



Religion and Politics' in Israel: the Mythology of Jewish Nationalism (until 1993)

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Abstract

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict stemmed from the clash of the loyalty of both sides to the same land, which is the Palestinian territory settled by both the Arabs and the Jews. This paper attempt to survey the role the development of the clash on the territory by elaborating the effects of Jewish immigration, the development of Zionist idea, the mandate period, political factions and the role of Religion and politics in Israel until the Oslo Accords. Thus, the beginning of the conflict and the development of the conflict will be stressed in order to understand the conflicting positions of both sides. These positions aim at helping the reader understand more clearly the deadlock in the peace process.

Keywords: Religion; politics Israel

Introduction

Religious Jewry was split between the ultra-orthodoxy of Agudat Israel and religious nationalism, led by Mizrachi. Within each of these movements there was a radical faction which was close to the Labour Movement and more in sympathy with the Zionist leadership - Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrachi and Po'alei Agudat Israel. Another internal division which was imperceptible at the beginning yet highly significant in conceptual terms was that between Jews from eastern and central Europe. Judaism in the West had incorporated the ideas of the Enlightenment and general philosophy, but had at the same time been aware of the consequences of emancipation, and of increased assimilation in particular (Sofer, 2009).

Religious Jewry lacked a comprehensive and coherent political doctrine based on Jewish law (Halacha). The Zionism of religious Jewry is imbued with tension whenever it refers to the secular foundations of nationalism, finding itself in an inherent imbalance vis-a-vis historical reality because of the concepts of messianism and redemption. Although it might be going too far to claim that the long period without political sovereignty had weakened the Jews' political judgment, religion was not able to afford a normative or practical view of political issues that would give rise to a prudent course of action (Roy, 2004). It could even be claimed that the believing Jew's ethical precepts concerning matters of government are unclear when it comes to military and political matters. They are concerned primarily with behaviour within the community and conduct towards a foreign ruler, not with the government of a sovereign state.

The connection between religion and policy emerges as nebulous and incoherent in most cases. First, it is not clear whether such expressions as 'a chosen people', or 'a nation that dwells alone', reflect only religious views of God's relations with His chosen people, or were ethical directives regarding qualities which would serve as an example to the rest of the world. Both terms could denote a demand for isolationism or at least neutrality in foreign affairs, constituting a basis for action designed to transmit and disseminate religious ideas to the wider world while at the same time representing a messianic view in which the will of heaven is accepted with complete passivity. Other precepts, such as 'respect the laws of the ruler', and the three oaths of the Jewish people, namely, rebel against other nations or seek to hasten the end of days, are concerned more with the relations between the Jews and Gentile rulers. They are instrumental rather than normative, directing towards restraint and caution without being able to provide any guidelines for statesmen and diplomats in a sovereign state (Javadikouchaksaraei, Bustami, & Farouk, 2016).

Discussion

There is no development in Jewish history parallel to the *Respublica Christiana* which, starting in the Renaissance, gave rise to a secular diplomacy, established the absolute monarchy beyond the Church's sphere of influence and moulded the community of European states after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Although the Emancipation, which followed the French Revolution caused Jewish unity to crumble, as was the case with Islam, religion and nationalism remained inseparable. It would seem that those who sought to survive oppression preferred to raise still higher the walls separating them from the world rather than to deal with universal questions. Jewish law had never accepted the existence of a secular Jewish state. Religious Zionism, like ultra-orthodoxy, wanted the state to constitute 'religion and state intertwined with one another' (Hellinger & Londin, 2007).

In the period which began in 1937, when the Partition Plan was first proposed, religious Jewry was forced to interpret its faith in the light of the possibility of a secular state. Like politicians, rabbis could no longer subordinate their political views to a purely religious eschatology. The historical circumstances were too tragic, and the demands of Zionist politics more pressing and demanding than ever. In the final event, however, the Jewish national homeland was an avowedly secular creation. The concept of 'the integrity of the Land of Israel' may have been the only political term which derived in part from religion. Mizrahi's slogan, as defined by its founder, Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines, 'the Land of Israel for the people of Israel according to the Law of Israel', compounded religion and Zionism into a single entity. Religious Jews did, indeed, perceive secular nationalism as a stage in the progress towards redemption, thereby legitimising secular ideas without severing themselves from the conceptual foundations of Jewish tradition.' Mizrahi's role in Zionist politics was defined as that of a bridge between the different trends of Zionist ideology. Mizrahi claimed a role for itself as representing national concord between Right and Left, though not without making utilitarian calculations which responded to political needs' (Javadikouchaksaraei, Bustami, Fazwan Ahmad Farouk, & Ramazaniandarzi, 2017).

One conclusion to be drawn from the relationship between religion and policy is paradoxical but of the utmost importance. The more demanding religion is with regard to precepts and faith, the more scope it leaves religious politicians to define political aims and ways of attaining them. This derives from the basic irrelevance of most religious injunctions to political life. It comes as no surprise, then, to discover that a belief in miracles or visions of the apocalypse can coexist with practicality and utilitarianism. It is difficult and complicated to attempt to explain political reality in terms of religious world-view. If the present seems to be merely a stage in the road to salvation, the metaphysical cannot be separated completely from the real. If the believer accepts the Jewish law and is not completely cynical, he wavers between determinism, detached from ordinary concepts of time and causal relations in a given situation, and the necessity of acting on the basis of what he actually sees and feels. Messianism and

salvation set up a tension in the believer between the transcendental and the real worlds. For the Jewish believer, Zionism became a chariot of fire, harnessed to the shafts of the redemption. But the religious politicians were to discover that once on the national chariot, it was not so easy to get off.

The danger of a world-view which perceives divine intervention in political events lies in the definition of Jewish nationalism as a phenomenon beyond the usual course of history and the laws which govern other nations. Thus, the believer can be divorced from any customary criterion, test of and responsibility for his own political actions, leading to a distorted perception where a resounding success- or failure- can be interpreted as intimating imminent salvation. It provides clarity of vision and absolute certainty about something which is essentially unstable and unclear. But messianism does not embody a clear program of what should be done. In fact, the belief that all historical events are directed by a supreme being, and that the individual is unable to comprehend or control that being's workings, brought the majority of religious Jewry to a state of extreme passivity, and others to radical nationalism (Green, 2008).

The deepest and most comprehensive attempt in religious thinking to integrate national ideas with the concept of divine pre-ordination was that of Rabbi Kook (1923). A unique individual, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hacoen Kook (1865-1935) was born in Latvia, immigrated to Palestine with members of the Second Aliya in 1904 and was the first Chief Rabbi. Rabbi Kook was close to the Mizrahi movement, but kept himself apart from any party affiliation. He established the Merkaz Ha-Rav religious seminary (yeshiva) in Jerusalem (1923), and this later fostered the Gush Emunim movement under the leadership of his son, Zvi Yehuda Kook. After his death, Rabbi Kook's ideas gained wider acceptance than they had done in his lifetime, and only in recent years has their extensive significance for Jewish nationalism become apparent (Halpern & Reinharz, 2000).

Rabbi Kook (1923)'s approach to Jewish nationalism and history was complex. His rhetoric abounds in flowery and even poetical phrases, in mystical similes and concepts which draw on metaphysical philosophy. Rabbi Kook's language is undoubtedly among the most forceful and compelling in Modern Hebrew literature. Rabbi Kook saw reality as a comprehensive whole that is sacred, harmonious and fundamentally appropriate. Its apparent defects are subjective and derive from man's limited perception. Only by means of divine understanding can man be brought to see the sacred that is immanent in the real. Rabbi Kook's attitude to reality was dualistic, contrasting the revealed with the concealed, imagination with reality and the obscure with the sacred. It can be seen to be forced to conclude that thought and logic are insufficient as tools for discovering the essentially perfect and sacred elements of reality: 'Our rational mind is like a young schoolchild who gives a partial explanation of all the light of life that exists in the rich and sacred treasure-house of our imagination, dwelling in higher spheres and defeating substantial reality by the strength of its independent existence' (Rubin, 2014).

According to Rabbi Kook, Jewish nationalism binds the individual irrevocably. In effect, the individual, the nation and the world system are united at all levels by the divine idea, which is to be found in everyone and is the force that guides all mankind. Jewish nationalism, which is in perfect harmony with the divine idea, is essential because then 'our national purpose will benefit all mankind' (Kaldor, Macginty, & Wallenstein, 2007). The Jewish people and the Land of Israel have a special relationship with One another, the full meaning of which will be revealed only when they are joined together. Only in the Land of Israel is the independent existence of the Jewish people revealed, being restored by it to its sanctity and divine destiny.

The connection between messianic belief and Jewish nationalism gave Kook's teachings their paramount historical significance. He accorded Jewish nationalism a decidedly theological interpretation and assumed that secular nationalism was unstable. The implicit conclusion was that Zionism was merely a transitory stage in which it was necessary to take part until its secular aspect declined and it reverted to

its religious Jewish character. But Rabbi Kook integrated the vision of redemption with secular Zionism within a real historical context, at least in dialectical terms. The experience of living in and settling the Land of Israel was defined as the prelude to ultimate redemption. In this way, Rabbi Kook absorbed the entire Zionist enterprise into a messianic whole, and the settlement of the Land of Israel became part of religious ritual. As a structure of political interpretation, as well as with regard to Jewish law, this is perhaps one of the weak points in the world-view of religious Zionism. The orthodox establishment opposed Rabbi Kook, and its leaders were deeply suspicious of the approbation he accorded the unbelieving socialist pioneers (Luz, 1988). It was hard to accept the mystical Kabbalistic view which bound good together with evil in the path to redemption, and partnership with Zionism seemed dangerous unless set off by clearly defined limits and restrictions.

The grave consequences embodied in Rabbi Kook's teachings were revealed in the actions of those who regarded him as their mentor, particularly the adherents of Gush Emunim. The latter rose to prominence in the period of elation after the Six Day War. Sanctity became 'actual-messianic reality', providing a metahistorical explanation for secular policy within history. An inherent flaw is the attempt to convert the unseen workings of the divine will into the overt demand to sanctify human actions which can be interpreted arbitrarily. This worldly, miraculous messianism displays irrational elements. Rabbi Kook's teachings were interpreted bluntly and crudely by his son, Zvi Yehuda, the head of the Merkaz Ha-Rav religious seminary for many years, to signify the attribution of sanctity to the entire Land of Israel and justify the establishment of a barrier between Jews and Gentiles (Halpern & Reinhartz, 2000).

Rabbi Kook's teachings reach gothic heights in just that part that has been neglected by his disciples- the universal message to the world embodied in faith. Rabbi Kook's view of the Jewish people's mission to the world was comprehensive and systemic. The Jews are the bearers of a universal doctrine which was forcibly interrupted in the distant past, but to which they have returned in modern times. Rabbi Kook regarded the Jewish convocation as the highest spiritual manifestation, and its history as the essence of the ideal whose faith and aspiration for a peaceful and just world have influenced the whole world. The foundation of the salvation of the world gives Rabbi Kook's outlook a teleological dimension- progress towards a predetermined purpose in which the individual, the Jewish nation and all mankind are bound together (Hellinger & Londin, 2007).

In this way, Rabbi Kook completed an almost Kantian scheme, which begins with the individual's interior world and progresses through the Jewish people to the world. But the Jews' mission is made possible only if they return to the Land of Israel and establish Jewish sovereignty there. The return of the Jews to the Land of Israel also depends on an initial normative change in the behaviour of nations. When that happens, the conceptual universe embodied in Jewish thought will alter the entire system and bring redemption to the world. The Jews' return to history will coincide with the world's restoration to its proper equilibrium. Until that happens, however, events may take a cruel turn: 'We were forced to leave world politics, although this also arose from an inner desire; we had to wait for a more auspicious time, when we would be able to govern ourselves without wickedness and barbarism; that is the time for which we hope. Obviously, in order to achieve this we must awaken all our inner potential and use all the resources available to us; for everything that happens is from the hand of God, creator of all worlds' (Rubin, 2014, p. 66).

The gap between the vision of religious redemption and the uninspired, parochial politics of the religious parties in Israel is astonishing. The Mizrachi Movement was founded in 1902 under the leadership of Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines (1839-1915), out of concern for the religious character of Zionism, and was established in Palestine after the First World War. The turning-point in Mizrachi's history was the immigration to the country of two prominent leaders, Rabbi Meir Bar-Han (Berlin) and Judah Leib Maimon (Fishman, 2007).

The Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrachi faction, which was founded at the beginning of the 1920 S, held its first conference in April 1922. Its history was shaped by the endeavour to set up an organisational framework similar to that of the Labour Movement, to maintain within it a left-wing section (consisting primarily of members of German origin) and to preserve its attachment to the Mizrachi party. In effect, Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrachi grew faster than its parent party, and by the end of the 1920S gained more votes than it in the elections to the Zionist Congress. Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrachi's political hegemony had become apparent by Mizrachi's third conference in 1933. Its foremost representatives were Shlomo Zalman Shragai and Chaim Moshe Shapira, who became a member of the Zionist Executive in 1935. At the beginning of the 1930s, the party also reached an agreement with the Histadrut, achieving autonomous status within it. This combination of socialism and religion was to decline in later years, giving way to fundamentalist nationalism.

For the Zionism religious history, the 1937 Partition Plan was a critical event. It was now possible to establish a secular state and under the Jewish law, the significance would be established. The religious parties and their monolithic nature were undermined after partition and this was the reason behind issues in their alliance with the Labour Movement. The Right maximalists were growing and the Zionist Executive views were being opposed increasingly. During the Zionist Movement, the religious Zionism was following the majority till the State was established. The foreign policy matters could not be viewed independently by the religious parties. The conceptual contribution was based on their religious beliefs which revolved around the establishment of the Land of Israel and its integrity. During the 1940's, this view was not approved, however, after the 1967 victory, it was revived through dedication.

In 1913, Judah Leib Maimon migrated to Palestine. He was Mizrachi's leader who helped establish the Chief Rabbinate. After 1935, he worked as the Zionist Executive movement representative and was the first Minister of Religion in Israel. Between Right and Left, a middle way was established by Rabbi Maimon for several years using the Mizrachi policy pattern. This policy was unifying and pragmatic that did not allow for a barren messianism. Orthodox religion was opposed and Zionist leadership tactics were supported. David Ben-Guriori and Rabbi Maimon were quite close (Ibid).

The Jewish state establishment was supported by Rabbi Maimon. The Zionist Executive minutes clearly state that as a member of the Partition Plan, he managed complex activities and was found to be much more positive than his public assertions. He considered the agreement presented by Weizmann a natural disaster and his reaction was a surprise to all. Towards the beginning of July 1937, negotiations were being carried out by the British through practical comments being used by him. He was convinced that Zionism has the optimal alternative of continuing with the Mandate. He followed a pragmatic approach, even though he publicly opposed partition. He stated that it was their duty to fight for the Mandate preservation. The Partition Plan would have to be studied if they failed (Baumgarten, 2005, p. 54).

Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan(Berlin; 1880-1949) attained extensive general education and he was a student of Rabbi Chaim Soloveichik of Brisk. In 1926, he moved to Palestine and before this time he was the World Mizrachi Organisation President. From 1929 to 1931, he served as a Zionist Executive but then, due to disagreements with Weizmann, he decided to resign. The Mizrachi newspaper, Hatzofeh, was initiated and edited by Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan in the mid-1930's.

A sharp and composite position was held by Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan over the Arab question. He believed that Zionism would always be negatively affected by the Arabs and its political aims did not need to depend upon them. Hence, he opposed the Jewish state objective of Zionism and did not approve of any plan that included federal alliances with the Arab nations. His objective was to reduce the effect of the Arabs on the aspiration of the Zionist maximalist as much as possible. Also, he wanted other people to also be accepted on the Israeli Land (Bareli, 2001). Religious nationalism was part of his political

perception where he ignored the present issues and with optimism, developed a future path which mysteriously removed all hindrances. However, in reality, the Zionist Executive policies were followed by Mizrahi. The Biltmore Programme was supported by Rabbi Bar-Ilan which brought forward a political campaign to establish a State by struggling against the British (Reidy, 2012).

The issue of establishing political aims was discussed by Rabbi Bar-nan in a seminal programmatic article of religious nationalism in 1946. High objectives were established after the Second World War and the Holocaust, but there were no aspirations present to achieve these objectives. It was quite essential to establish a difference between the demands and the aspirations. An aspiration has been defined as a strategic objective which is fixed in terms of the supreme national interest. Such an aspiration was not suitable in the present situation. This aim was continuous and did not change according to the environment. The Partition Plan was attacked by Rabbi Bar-nan by stating that it was not a tactical concession by an ultimate objective rejection. He required that a persistent advancement be present which moves from one demand to the other. This was to be followed till the time the Greater Land of Israel was achieved. The Paris Plan, which was the diplomatic initiative of the Zionist Executive, was asked to be annulled by Rabbi Bar-Ilan on his electorate of the Twenty-second Zionist Congress official address. By the end of 1947, the initiative required that the Partition Plan would be accepted and the State of Israel would be established. The non-acceptance of Zionist diplomacy occurred with Rabbi Bar-Ilan after the Partition Plan became a *fait accompli*. He believed that it was necessary to remain loyal to the border treaties as well as the covenant that was made to the Lord and the forefathers (Hellinger, 2008, p. 96).

Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrahi (1922) was close to the Labour Movement and he was quite moderate as far as his political views were concerned. He was a pioneering movement. The party had issues between the proletarian and religious faith aspects. The proletarian aspects were affected by the revolutionary socialism rejections and required legitimacy of the religion's proletarian character (Shimoni, 2007). Apart from the electoral strength of the faction, there was small political power. Moderate political views were present with most of the members who were usually German born. They were unable to challenge the Mizrahi dominance along with the rest of the world leaders. Furthermore, even though various issues were present, a common stance was established by the two parties. They decided to unite upon the Zionist politics – partition cardinal issue.

The leading figure of Ha-Mizrahi, as a representative of the Zionist Executive, was Ha-Po'el. Chaim Moshe Shapira (1902-70) was the leader after the State was established. At the same time, Shlomo Zalman Shragai was the most appropriate person to express world views and political outlook (Fajwlowicz, 1996). In 1924, Shragai migrated to Palestine, and he was a Zionist Executive and National Committee member. His views were quite close to Mapai, even though his statements were maximalist (Aronoff, 1984). The Zionist diplomacy principles were supported by the Shragai during the Second World War and he preserved the political orientation of Yishuv which was present with the British. In the Middle East, he observed that the Arab attitude was dependent upon the British policy. He believed that the appeasement policy in Europe and Middle East was responsible for the Arab Revolt. He also stated that some feudal families and Arab politicians were responsible for this Revolt as they conducted rebellious activities.

The Zionist history was subjected to crisis and twice the Zionist policy was criticized by Shragai. This was done right after the Second World War and by the end of the 1930s. He believed that the failure of the policy to defend itself in an aggressive manner and not conduct an open struggle against the Arab aspirations was the reason behind the crisis. The second reason he stated that there was complete avoidance of establishing a diplomatic offense against the British. He completely supported the idea of creating a Jewish State by late 1946 at the Twenty-Second Zionist Congress. He helped carry out a campaign against the British and conducted diplomatic negotiations. The Zionist policy, according to Shragai, was influenced by the world politics which did not consist of any brotherhood of nations and

completely depended upon the strategic and powerful aspects. Self-reliance was the only option available. Nations were required to remain alone and must not be associated with other nations (Hermann, 2013).

The Jewish Israeli reason was not the only reason behind the return of the people to Jewishness. The Israeli Palestinian conflict must also be held accountable. The major antagonists and the Israeli emergent state were responsible for the condition of the Palestinians. For the Palestinians, the 1948 war was a major destruction and it was a war of independence for the Jews (Morris, 2001). The Israeli–Arab conflict must be kept in context when the Jewishness of Israel reinforcement is to be assessed. As time has passed, the weight of this aspect has changed quite a bit.

During the state-era, this aspect has remained inactive. During the 1950s till the early 1970s, the Israeli Palestinian-Arabs remained far from the political spheres and the public eye by limiting themselves to the villages. A war of survival was being fought by Israel against the Arab states, but the national identity was not affected or endangered for the Arab minority within the nation. The military regime over the Arabs was removed in the year 1966, but then imposed again in the year 1967. During this military regime, the Arab territories which were largely populated by the Palestinians were taken over, and this includes the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A major political issue took place regarding the Greater Israel boundaries and the Jews and Arabs numerical demographic equation. The Jews and non-Jews balance is subjected to a radical change when the Territory Palestinians are shifted from one geopolitical unit to another between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. At such a point, it is quite possible that the Jews will become a minority.

In October 1973, a catastrophic war took place which is why in the year 1977, the historical control of the Labour regime was lost. Hence, during 1967 and 1977, the Israeli ideological aspects were removed and the political culture of Israel was also subjected to change. The historical and analytic consideration of the Arabs and Jews suffers a setback. The Jewish and Hebrew identities need to be differentiated since the Hebrews are unable to surrender to Judaism in a complete manner. Two vital elements have been attained through Jewishness. At first, the Palestinian colonization has become legitimate which means they have the right to own the land and it is not through trouble. Secondly, an exclusion instrument or local Arabs must help form the national boundaries to support national exclusiveness (Ram, 2008).

As compared to the time period before and after, the 1948 and 1967-time period has been quite unimportant. Keeping in mind the demographic and geographic aspects, the Israeli era from 1967 has attained a new meaning of being Jewish. It basically states that if a person is a Jew in Israel he is a non-Arab or not an Arab at all (Ibid). Keeping in mind the Halachic terms, the non-Jewish migrants from Russia must be considered as they were subjected to a lenient attitude. There were nearly 300,000 individuals who were migrating from the former Soviet Union during the 1990s and they were not Jewish in religious Halachic terms. The service of these individuals in the army helped them become the ‘Jewish de-facto’ and allowed them to attain a de jure conversion. A ‘sociological conversion’ designation was granted to the activity (Cohen & Susser, 1996), even though it should have been referred to as a ‘demographic conversion’. The Palestinians and the demographic race must contain numbers rather than fast conversation. Such a concept does not allow for decline of the religion but needs instrumentalization for the national reasons.

The national colonial policies were required to an extent that the secular Jews would also become part of the Jewishness in order to be united. The reason behind this activity is the presence of Arab-Israeli conflict, the invasion of a country which is far and foreign, land acquisition, Jewish state creation, Arab inhabitant expulsion and stating the rest of the Arab groups as a minority within Israel (Kimmerling, 1999). Since 1967, these aspects have gained importance and Jewishness attained a new meaning along with Israeliness as a national and civil religion.

From the 1950s, the combining tendencies initiated and continued till after the 1960s. There were two major pillars for the Israeli-Jewish civil religion from the 1970s. The first pillar shows the nation downfall known as the Holocaust and the second pillar shows the revival of the nation through the Israeli Arab wars (Ram, 2008). Judaism does not consider these pillars as their traditional stock, but it allowed for Israeli's to attain a stronger identity of Jewishness after the 1970s.

The Mafdal policy, a religious national party, carried out variations which are responsible for the drastic changes that took place between nationalism and religion during the early 1970s. Initially, the party only handled internal civic affairs and the activities were designed to manage the façade of the Jews within the Israeli public space. They also worked towards managing the 'Status Qua'. It was also regarded as an Israeli politics dovish actor. Mafdal was a religious national party till the 1970s and since that time it has worked towards West Bank constructing settlements and sending the Jewish high school, Yeshiwa, students for military service. Gush Eminent or the Block of Faithful movement was founded in 1974, and showed the new Mafdal face (Lustick, 1988). Jewish religionism and Zionist nationalism were both used to extract elements for the new religious-national ethos. Traditional Judaism was able to provide a historical fate to the community along with messianic redemption expectation. The secular Zionism, on the other hand would provide a national project territory centrality and the proactive 'messianic' dimension. There was a new colonial settlers' wave within the new messianic Zionism concept after the community and territory became religiously sanctified (Ibid).

There was an implicit tie between Zionism religion and nationalism during 1967 and early 1970s. Since then, it hasn't been negative altogether, entirely explicit and positive. In 1977, the fusion was crystallized in a political manner as it was the year when Labor was deposed from the power through Likud that was managed and headed by Menachem Begin. The middle-class Ashkenazi religious nationalists formed the new Likud regime main constituencies. The Mafdal party, nationalistic voters and the low class traditional Mizrachi represented them largely at this time.

The low-class Orient Mizrachim, during the 1980s, were amplified and politicized the traditionalist along with the 'ethnic'-Mizrachi-dimensions, their identity and the Shas party received their allegiance (Peled, 1998). 77 new settlements were attained within the West Bank between 1977 and 1984 by Menachem Begin as part of the Likud government (ICBS, 2004)¹. There is nearly an eleven fold increase, from 3200 to 36,900, in the number of settlers during this time period. The religious Zionists and state discrepancy widened when the Likud power took rise. The State was required to abide by the movement goals and if this occurred, there would be restraining upon the bifurcation and illegal political behaviour and confrontation was not required.

In the 1970s, peace was offered to Israel by Anwar Sadat of Egypt. From the strategic equation, Likud decided to make use of the Camp David Agreement and remove one of the most dangerous enemies. The Sinai returned after the offering of Sadat was accepted and the Israeli settlements were evacuated. Likud agreed and this disappointed the religious settlers that the party with the territorial nationalism philosophy would cruelly remove the Jews from the homeland which is ancient to them. Many of the religious settlers considered the activities of Likud as betrayal as they were disrespectful towards God's will (Sprinzak, 1991). Various Religious Zionists opposed the Camp David Agreements which showed the level of improvement for the Zionist consensus that had removed the Israeli political spectrum extremes. Over the years, the position was maintained as the settler movement was the Israeli concession main opponent. The Israeli concessions were related to the sovereignty and autonomy of Palestine. The Religious Zionists who did not settle within the West Bank, a large part of the community came to be known as the new Israeli civil religion (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983). A sacred status was given to the land with the help of faith, socialization mechanisms, holidays, symbols and distinctive religious faith. The Land was an end in itself and not a means to an end. It provided Jews with security

¹ ICBS (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). 2004. Israel Annual Statistical Report. Jerusalem: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

and a place where they could exist normally. It is believed that providing foreign control to the land would not be a bad policy but considered God's will.

Since 1980, the settlement movement, violence became a regular aspect. The Arab mayors of Ramallah and Nablus, were subjected to attempted assassination by the Jewish Underground who were Jewish terrorists. The attempted assassination took place in June 1980. Several violent activities against Palestinians were conducted by this group during 1980 and 1984. Before they blew up Palestinian buses in East Jerusalem, they were caught in 1984. A hand grenade was thrown in a crowd of individual who were protesting for peace in February 1983. In this activity, one individual was killed and several others were wounded. During the early 1980s, the worrying aspects were the religious cell plots by Gal and Hashmonaim. They aimed to destroy the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque since they were Muslim holy sites which were standing upon the Jewish Temple Mount ruins. Such events are considered highlights of the violent routine activities that occurred on a daily basis against the occupied Palestinian population territories. The public violence was condemned by the leadership of the movement, but they only criticized the activities vocally. The Zionist authorities and the political leaders explicitly authorized and justified the violence as *ex post facto* (Jones, 1999; Luz, 1988; Zertal & Eldar, 2004). During 1987 and 1991, the trend changed due to the political aspects. These political aspects were due to the rise of Yitzhak Shamir, the hawkish prime minister, to power. The first Intifada took place along with a mass Palestinian uprising that did not allow for future agreements in Palestine. The government provided strong support to the settlement movement which is why there was no confrontation with the state.

The Labor party was given power yet once again by the 1992 elections. The Palestinian national right was attained during the 1993 Oslo Accord. The principle of land for peace was consolidated and the West Bank and Gaza parts were transferred back to the Palestinian responsibility. Furthermore, Jewishness was altered in Israel and turned into a nationalist territorial cult. The new Jewish religionism and its primary principles are now part of the land and nation where God and religious faith are part of the third priority. Hence, the analysis must not be conducted upon the sacralisation of nationalism, but upon the religious nationalization. The bottom line remains the same for all aspects. The Israeli Jewishness is transformed from the religion of a nation to a national religion keeping an exception of some small ultra-Orthodox enclaves who would not accept the Zionism traditions (Ram, 2008).

Conclusion

In the present paper, the Zionist idea triggering aspects would be mentioned that encouraged the Jews all over the world to migrate to Palestine, settle within the nation and establish their own Jewish State within Palestine. Zionism nationalism was affected by British policies. In 1948, the Jewish state was formed since the Palestinian Arab community was weak in relation to the Jewish community that was robust, united and active. A Jewish community was formed by the Zionists with the help of the British mandate. The united political parties formed the pre-state structure based on a national cause since the Palestine Arabs political factions were quite disorganized.

The social structure change in Israel has been discussed. It was this change which brought about the development of Arab and Jewish communities. Yishuv, the Jewish community, was able to become an organized, qualified state that would apply the religious ideas upon nationalism to attain the Palestine land. The national movement became a part of the Jewish community with the institutions and the parties. The conflict had a strong side which was the Jewish community along with its organized state institutions. However, the Palestinian claim was weakened when rivalries arose between the political leaders of Palestine and their disloyalty towards the national movement. Hence, a weakness was observed due to the Palestinian conflict between parties and groups. On the other hand, the Jewish community became stronger against the neighbouring nations since they used the religious nationalism aspect to expand their territory within the Palestine land.

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