 100 residents' homes near Muara Angke river were evicted by Civil service police Unit on Ahok's orders as the Governor of Jakarta at that time. These facts show that the social problems of the citizens of Jakarta related to the right to live in their own homes have been disturbed by the Jakarta government by eviction thus triggering a protest movement. In addition to the social conditions that triggered the protest movement, political conditions were very dynamic, especially regarding the nomination of Ahok as a candidate for Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta 2017. Ahok problem was political because he was going to run through an independent path for a candidate for Governor. Ahok problem is a matter of politics

because Ahok political communication often triggers high political tension. Not only the political tension of Jakarta even nationally. Ahok became a separate political factor that triggered the protest movement at that time.

National political tensions then escalated. Among the triggers is related to several facts that show Jokowi is silent in the Ahok case. Both the matter of the Sumber Waras Hospital swap, the Jakarta Bay beach reclamation, and the religious blasphemy event conducted by Ahok during a speech in front of the thousand islands in September 2016. The protest movement then emerged on October 14 and November 4. In the two protests President Jokowi appeared to defend Ahok. Jokowi actually left the Palace to Soekarno Hatta Airport and did not want to meet the demonstrators on 4 November 2016. Jokowi then held a Roadshow to a number of religious scholars, Islamic organizations, even to the headquarters of the Police and Army main headquarters, and invited prominent figures Islamic leaders to the State Palace, minus the figure of the National Movement for Defending Fatwa MUI (GNPF MUI) as the main motor of the protest movement.

The escalating political situation heats up when Jokowi holds a Press Conference on the night of November 4, 2016 which mentions that there are intellectual political actors who have moved the November 4, 2016 protest movement and is seen as an attempt to rebel against legitimate power. President Jokowi's attitude was so panicked that it only heightened Jakarta's political tension even nationally, especially when it was accompanied by the arrest of a number of national figures who had been at odds with Jokowi as against Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, and others. The political situation in the aftermath of November 4, 2016 did not also decrease in weight, but even led to the emergence of a larger movement which was later called the 212 movement. In addition to the social and political conditions as narrated above, actually Jakarta's economic conditions also triggered the emergence of the protest movement. Economic conditions at the time of the emergence of the October and November 2016 protest movements were not okay. Because economic data at the time (Korindo Sekuritas, 2016) showed a situation that was not so encouraging, the inflation rate was 3.8 to 4.2%, the growth rate did not shift about 5%, there was an increase in fuel and electricity tariffs, the ratio reached the figure 3.9 and more than 380,000 Jakarta residents are still classified as poor. In the midst of the socio-political conditions which heightened economic conditions that also did not improve had experienced a kind of accumulation that led to protest movements which were then consolidated into social movements.

Schematic Picture 1.
The Dynamics and Factors of the 2016 Jakarta Protest Movement



Source: Researcher's analysis of 2016 field data

The Main Issue of the 2016 Protest Movement

Based on observations by researchers in the field, it was found clearly that the main issue in the protest movement of October 14th, November 4th and December 2nd 2016 was law enforcement on the blasphemy of religion allegedly committed by Ahok. These actions gave an important message so that the legal process against alleged blasphemy by Ahok alias Basuki Tjahaya Purnama who happened to be one of the candidates for Gubernatorial Election of Jakarta 2017, must be carried out fairly without any political intervention from anyone including Jokowi's intervention as President.

Because in our demands, there is no demand to cancel Ahok nomination as Governor, even if Ahok said Muslims, we must continue to make lawsuits until the law is truly upheld (Dr. Zaitun Rasmin, one of the GNPF figures, 2016)

According to Dr. Zaitun Rasmin in the Trijaya FM Radio Discussion who is also a researcher as one of the panelists in the discussion said that the demonstration actions led by the GNPF MUI were not related to the 2017 DKI Jakarta elections but were purely for the law to be upheld in the case of blasphemy by Ahok. The main issue of the 2016 protest movement on November 4th night was shifted by President Jokowi during a press conference because it mentioned the existence of political actors riding the agenda of the action. The main issue of law enforcement is blurred. During Jokowi's meeting with Megawati on November 21st, Jokowi then repeated again, revealing that on the November and December action agenda there were intellectual actors and treason efforts towards the state. Instantly the main issue of law enforcement against the alleged blasphemy case committed by Ahok disappeared for a while. This happened because the issue of political actors and Makar became a trending topic at the end of November 2016. The contestation of issues in the mass media between law enforcement and treason then encouraged the emergence of a consolidation of the government's political elite and the consolidation of GNPF figures. The GNPF meetings then agreed on an action agenda 212.

From Protest Movement to Social Movement

Protest movement due to social, political and economic conditions that occurred on October 14th and November 4th, 2016 which culminated with the main issue of law enforcement because of the case of religious blasphemy carried out by Ahok on September 27, 2016 on the island of a thousand followed by President Jokowi's response that did not meet the demonstrators and through a press conference said there were political actors behind the movement and said there was an attempted rebellion, which had driven the demonstrators who were members of the National Movement for Defending Fatwa (GNPF) of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). The protest movement from October 14th became even bigger with the November 4th protest movement or the escalation of the movement and the masses had disturbed the researchers' curiosity that what later caused the escalation to escalate? One of the main triggers for the growing protest movement was September 27th, 2016 incident on Pramuka Island, Kepulauan Kepulauan District. On September 27th, 2016 Ahok as the Governor of Jakarta conducted a working visit on Pramuka Island, Thousand Islands.

On September 27th, 2016 Ahok came to Pramuka Island to review the grouper cultivation empowerment program. According to him, the program will continue even though he will not be re-elected as governor in the February 2017 governor election so that citizens do not have to vote for it merely to want the program to continue. But in the middle of the speech came Ahok statement which then triggered a growing protest movement because the statement was considered by some Muslims as blasphemy. The following is Ahok sentence which triggers accusations on him as a blasphemous of Islam:


"You could be in the hearts of men and women, do not choose me because I was lied to using Al-Maidah 51 letters. That is the right of you. If you feel you don't you can choose for fear of going to hell, being fooled, that is, oh that's okay, because this is your personal calling, ladies and gentlemen" (BBC, 2016).

Ahok statement then spread on social media after Buni Yani uploaded a video taken from the DKI Jakarta regional government website to a Facebook account on October 6th, 2016. Even though Ahok on October 10, 2016 apologized to the Muslims for what he said, it was considered by many Muslims not to discourage legal proceedings from him which had to be upheld. The attempt to report Ahok to the Police was carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), then the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) of South Sumatra, followed by other Islamic organizations. On October 11th, 2016 the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa or called MUI Religious Opinion and Attitude signed by MUI General Chairperson K.H.Ma'ruf Amin and MUI General Secretary Dr. H.Anwar Abbas. One of the important points of the MUI Fatwa is that the statement of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama or Ahok is categorized as insulting the Qur'an and or insulting scholars who have legal consequences (Based on the Opinions and Religious Attitudes of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued on October 11th 2016). This fatwa is what the GNPF MUI defended by carrying out Islamic defense actions. Jakarta social and political tension heats up until then on October 14th, 2016 tens of thousands of Muslims from various mass organizations staged a protest movement in front of the City Hall of DKI Jakarta. The demonstrators demanded that Ahok be sentenced immediately. At that time the demonstration took place chaos. Ten days after the demonstration on October 24th, Ahok went to the Criminal Investigation Police Headquarters to provide clarification regarding what he said.

Apology and clarification of Ahok to the Criminal Investigation Police Headquarters did not dampen some Muslims to hold a demonstration. On 4 November 2016 a demonstration was made so that the law was enforced in the blasphemy case by Ahok. Hundreds of thousands of people rallied in front of the State Palace. The rally involved the GNPF MUI, founder of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) Habieb Rizieq Shihab and a number of DPR members such as Fadli Zon, Fahri Hamzah, etc. The demonstrators besides demanding the enforcement of the law for religious offenders, they also demanded to meet President Jokowi. Jokowi did not meet with the demonstrators but the demonstrators were finally met by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who promised to resolve the case within two weeks. On November 4, 2016 researchers conducted direct observations in the field from the direction of Cikini (Direct observations by researchers in the field on November 4th, 2016 until sunset).

The November 4th 2016 rally was initially peaceful until the afternoon. But when entering the night of the action in front of the Merdeka Palace involved clashes with the police and in several corners of the city of Jakarta, especially in northern Jakarta there was chaos that could soon be overcome. Researchers monitor the events of the night second by second through the Elshinta Radio 90.00 FM live radio (Monitor directly on air Elshinta Radio 90.00 FM on the night on November 4th until the president Jokowi press conference at midnight).

The protest movement through the demonstrations on October 14th and November 4th, 2016 which was responded to inappropriately by President Jokowi has triggered a high intensity of consolidation of the mass action groups so that then increasingly shifted from the protest movement to a large social movement on December 2nd, 2016.

Schema Picture. 2 From the Protest Movement to the Great Social movement

Source: Researcher's analysis based on November 2016 findings

The above scheme illustrates that the protest movement that took place on October 14th and November 4th, 2016 was not due to a single cause but was an accumulation of at least three things. First, the factor of rising social tension due to the suffering of the urban poor who were displaced by the Jakarta administration under Ahok leadership. Second, the factor of high political tension due to Ahok political style of communication which tends to be arrogant and then makes a statement that offends Muslims on September 27th, 2016 in the Thousand Islands. Third, economic stagnation. The economic conditions at the time of the emergence of the October and November 2016 protest movements were not okay. The factors of high social tension, high political tension and economic stagnation have triggered the protest movements on October 14th and November 4th, 2016. These three factors are the accumulation of problems which then easily trigger the emergence of the 1410 and 411 protest movements. The protest movement was wrongly responded by President Jokowi with left the Palace and said there were political actors behind the November 4 movement and could already be judged as treason against legitimate government. Until now, the political actor referred to by President Jokowi has never mentioned who it was. This erroneous and inaccurate response from President Jokowi has worsened the situation triggering widespread consolidation of community groups from various Islamic organizations in Jakarta and from a number of regions throughout Indonesia. The consolidation succeeded in uniting elements of action from various Islamic organizations and other non-Muslim-based communities such as the Community Village Forum (FKK) and others. The consolidation of various community groups and Islamic organizations then became a major social movement on December 2nd, 2016 which packed the Capital City of Jakarta (from National Monument to the HI Roundabout and so on). In the 212 Social Movement or also known as the Islamic Defendant Action III, it was seen that the mass of the action reached more than 7 million people and made President Jokowi forced to meet with the demonstrators. A Great Social movement.

Table 1. 212 Movement as a Social movement

No	SOCIAL MOVEMENT INDICATORS	212 MOVEMENT
1	Social movements are a form of collective behavior	Meet the indicators of Social movement because it is a collective behavior
2	Social movements always have a goal to make social change	Meet the indicators of the Social movement because it has the aim to make social change
3	Social movements are not identical with political movements involved in the struggle for power directly.	Meet the indicators of the Social movement because it is not identical with the political movement involved in the struggle for power directly
4	Social movements are organized collective behavior, both formal and not.	Meet the indicators of the Social movement because it is a collective behavior that is organized whether formal or not

Source: Processed using the perspective of the American Sociological Association and the perspective of Sadikin in Peasant Resistance and Agrarian Conflicts in Social movement Discourse, 2004.

212 Social Movement as a New Social Movement based on Religiosity

212 Social Movement as a New Social Movement

In social theories, 212 movements can be positioned as social movements. Jurgen Habermas when explaining the phenomenon of social movements argues that social movements are understood as defensive relations to defend the public and private sphere of individuals against the inroad of the state system and market economy (Edwards, 2009). Habermas's perspective illustrates that something is called a social movement if there is a defensive relationship between members of the community that is consolidated to protect their public and private spaces by resisting pressure from the state system and the market economy. While Giddens (2013), social movements are interpreted as collective efforts to pursue shared interests or movements to achieve common goals or joint movements through collective action (action collective) outside established institutions.

From the perspective of Habermas and Giddens above it is enough to place the 212 movement as a social movement because its fulfillment is full of them as a collective effort to achieve common goals (law enforcement), protect public and private spaces (individual rights as individuals and as citizens), there is collective action (moving together), done not by established institutions (GNPF MUI initiative).

If then the answer to the 212 movement question is sought for what social movement category? So in the theoretical reference of social movements, no exact answer is found. For example, if the 212 movement is positioned as a form of revolutionary social movements or the ruling language, calling it a treason movement is certainly not appropriate because the terms of treason are not fulfilled by them. If the 212 movement is positioned as a reformative social movement, a movement of gradual change and redemptive social movements is also not appropriate. As described in the narrative framework of this research concept that the new social movement paradigm rests on two main claims, namely: first, the New social movement is a product of the transition from the industrial economy to post-industrial. Second, the New social movement is unique and different from the Social movement in the industrial era. Whereas the Traditional Movement usually places more emphasis on economic-material goals as the Labor Movement, while the New social movement tends to avoid those goals which set goals that are non-economic-material. Based on the findings of this study the 212 movement is precisely classified as a new social movement that can be positioned as a Religion-Based Social movement (GSBR). It was called GSBR because the idea of the movement was carried out as a protest against the injustice of the law which was based on the religiosity of the movers (a spiritual response to what was referred to as blasphemy behavior).

Table 2.212 Movement As a New social movement


No	NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT INDICATORS	ACTOR	212 MOVEMENT
1	The New social movement is a product of the transition from the industrial economy to post-industrial	New middle class	Gerakan 212 fulfills the indicator as a new social movement because it is in the capital that is entering the post-industrial era, has a non-economic-material and unique goal. In addition, in terms of actors also fulfilled because the 212 movement actors are the majority of the new middle class, part of the old middle class and marginalized people
2	The New social movement sets non-economic-material goals.	Most of the old middle class	
3	The New social movement is unique and different from the Social movement in the industrial era	Peripheral people	

Source: Processed by researchers using the perspective of William Outhwaite in Social Theory and Social Criticism (Bottomore and Faqih, 1996).

212 social movements that are able to move the masses to reach approximately 7 million people have been gathering in National Monument to Thamrin, Sudirman, Salemba, Patani Statues until Monday and Cempaka Putih, etc., certainly not just a crowd. The 212 Social movement which calls itself the Action of Defending Islam III (ABI III) has a clear purpose as stated by its leaders. Among the most prominent figures and the Chair of the Indonesian Ulama Council Fatwa Guard National Movement (GNPF MUI) was Dr. Bachtiar Nasir. According to Bachtiar Nasir Islamic Action III on December 2, 2016 in addition to aiming to strengthen the sense and ranks of *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic brotherhood) and *Ukhuwah Wathoniah* (brotherhood of waterman and nationalism), this action aims to demand social justice and legal justice for all Indonesian people, against the power of the oligarchy that made Indonesia colonized politically, economically, socially and lawfully and strengthened the unity of the Islamic ummah which led to the unity of Indonesia, strengthening Unity in Diversity based on the values of the original 1945 Constitution (Bachtiar Nasir's remarks when holding the ABI III press conference at the AQL Islamic Center Jakarta Friday 18 September 2016). According to other central figures in the 212 social movement, namely Habieb Rizieq Shihab who is also the Chairperson of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) stated that the 212 action was not an activity against the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) or anti against diversity but the 212 action aimed at enforcing the law against religious dissenter (Information from Habieb Rizieq Shihab after undergoing the examination as a witness to the alleged treason attempt at the Jakarta Metropolitan Police on 1 December 2016).

According to another phenomenal figure in the 212 movement, K. H. Nonop Hanafi, head of the Miftahul Huda 2 boarding school in Ciamis (initiator of the Ciamis santri walk to Jakarta), that the 212 movement is a movement to defend God, defend apostles, defend Islam, defend the Qur'an 'an. This statement was also confirmed by the confession of the participants of the longmarch when K.H.Nonop Hanafi asked them: *"Are you ready to defend Allah?"* Participants answered: *"Ready!"* *"Are you ready to defend the Apostle ?!"* Answer participants: *"Get ready!"* *"Are you ready to defend Islam?"* Answer participants: *"Get ready!"* *"Are you ready to defend the Qur'an?"* Answer the participant: *"Alright!"* (Explanation of K.H.Nonop Hanafi on Monday 28 November 2016 when the group of foot walkers from the Miftahul Huda 2 pesantren arrived at the Ciamis Great Mosque). From Bachtiar Nasir's opinion, Habieb Rizieq Shihab's opinion and K. H. Nonop Hanafi's opinion, it can be concluded that the main objective of the 212 social movement is to defend Islam by upholding the law for blasphemy by Basuki Tjahaya Purnama alias Ahok, strengthening the sense and rank of *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic brotherhood) and *Ukhuwah Wathoniah* (fraternal brotherhood / nationalism), and demanding social justice for all Indonesian people.

Schema Picture. 3 The Purpose of the New social movement 212



Source: Researcher's analysis based on field data, 2016.

Social Movement Ideology 212

It is not easy to understand the ideology of social 212 movements. This is due to the organization that drives the 212 movement is an organization that was formed collectively and not in the form of a formal organization but rather as a consolidated organization that does not have a kind of statutes and bylaws. Organizations that usually put their ideology in the statutes by laws. However, the statements of the main characters can be found in the ideology underlying the 212 social movements. According to Bachtiar Nasir the 212 movement was essentially the Soft Moeslim People Power ideology movement, in the form of a really peace action that was driven because of a shared sense of blasphemy due to the blasphemy of Muslims and religious scriptures carried out by Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok), specifically related to Ahok statement concerning the Al-Maidah paragraph 51 (Bachtiar Nasir's remarks when holding the ABI III press conference at the AQL Islamic Center Jakarta Friday 18 September 2017). Bachtiar Nasir also said that the 212 movement was an iceberg. The movement claimed to be a national and even international movement was considered by Bachtiar Nasir to be an accumulation of various cases of social injustice, especially Muslims as a party that is often cornered and whose ideology is defamed. Muslims are often accused of being non-nationalist, anti-Pancasila, intolerant, not pro to Bhineka Tunggal Ika and their rights are often marginalized (Bachtiar Nasir's remarks when holding the ABI III press conference at the AQL Islamic Center Jakarta Friday 18 September 2017) From Bachtiar Nasir's statements and answers, the researcher can conclude that 212 Social Movement is based on Islamic ideology. Researchers concluded that the ideology of semi-moderate Islam, and still includes the model of Islam *Ahlussunnah Waljamaah*. These conclusions can be seen in the terms *ukhuwah islamiyah*, *ukhuwah Wathoniyah* and their rejection of accusations of being un-nationalist, anti-Pancasila, intolerant, not pro on Unity in Diversity. This group includes moderate Islamic groups who uphold Islamic principles but still prioritize deliberation decisions and obedience to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Actor of the Social Movement 212

A social movement always necessitates the role of the actor. That no social movement is carried out without the role of the actor. Based on observations by researchers in the field and analysis of the news there are at least 5 important actors related to the social movement 212. The five actors are Habieb Rizieq Shihab, Bachtiar Nasir, Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, Muhammad Alkhattat, and K.H.Nonop Hanafi. Habibe Rizieq Shihab is one of the central figures of the 212 social movement because of his position as Chairperson of the GNPf Board of Trustees. Before the 212 Habieb Rizieq Shihab movement was the founder and leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) organization, an organization known to be very brave in upholding the amar ma'ruf nahiy munkar (inviting goodness and preventing munkar) in Indonesia. In addition, FPI is also known as an organization that is close to the police and was established to have a closeness to the history of the presence of Pam Swakarsa at the end of the New Order regime, where FPI was established on August 17, 1998. FPI is also known to have a paramilitary wing known as the FPI Laskar which carries out activities such as attacks on immoral activities. Interestingly Habieb Rizieq Shihab is a learned person. His S1 study was completed at King Saud University's Islamic Religion study program with a focus on jurisprudence and fiqh proposal. His master's degree study was completed at the University of Malaya under the thesis title "The Effect of Pancasila on the Implementation of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia". His doctoral study is from Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia with the dissertation title "Differences in Origin and Branches of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah".

Bachtiar Nasir was one of the key actors of the 212 social movements as GNPf MUI. Before becoming involved in the GNPf MUI Bachtiar Nasir was the leader of the Ar-Rahman Qur'anic Learning (AQL) Islamic Center. He also served as Secretary General of the Indonesian Intellectuals and Young Ulama Council (MIUMI), Chairperson of the Saudi Arabian Alumni in Indonesia, Chairperson of the

Alumni of Madinah Islamic University in Indonesia, he was also noted to have been a central administrator of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). Bachtiar Nasir also often fills various studies on national television stations. His educational background illustrates his concentration as a Muslim intellectual in the field of religion. His secondary education level was completed at Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor Ponorogo, East Java, a prominent pesantren that gave birth to major scholars and national figures in Indonesia, including KH.Hasyim Muzadi and Dr.Hidayat Nurwahid. His higher education was completed until his graduate program at Madinah Islamic University.

Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin was another key figure in the MUI Fatwa Guard National Movement (GNPF MUI), his position as Deputy Chair. Before becoming active in the GNPF MUI, Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin was the Chairperson of the Muslim Youth Association of South Sulawesi, the General Chairperson of the Indonesian Wahdah Islamiyah Community Organization, the Deputy Chairperson of the Central MUI Foreign Relations Commission, Deputy Secretary General of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), Deputy Chairperson Indonesian Council of Intellectuals and Young Ulamas (MIUMI), Members of the World Muslim Ulama Association, and Chairpersons of the Association of Ulamas and Da'i in Southeast Asia. Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin is also an alumnus of Madinah Islamic University to graduate programs. Another prominent figure who emerged that was popular with the Islamic defense action movement and was arrested by the police for alleged treason was Muhammad Alkhathath, the head of the consolidation of ulama and Islamic mass organizations GNPF MUI. The leader of the Islamic defense action was the General Secretary of the Islamic Community Forum (FUI), an organization that was once commanded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Muhammad Alkhathath or Muhammad Gatot Saptono are graduates of seed science and technology in the agricultural cultivation study program at the Faculty of Agriculture, Bogor Agricultural University (IPB). While a student was very active in Islamic organizations, he was the Chairperson of the Islamic Spiritual Board of IPB, later became the leader of the Indonesian Hizbu Tahrir (HTI), and was a board member of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) Commission for Preaching in 2005-2010 and is currently the leader general tabloid Voice of Islam.

Another important 212 Social Movement actor was K.H.Nonop Hanafi, head of the Miftahul Huda 2 Islamic boarding school, Bayasari, Ciamis Regency. The role of K.H.Nonop Hanafi is the main figure who initiated the action of walking thousands of students and Muslims to defend Islam from Ciamis to Jakarta from November 27 until arriving at the Jakarta National Monument on December 2, 2016.

Table 3. New social movement Actor 212

NO	ACTOR	ROLE	BACKGROUND
1	Habieb Muhammad Rizieq Shihab	Chairperson of the Board of Trustees GNPF MUI	Chief of FPI, Alumnus <i>King Saud University, Universiti Malaya, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia</i>
2	Bachtiar Nasir	Chairman of GNPF MUI	Leader of <i>Ar-Rahman Qur'anic Learning (AQL) Islamic Center</i> , General Secretary MIUMI, Alumnus Islamic Boarding School Modern Gontor, <i>Madinah Islamic University</i> .
3	Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin	Vice Chairman of GNPF MUI	Chairman of Wahdah Islamiyah Indonesia, Vice Secretary Head Office of MUI, Vice Chairman MIUMI. Alumnus <i>Madinah Islamic University</i>


4	Muhammad Alkathath	Chairperson of the Consolidation of Ulama and Islamic Organizations GNPf MUI	Secretary General of the Islamic Community Forum (FUI), Chairman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Alumnus Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB).
5	K.H.Nonop Hanafi	The originator of the Ciamis-Jakarta longmarch	Chairman of Islamic Boarding School Miftahul Huda 2 Bayasari Kabupaten Ciamis.

Source: Analysis of tables by researchers processed from various sources

New Social Movement Strategy 212

The 212 social movement was driven by an organ called the Fatwa Guard of the Indonesian Ulama Council (GNPF MUI). A movement organization devoted to escorting the MUI Fatwa whose fatwa was issued on October 11th, 2016. As is well known, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa or called the MUI Religious Opinion and Attitude signed by the Chairman of the MUI KH Ma'rif Amin and the Secretary General of the MUI Dr.H.Anwar Abbas. One of the important points of the MUI Fatwa is that the statement of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama or Ahok is categorized as insulting the Qur'an and or insulting scholars who have legal consequences (based on the Opinions and Religious Attitudes of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued on October 11, 2016). This fatwa is what the GNPf MUI defended by carrying out Islamic defense actions to uphold the law against religious dissidents. In carrying out its agendas, the GNPf MUI is seen using two strategies, namely the short-term strategy and the long-term strategy. First, a short-term strategy using an action or demonstration strategy. This strategy was chosen to respond to cases of blasphemy on religion which at that time were not prosecuted. In addition, this strategy is also carried out because it is understood as a strategy guaranteed by law number 9 of 1998 concerning Freedom of Expression in Public. In this short-term strategy is carried out with consolidative steps with various figures, circles, students, Islamic community organizations and other communities. The action strategy is also accompanied by a strategy of using social media as an alternative media that is used differently from the mainstream media. The role of social media is carried out by what is referred to as MCI or Muslim cyber Indonesia, including accounts of GNPf, FPI etc. Short-term strategy through this demonstration the researchers refer to as a hard strategy or non-cooperative against the authorities.

Second, a long-term strategy. This long-term strategy is carried out in line with the continued role of the GNPf to oversee all ulama fatwas not only the fatwa of the Indonesian Ulama Council. Therefore, the GNPf MUI changed to GNPf Ulama since 30 October 2017. The reasons for the change are twofold. First, so that what is escorted by the GNPf is not merely a MUI fatwa because the MUI has its own privacy and the MUI is not burdened with the name carried in the GNPf. Secondly, so that the term 'ulama' attached to the GNPf becomes a kind of joint ijma of the ulama in making decisions (Bachtiar Nasir conveyed during a Press Conference at Grand Sahis Jl.Sudirman Central Jakarta, 30 October 2017). This long-term strategy also began to open dialogue with the authorities. This was seen not only when the GNPf was willing to meet Jusuf Kalla but also later accepted Jokowi to attend the 212 action and then the GNPf met Jokowi at the Palace on June 25, 2017. This long-term strategy the researchers refer to as a soft strategy or cooperative towards the authorities.



Source: Researcher's analysis of 2016-2017 field data

212 Movement as a New social movement based on Religiosity

A number of characteristics to show that the 212 movement is a social movement Based on Religiosity among others is seen in militancy which mingles with the voluntary attitude (sincerity) that is seen in their behavior. The long march action of the people from Ciamis led by K.H.Nonop Hanafi to National Monument which later inspired the people of Bogor and Bekasi to do the same thing was a fact of militancy and sincerity carried out with a high and sincere awareness on the basis of their religiosity. The solidarity of their fellow men also appears to be strong, popular support to provide abundant food and drink, hundreds of medical teams and ambulances on alert, millions of times that are not anarchist, helping each other, orderly, are framed in the prayer agenda and organized Friday prayers in congregation are other facts seen in the field.

They are not an intolerant group because in the field they appear to be so welcome to anyone working with different religious backgrounds who greet them along the Pramuka, Salemba, Senen, Medan Merdeka, Medan Merdeka, Menteng, Cikini, Harmoni and Sudirman-Thamrin roads. Neither do the authors find intolerant sentences from their mouths, except the prayers of humanity and justice. The intolerant accusation against them is very baseless, the presence of Jokowi-JK is a fact of recognition of the most powerful people in this republic of the greatness of millions of people gathered peacefully. The December 4th Unity in Diversity Parade if carried out to position the 212 movement as anti Unity in Diversity is wrong, because there is no Unity in Diversity if the existence of Indonesia without their presence.

They are educated Muslims who value diversity. In fact, the authors also found that those who participated in the 212 movement also came from different ethnicities and different religions. The 212 movement only wants the law to be upheld. The substantive message of the 212 movement is that law enforcement should not be neglected in this regard. As a new social movement, the 212 movement which the authors categorize as a religious-based social movement by millions of Indonesian Muslims has made a valuable contribution to the world, that Islamic religious values believed by millions of people in Indonesia have been able to encourage a large social movement that is civilized (civilized). This fact is certainly extraordinary for the progress of democracy. But actually Indonesian Muslims have given the best example not only for democracy but also for world civilization.

Conclusion

The 212 movement began with a protest movement caused by social conditions (eviction of thousands of homes and residents, etc.), political conditions (the political elite communication in DKI Jakarta that sparked Muslim protests, factors leading up to the elections, etc.) and economic conditions (economic stagnation) , gini ratio, TDL increase, urban poverty, etc.). The main issue of the 2016 protest

movement is that the legal process against alleged blasphemy by Ahok alias Basuki Tjahaya Purnama who happens to be a candidate for the Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2017, must be carried out fairly without any political intervention from anyone including Jokowi's intervention as President. The 2016 protest movement became a Social movement because it fulfilled indicators as a social movement that is as a collective behavior, has a purpose for change, is not identical with political movements, and is organized. The 2016 protest movement then led to wider protests and the consolidation of the movement's organization so that it became a social movement. 212. 212 Social Movement is a New social movement because it meets the indicators as a new social movement that occurs in the capital that enters the post-industrial era, has non-material goals, not in the context of a direct struggle for power, and moves uniquely specific (there are long marches, millions of people present, and peace). The objectives of the New 212 Social Movement are two main objectives and other objectives. The main purpose of this new 212 Social Movement is to uphold Islam by upholding the law against Islamic religious dissidents. Other objectives are to strengthen *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic brotherhood), *ukhuwah wathoniyah* (brotherhood of water / nationalism), and demand justice for all the people of Indonesia.

The ideology of the New 212 Social Movement is a semi-moderate Islamic ideology, and still includes the Islamic model of Ahlul-sunnah Waljamaah. These conclusions can be seen in the terms *ukhuwah islamiyah*, *ukhuwah Wathoniyah* and their rejection of accusations of being un-nationalist, anti-Pancasila, intolerant, not pro on Unity in Diversity. This group is a moderate Islamic group that upholds the principles of Islam but still prioritizes the deliberation and obedience decisions towards the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The five actors are Habieb Rizieq Shihab, Bachtiar Nasir, Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, Muhammad Alkhattat, and K. H. Nonop Hanafi. The majority of these actors are educated Muslim groups with a background in tertiary education to postgraduate level both from an Islamic based university and a general science-based university. The new 212 Social Movement has two strategies namely the short-term strategy and the long-term strategy. The short-term strategy is carried out through demonstration protest movements or mass actions. This strategy is called a hard strategy, or non-cooperative strategy. The long-term strategy is carried out in the form of dialogue with the authorities. This strategy is called Soft Strategy or cooperative strategy. In addition to dialogue, a long-term strategy is also carried out by changing the name from the GNPf MUI to the GNPf Ulama.

The new 212 Social Movement is a new social movement based on religiosity. Called a new social movement based on religiosity because there is militancy that mingles with voluntary attitudes (sincerity) that are seen in their behavior. The religious basis became the main motive for the new social movement 212. The long march of the people from Ciamis, led by K. H. Nonop Hanafi towards National Monument which later inspired the people of Bogor and Bekasi to do the same, was a fact of militancy and sincerity carried out with a high and sincere awareness of the basis of their religiosity. The solidarity of their fellow men also appears to be strong, popular support to provide abundant food and drink, hundreds of medical teams and ambulances on alert, millions of times that are not anarchist, helping each other, orderly, are framed in the prayer agenda and organized Friday prayer in congregation are other facts seen in the field to show that the new 212 Social Movement is based on religiosity. The step to change the name from the GNPf MUI to the GNPf Ulama is the right step so that it does not seem to burden the MUI institution. But this step needs to be accompanied by a concrete attitude to oversee the edicts of other Indonesian scholars who contribute to the progress of the nation and the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. The government needs to position the GNPf Ulama proportionally as their right to gather and associate guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the government does not need to take repressive measures against the Ulama GNPf, let alone dissolve it. To the GNPf Ulama in order to truly show their statesmanship that respects diversity, tolerance and helps protect and care for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) with work agendas that strengthen Islam as well as Indonesia, both by demonstration and by dialogue.

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