Theory of Reign, Shahid Sadr's Answer to the Question of Determinism

Hassan Lahootiyan1*; Behruz Muhammadimunfared 2

1 3rd Grade Student, Seminary, Qom, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Ethics, Islamic education, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran
lahotian@gmail.com; muhammadimunfared@ut.ac.ir

Abstract

The problem of determinism is one of the complicated philosophical and theological issues that various answers have been offered by the thinkers for its resolution. One of the exact and from one perspective exclusive answers belongs to Shahid Sadr. He has sought to distinguish between the question of "Who is the agent?" and "Is the agent free?" and in this way prevent from the confusion of theological and philosophical aspects. According to Shahid Sadr, the main question the answer of which can uproot determinism as a whole is the second question. The origin of this question can be traced back to the philosophical principle of "an object cannot exist as long as it has not turned necessary". According to this maxim, human actions become realized when they turn necessary. Now how could a man be free while his action has existential necessity? Having refuted the answers given by previous scholars, Shahid Sadr seeks after the solution in particularization of this rational maxim. He has suggested the "theory of Reign" as regards modalities of judgment. Thus, he rephrases the maxim as follows: "an object cannot exist but by necessity or Reign". The current essay is an effort for explanation of the theory of Reign and Shahid Sadr's answer to the question of determinism and the objections leveled against it and their answers.

Keywords: Shahid Sadr; Theory of Reign; Determinism; Free Will

I. Introduction

Explanation of human free will has been always one of the most challenging problems which are discussed by thinkers insofar even some scholars due to their inability of solving it have denied it and accepted determinism. There is no doubt that this issue is mainly dealt with in philosophy and theology and in these sciences we can find various answers proposed by the theologians and philosophers. However, among Muslim thinkers this issue not only has been discussed by the aforementioned sciences rather an independent chapter has been opened in the science of principles of jurisprudence that is devoted to the discussion of desire and will of the legislator (in the chapter of orders). This chapter is one of those points where we can find philosophical and theological views of the scholars of principles of jurisprudence and their power before the philosophers.
One of the contemporary scholars and thinkers of principles of jurisprudence is Shahid Seyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr who has developed numerous theories in different areas and his ideas due to its scientific power have been taken into account by researchers and scholars. He has also provided a detailed discussion of the issue of determinism and free will and evaluated it. In the notes of his lectures on principles of jurisprudence the answer to this question has been offered in two issues of "desire and will" and "rational good and badness". This answer is indeed a developed version of the answer given by later scholars of principles of jurisprudence like the author of Hashyah, Mohaqiq Naeini and Mohaqiq Khoei and its course of development can be clearly seen in the works of these key thinkers. Nevertheless, Shahid Sadr's answer due to its different explanation as well as new philosophical foundations upon which the discussion has been established can be considered as an independent answer. Some scholars have argued that Shahid Sadr's answer not only solves the question rather it opens a new path in philosophy and understanding of religious teachings and paves the ground for the presentation of a logical and philosophical interpretation of the Quranic verses and prophetic traditions without any hermeneutical interpretation. Moreover, interpretation of miracles and divine actions can be done without any further problem (Shahrudi, 2011, 1: 147).

Despite the expressed significance, unfortunately this new school has not been sufficiently assayed by the researchers and even those scholars who have turned to it, e.g. Causality and Human Reign according to Shahid Sadr (Berenjkar, 2013) and A Comparative Study of the Theory of Reign in Thoughts of Mohaqiq Naeini, Mohaqiq Khoei and Shahid Sadr (Esmaeili, 2013), have not sufficiently studied it and raised certain objections and considered it insufficient or defected. The author intends to explain the answer of Shahid Sadr in this article in a way that the aforementioned objections not to be able to challenge it. An appropriate explanation of this answer first requires an outline of his interpretation of the problem of determinism and after it a review of the offered answers particularly the answer of Mohaqiq Naeini. In the second stage one needs to express the disputes and objections of the solutions of others so that in this way the ground is paved for the delineation of the exact answer. The ultimate intention of this essay is the expression of the possibility and conditions of acceptance or denial of this new and unique theory.

II. Shahid Sadr's Interpretation of the Problem of Determinism and Free Will

Before starting his discussion, Shahid Sadr provides an analysis of the problem of determinism and free will and struggles to show the subject of dispute. He contends that this problem has two different aspects, i.e. philosophical and theological aspects (Abd Al Satir, 2003, 2: 58).

The first question is that who is the agent of the actions that are issued from man? This is a theological question not a philosophical one; because the answer to this question regardless of its being God (as suggested by Asharites) or man (as suggested by Mutazilites) or both (as suggested by Shia theologians) does not raise any philosophical problem but from theological point of view when we intend to defend the articles of faith and principles of Sharia the answer to such a question is necessary. For if man is not the agent of his actions religion and its orders are useless.

Shahid Sadr chooses the answer reflected in the prophetic traditions, i.e. "no determinism and no indeterminism rather the middle ground", for this theological question like all Shia theologians (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 29). However, since according to his view the main root of the problem of determinism lies in the second question, then he immediately passes the question of "who is the agent?" and raises the second question: "if the agent is free?"

The second question is more philosophical because it has its origin in the philosophical maxim "an object cannot exist as long as it has not turned necessary". In fact, human willpower is a counter example for this philosophical rule and challenges it and needs a philosophical justification.

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1 Mohammad Taqi Razi Isfahani better known as Sheikh Razi the author of Hedayat Al Mostarshidin who is also known as the author of Hashyah (1187 H.).
To explain this point one needs to argue that man for doing an action goes through four stages: he first conceives it then affirms its usefulness. After this he acquires enthusiasm for doing this action and when this enthusiasm was intensified and turned to a so called absolute enthusiasm finally the action takes place by means of the muscles (Ibn Sina, 2015: 289). We see that it is through this series of causes that the realization of the action becomes necessary. If there is such a necessity it cannot exist along with the free will; because willpower means that man has the power to choose and do whatever he wants himself. The man of free will is always faced with two options: doing and refusal of doing; while if we accept determinism there is only one option and nothing more. After conception, affirmation of usefulness, enthusiasm and will (which are all non-volitional), the action is necessarily realized and there is no reason for its failure of realization.

Shahid Sadr summarizes this question in the form of two premises insofar as the acceptance of these two premises together leads to the belief in the non-volitional nature of human actions:

First Premise: Willpower is in contradiction with necessity.

Second Premise: Philosophical rule "an object cannot exist as long as it has not turned necessary": If something does not come into existence it has surely found necessity in a previous stage (Abd Al Satir, 2003, 2: 66).

After the explanation of the disputed point as regards the question of determinism, Shahid Sadr provides a review of the answers that have been given to it. He mentions four answers each one of which propose an answer via the denial of one of the aforementioned premises:

III. Shahid Sadr's Perspective of the Answer of Mohaqiq Naeini

Shahid Sadr has chosen four proposed various solutions for the question of determinism and willpower and after their critical assessment found no one of them sufficient for tackling the question of determinism. Meanwhile Mohaqiq Naeini's answer has been taken into consideration by him more than other alternative solutions and he even implicitly accepts it. However, due to the objections that are raised against the detailed answer of Mohaqiq Naeini he seeks to find the main solution of the problem via its revision and completion. Therefore, precise understanding of the word of Mohaqiq Naeini can pave the ground for understanding the answer proposed by Shahid Sadr.

In this section of the paper we first shortly discuss three solutions offered by Muslim, Western and Modern philosophers along with the challenges which they are encountered with and then we turn to the idea of Mohaqiq Naeini and we explain it with the critical arguments of Shahid Sadr:

1- Answer of Muslim Philosophers:

The first answer is attributed to Muslim philosophers who deny the first premise because based on their view, an agent has a free will who "can act if he wants and can refuse to act if he does not want" (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 6, p. 308). Then if the will and desire in this sense is necessary the willpower is proven. Shahid Sadr considers this answer to be correct based on the interpretation that these philosophers offer of the free will but he does not think that this answer can tackle the question of determinism because this is not the meaning of volition that has triggered the question (Abd Al Satir, 2003, 2: 72). Rather willpower means choosing.

2- Answer of Western Philosophers:

The second answer is that of western philosophers like Hume who deny the law of causality (Copleston, 2007, 5: 300). They believe that human actions as compared to his will are contingent and even in the time of their occurrence they have not reached the state of necessity. Then there is no necessity so that it would be in contradiction with volition. Shahid Sadr in his criticism of this solution
correctly argues that the denial of causality and necessity is tantamount to acceptance of accident and chance not the demonstration of willpower. Then, according to this answer, human actions become the results of chance not volitional (Abd Al Satir, 2003, 2: 74).

3- Answer of Modern Philosophers:

Shahid Sadr attributes to this answer to the modern philosophers but he does not clearly explain to whom he is referring. They have also denied the first premise because they consider the difference between the volitional and non-volitional actions within the circle of possibilities of agent (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 438). In other words, when we compare human being with other objects we see that man has a wider circle of possibilities and states that he can takes as compared to e.g. a stone. Then, the movement of a stone can be easily foreseen and a physicist can easily determine the speed, direction, weigh and the place where the stone will fall according to the laws of physics. Nevertheless, the circle of states and possibilities of man is so wide that his actions are not predictable and it is only this man who can determine it. In this way the difference between volitional actions of man and the actions and states of other creatures is explained and volition is interpreted as the expanse of the circle of human possibilities and freedom. Then there is no contradiction between it and necessity.

Shahid Sadr has not accepted this answer and considers this interpretation of free will to be tantamount to the denial of willpower and the determinism itself; because volition interpreted in this way is in fact the result of our ignorance of all aspects of human action and is an elusive and unreal thing otherwise if we had a thorough knowledge of all aspects of human action we could foresee it and determine the next action. Then, this interpretation of willpower has its origin in our ignorance and is nothing but determinism not an answer to the question of determinism (Abd Al Satir, 2003, 2: 76).

4- Answer of Mohaqiq Naeini

The fourth answer belongs to Mohaqiq Naeini. However, according to Ajwad Al Taqrirat which has been authored based on his lectures, this answer has also been endorsed by a number of later scholars of principles of jurisprudence including the author of Hashyah (Khoei, 1973, 1: 90). Mohaqiq Khoei has also accepted the answer of his mentor, and explained it well (Fayyaz, 2002, 1: 397-403). Of course, we can find other proponents for this theory because this idea has also been attributed to some of the theologians (Khomeini, 2000: 57). Moreover, Shahid Sadr himself accepts the outlines of this answer and in fact, he considers his own answer to be the developed version of the latter answer (Abd Al Satir, 2003, 2: 83).

Anyway we follow the explanation of this answer in the words of Mohaqiq Naeini, Mohaqiq Khoei and Shahid Sadr:

To answer to this issue, Mohaqiq Naeini accepts the first premise and challenges the application of the second premise. He contends that willpower and its foundations are understood based on the rule of necessity and upon the existence of the cause of each one they come to existence. However, external action is not the effect of human will rather beyond human willpower there is another thing which is the causa adaequata of action and various titles are used to refer to it: desire, movement of soul, administration of soul, reign of soul and power enforcement of the soul. We know the existence of such thing by intuition (Kazemi Khurasani, 1997, 1: 132-133).

Mohaqqiq Khoei has taken a step further and considers the "soul's being an adequate cause" and "denial of the reign of soul" to be in conflict with our intuitions and also rational proofs (Fayyaz, 2002, 1: 397). It is against what we intuit inside because after the emergence of will and absolute enthusiasm we

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2 Even one of the annotators (Sheikh Hassan Abd Al Satir) who has interpreted the theory of Shahid Sadr and referred to his source has not succeeded to determine the owners of this answer and does not provide any reference in this part.
find in ourselves the power to refuse to pursue what we have willed and understand the reign of the refusal of doing a determinate action.\(^3\) It is against the proof because if the willpower is the adequate cause and there is no reign for the soul, there will be no difference whatsoever between the effects of the will and effects of other attributes of soul like fear, shame, wonder and so on and so forth. When a man, for example, fears, this fear has such effects as fainting, trembling and etc, which all occur in spontaneous fashion and this fear is the adequate cause of these effects. If he will is the adequate cause of the actions no difference should be found between the actions resulted from it and the effects expected from the fear state no matter one is volitional actions while the other constitutes the non-volitional actions. No change takes place via names! However, difference between these two types of actions is one of the self-evident truths. The evidence of the existence of this difference is that the men of reason describe the volitional actions as good and bad while these attributes are not used as regards the non-volitional actions.

Then, Mohaqiq Khoei provides two examples and draws two conclusions:

The first example is that someone is doubtful of choosing between two routes. Suppose that the first route is safe and has numerous advantages contrary to the second route that not only is dangerous it has no privilege over the other. Therefore, this person will confirm the profit of the first route and have enthusiasm for it not for the second route. Having said these, wouldn’t he still choose the second route? Doesn’t this reign and power exist for his soul? The answer to this question is clear by the conscience of everyone. Then, Mohaqiq Khoei draws the first conclusion: willpower is not the adequate cause and does not make the action to stand outside the reign and will of human being.

The second example is concerned with a person who is falling from a mountain. He has two options: either fall on his elder son and cause him to die or fall over his baby son and chooses his death. If this person supposedly chooses the baby son due to his attachment to the elder son, it is needless to say that not only he has no enthusiasm for this action rather this is an abhorrent action by him indeed. Since will is resulted from the enthusiasm then there is no will in this example. We have to search for the adequate cause in another place.\(^4\) Then, Mohaqiq Khoei concludes: if we accept that willpower is the adequate cause of the action, it is not the exclusive cause rather the existence of another object and cause is demonstrated and it is the reign and power of soul (Fayyaz, 2002, 1: 397-399).

Up to here the idea of Mohaqiq Naeini was expressed along with the explanations of Mohaqiq Khoei. Based on these, we can conclude that Mohaqiq Naeini suggests that when a man takes an action two distinct things happen:

1- Desire and exercise of power which itself an action of the soul not an accidental attribute of the soul like will. Of course, this is an action that is not the effect of the willpower and then it does not have necessity by-something-else. Rather the will is still in contingent state and it can do the action or leave it. Then the exercise of the willpower is outside the scope of the rule of necessity and is volitional.

2- External action occurs after the mental action and is its effect. The external action is a function of the rule of necessity and becomes realized when it has been necessitated by-something-else, but this necessity is not in conflict with the free will because it is not an alternative for willpower rather it is part of the hierarchy where the latter stands. Take it into consideration that here we are speaking of a hierarchy having the volition as its part not the will (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 440).

Accordingly, the question of determinism is answered. However, another question remains which has been noticed by Mohaqiq Naeini. What is the role of will in human volitional action? Does will have any effect on our actions? The answer given by Mohaqiq Naeini is as follows: we accept the role of

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\(^3\) Of course, the proof offered by Khoei is traced back to the intuition. This is indeed an informing proof that reminds us the intuition that underlies it.

\(^4\) This claim of Mohaqiq Khoei can be challenged because there is enthusiasm here and that is the attachment of the man to his elder son as compared to his baby son. Philosophers believe that enthusiasm is one of the main foundations of every action (Ibn Sina, 2015: 290).
willpower as preponderant. In other words, if absolute enthusiasm and will belong to an action its desire becomes preponderated by soul. Otherwise man does not desire any action in which he does not find any profit and have no enthusiasm for it. Then, the soul is the agent and the will is a preponderant that makes the soul's action relevant. There is difference between taking the will as the preponderant or consider it to be the adequate cause of the external action (Kazemi Khurasani, 1997, 1: 133). Generally speaking, one can say that these two scholars of principles of jurisprudence contend that what is challenging for the philosophers is indeed their baseless belief in the absolute nature of the rule of necessity. They consider this rule correct but only within the circle of natural and non-volitional effects; however, within the domain of volitional actions our mental intuitions suggest the invalidity of this rule in the domain of the soul's desire. Shahid Sadr's view of this answer is associated with some reflections. He shortly accepts this answer and asserts that the solution of the problem lies in the particularization of the rule of necessity but in its explanation he takes different strategy as compared to Mohaqiq Naeini and Mohaqiq Khoei and raises three objections of the views of these two scholars (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 35):

1- They have sought to solve this problem via distinguishing between the exercise of power by soul and the external action while exercise and action refer to the same thing and their difference depends on our point of view like creation and existence or influence and effect. Exercise is one and the same with action but from the point of view of the relationship it has with the agent and in view of its being his action. Then, it is not correct to consider the exercise to be outside the scope of the rule while the same is not done as regards the action because necessity is real and does not change by mental speculation.

2- Mohaqiq Naeini has particularized the rule of necessity and considered soul's desire and exercise of power to be outside this rule while the external action is an extension of this rule. The question is that why the external action was not considered to be outside the scope of the rule? What is the difference between the soul's desire and exercise of power on the one hand, and the external action, on the other? Both are actions and contingent. There is no occasion for this distinction.5

3- Mohaqiq Naeini claims that the action of soul lies outside of the rule of necessity by particularization. Since the latter rule is a rational rule this question must be answered that why this rule has been particularized regarding the soul's action? In other words, if the soul's action is not necessary and remains in contingent state then how could it be existent? If it has become necessary this falsifies the presupposition and is tantamount to acceptance of the rule as regards the soul's action. If it is contingent and has become existent why the same thing has not happened?

IV. Theory of Reign and Completion of Naeini’s View

Shahid Sadr in his search for finding the answer of this question has recognized that until the modalities of judgment are restricted to three relations of necessity, contingency and impossibility, the idea of philosophers is valid and the rule of necessity is an absolute and unparticularizable. Then his answer begins with the discussion of the modalities of the judgment and right here he has expressed his disagreement with the philosophers and proposed the theory of reign. Then, accordingly he has

5 Shahid Sadr believes that this distinction has been made by Mohaqiq Naeini of the external actions because he thought that by considering the external actions to be outside the scope of the rule of necessity and accept the contingency and lack of necessity as regards the external actions the same would be done as regards other genetic affairs and in this way we will not be able to demonstrate the existence of Creator. Then, in his discussion of external actions he has discussed the soul's action. However, he is forgetful of the fact if we can claim that contingency is insufficient as regards the soul's action the same can be said of other affairs because there is no occasion for the difference between the two (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 441).
particularized the rule of necessity and rephrases the answer of Mohaqiq Naeini in a form that no one of the earlier objections would be leveled against it and the question of determinism is strongly retorted. Therefore, we first discuss the theory of reign and then we return to the idea of Mohaqiq Naeini and show how Shahid Sadr has completed his answer with this theory:

1. **Concept of Reign:**

Shahid Sadr has propounded a fourth notion called reign along with the three modalities of judgment, i.e. necessity, contingency and impossibility. He believes that reign is the relationship of the volitional action in with the agent. "The agent's freedom of doing an action or refusing to do it is termed as reign" (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 441).

From this definition that has been offered by Shahid Sadr it becomes clear that reign is a relation by-something-else. To put it otherwise, philosophers divide the modalities of judgment into three types of what-is-by-itself, what-is-by-something-else, and what-is-in-relation-to-something-else. If reign is the relationship of action with the agent it cannot be by-itself or in-relation-to-something-else. In essential relations one cannot add a fourth notion because their restriction to necessity, contingency and impossibility is rational. However, when an entity is compared with its cause four states can be deemed: either this entity owes its necessity to the cause or not. If it owes it will be the necessary-by-something-else, if not either it is the cause that makes it impossible or not. In the first case, it will be impossible-by-something-else but in the second case we have two possible states: either the existence of the cause is sufficient for the realization of one of the sides or not. If it is not sufficient, it does not have the contingency-by-something-else because in philosophy it has been demonstrated that contingency-by-something-else is impossible as such. Then, it remains in its essential contingency state and its occurrence is by chance. However, if the existence of the cause is sufficient for the realization of one side, the relationship between this entity and its cause is what Shahid Sadr calls reign and he infers the notion of volition (free will or willpower) from it. In the following figure, this classification is clarified:
The concept of reign has commonalities and differences with the concepts of contingency and necessity. The commonality of contingency and reign is that the object that is described with these attributes has an equal status in relation to existence and nothingness. The difference between these two notions lies in the fact that reign is sufficient for realization of one side but this is not the case with contingency. Contingency is a relationship that an object has with its recipient while reign is a relationship between the object and its agent. Moreover, reign and necessity are both sufficient for the realization of an object but in necessity the realization of the object is necessary while there is no such necessity as regards the reign because if there is a necessity this is against the thesis of reign. In other words, there is a clear contradiction between the concept of "it can do it" and the concept of "it must do it" (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 36-37).

1- Demonstration of Existence of Reign in the Outside World

Although Shahid Sadr believes that reign like necessity and contingency is a self-evident truth which is intuited inside he does not suffice to this and provides a proof for it. This proof has been proposed for the first time by him but it seems that the critics of Shahid Sadr has not paid any attention to this proof and have passed it in silence.

The summary of his proof is that the following two rules have been demonstrated in their place:

1- Contingent-by-itself cannot be the cause of the impossible-by-itself;
2- Impossible-by-itself cannot be the effect of anything;

However, we can find a case where a contingent-by-itself is the cause for an impossible-by-itself and as a result both aforementioned rules are negated. This case is that if we consider two contradictive objects that do not have a third option, their simultaneous negation is impossible-by-itself. For example, kinesis and stasis for an entity are two contradictories whose simultaneous negation for the latter object is impossible. On the other hand, lack of preponderant for none of the contradictories in the chains of causes is possible by itself; because it is possible that none of them has any preponderant. Now if there is no preponderant no one of the kinesis and stasis are attributed to the object and this is impossible that an object is neither moving nor still. This lack of preponderant is the cause for the simultaneous negation of the contradictories; while if we accept the relationship of reign without needing any preponderant one them comes to existence (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 442).

It might be argued that reign exists in some cases like human soul's actions but in the domain of natural effects there is no reign. How do we answer the question in those cases?

The answer to this question can be given in this way that those natural effects in the chain of their causes reach to an agent which has a reign. In other words, whatever happens in the world is the action of a free agent and the natural causality finally returns to the volitional causality of God or man.

Keep it in your mind that Shahid Sadr insists that with this proof we can only prove the existence of the reign in the outside world but its demonstration is no longer possible for man and our only path to human reign over his actions is Sharia and intuition (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 37).

2- Particularization of Rule of Necessity with Reign

After demonstration of the reign relation we return to the issue of determinism. Mohaqiq Naeini develops the discussion up to the particularization of the rule of necessity. Shahid Sadr continues this discussion by noting that human action does not have necessity-by-itself; the reason asks: why did it come to existence? The answer of this question is not outside four probabilities:
- First Probability: It is necessary by something else and the cause gave this necessity to it. This probability is the rule of necessity and our presupposition in this regard is that in this case the rule is not applied because it leads to determinism.

- Second Probability: Essential contingency caused it to come to existence. This is also denied because it is clear that in the state of contingency, the relationship of the action to existence and nothingness is the same and contingency cannot be the preponderant of one of the sides. Moreover, if the contingency is a preponderant why it is not a preponderant in other contingent beings?! Furthermore, this answer cannot provide any understanding of volition because when something is in the state of contingency and without a cause it is chance not volition.

- Third probability: Desire and exercise of power of soul (as Mohaqiq Naqini suggests); this is not acceptable because the same question is repeated of this desire and action of soul and finally leads to the regressio ad infinitum.

- Fourth Probability: Action in relation to its agent (human soul) neither has necessity nor contingency rather it has reign and this reign is enough for the realization of action without having any necessity around. This fourth probability is the same answer that Shahid Sadr has chosen and considers it as what puts an end on the question of determinism (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 35).

To put it otherwise, Shahid Sadr after demonstration of the existence of the relationship of reign in the outside world proceeds to complete Naqini's view of particularization of the rule of necessity. He believes that the rule of necessity is an intuitive self-evident rule not syllogistic. Although some scholars have offered proofs of it (Tabatabaei, 1996: 58), it can still be traced back to the intuitive perception (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 36). The proof offered of it can be summarized as follows:

1- Contingent essence is of an equal status in relation to existence and nothingness;

2- Preponderance without a preponderant is impossible and reason says that a contingent entity cannot come into existence unless we have no preponderant;

3- If the preponderant does not give necessity of existence to the contingent entity the reason considers its existence impossible because that essence came to existence while it could have been nothing?

4- Conclusion: Contingent entity must first be necessitated and only after this it can come into existence;

Shahid Sadr contends that the whole point of this proof lies in the second premise and it is also an intuitive fact. In other words, the rule of necessity by its nature is nothing but the impossibility of preponderance without preponderant. Then we need to refer to our common sense as regards this rule and study this rule away from the terms and words only from the point of view of conscience and primordial nature.

Upon contemplation on the intuitive perceptions we recognize that contingent entities sometimes come to existence based on the relationship of necessity-by-something-else and sometimes with the relationship of reign. The first class is the extensions of the rule of necessity but the second class that includes human volitional actions lies outside this rule.

Our conscience understands this reign well because in many cases where there is no preponderant we preponderate an object over the other. For example, a hungry man who chooses between two types of food without having any preponderant or someone who is on the run and chooses one route instead of the other.

6 We consider human volitional actions as examples of the second class because there are other examples either, e.g. divine actions that can be understood in terms of the rule of reign. This is also the case with every entity that can be referred to as an entity of volition, e.g. Jinn. The reign relationship not only solves the problem of determinism rather it can also demonstrate divine volition.
other without having any preponderant; while if the rule of necessity and impossibility of the preponderance without preponderant were at work in these cases and the object for realization needed to be necessary by something else that hungry man would never be full. By the same token, the running man would stop and did not choose any of the routes. Then we see that the man preponderates without any preponderant resorting to his reign. In other words, in these cases where we know that the relationship of necessity never takes place due to the lack of preponderant it becomes clear that the relationship between the external action and the agent is of reign type.

The significant objection that can be raised here is that in those cases which were mentioned as examples there is a preponderant but we are ignorant of it otherwise this preponderant is clear in the divine knowledge and then no preponderance without preponderant has taken place. The unknown state of the preponderant cannot be a basis to conclude that there is no such thing.

In response, we would say that when we refer to our conscience we find the lack of preponderant not its state of being unknown. In other words, we do not infer the non-existence from the lack of intuition rather we have an intuition of the non-existence (Shahroodi, 1997, 2: 38).

To put it in a nutshell, human relationship with the action that occurs from him as its agent can be deemed in two ways: either their relationship is necessity or it is reign. Shahid Sadr argues that since we understand the lack of necessity by intuition then the relationship of reign is established. Then we can say that the rule of necessity which is an intuitive rule has been particularized by human volitional actions in which the relationship between the action and soul of man is the relationship of reign and the correct formulation of this rule is as follows:

"Object cannot come into existence but through necessity or reign" (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 442).

Then, volition which is inferred from human reign over his own actions does not have any conflict with the rule of necessity.

V. Evaluation and Criticism of Theory of Reign

After the explanation of the theory of reign and the answer of Shahid Sadr to the problem of determinism now we turn to the main objections of this theory and answer them one by one:

1- First objection and its answer:

When theologians consider man in their theological discussions as the agent of his actions, by agent they do not just intend the one who does the action rather the one who creates the action with his power, freedom and volition. Then, it is not so that theological question is merely concerned with agent without taking the volitional or non-volitional state of the action into consideration. Then, Shahid Sadr's restriction of the theological question to the agent's understanding without referring to its volitional or predetermined states is not correct (Berenjkar, 2013).

This objection is not correct because Shahid Sadr does not want to raise this question in theology rather he believes that the issue of volition and determinism can be analyzed into two independent questions and accordingly, two different approaches can be raised as regards it. It is correct that the theologians have given their answers without distinguishing between these two approaches but according to Shahid Sadr, such a distinction needs to be drawn for presentation of an exact answer and the main disputed point must be clarified well; because what uproots determinism is the answer to the second question otherwise the answer to the first question only determines the extension of the agent while the agent can be free or compelled. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, the first question does not have any relationship with philosophy and must be discussed in theology and the second question is also a question that must be dealt with in the domain of philosophy and not theology. Then, we need to keep these distinctions in mind.
2- Second Objection and Its Answer:

Restriction of three modalities is a rational restriction and we cannot add the concept of reign as the fourth modality of judgment. The concept of reign if refers to equality of the relationship of existence and nothingness it is part of the concept of contingency and what has the same equal status in relation to existence and nothingness cannot preponderate one of the two alternatives (Esmaeili, 2013).

In response to this objection we need to say that Shahid Sadr accepts the commonality of the concept of reign with the notion of contingency but due to the difference it has with it he does not consider reign as a subcategory of contingency. This difference, as we mentioned earlier, lies in the fact that reign contrary to contingency is sufficient for the realization of one of the two sides. This is our conscience that understands this difference. We have recognized that our actions despite their having an equal status in relation to existence and nothingness become realized and this shows a relationship but necessity and contingency and Shahid Sadr calls it reign. In explanation of the theory of reign we have shown based on rational restriction that by-something-else-relations are of four types not three types.

3- Third Objection and Its Answer:

Reign of soul and its exercise of power is not an alternative for it rather it is a higher category. The soul with its reign necessitates its volitional actions and it is not so that the issuance of action from the soul is not necessary but this necessity of action does not require the agent's necessity rather this necessity has its origin in the free will of the agent. In other words, the reign of soul and its exercise of power is a preponderant that disturbs the evenness of the scales of existence and nothingness (Esmaeili, 2013).

The critic wants to say that the agent's will is a cause or part of the cause and therefore with its presence the action turns necessary. However, this is confusion between two meanings of volition. In other words, volition is sometimes in the sense of act of choosing and it is this choosing that is an action of the soul and sometimes it refers to a type of power, capability or the state of “can do and can refuse to do”. The critic has chosen the first meaning while it is the second meaning that is discussed in the dispute otherwise the first meaning which is choosing or adopting or exercise of power (as Mohaqiq Naeini suggests) it is identical with the existence of action and they are also of the same extension. It is one single external entity which is called from one perspective the product of the creation of the agent and from other point of view it is called action (as we explained it in the first objection of Shahid Sadr to the theory of Mohaqiq Naeini); then what is said of external action is also said of the actions of soul. If the relationship of the action to the agent is necessity the relationship of the actions to the agent is also necessity and if it is reign it will be also reign. But the second meaning of volition is in conflict with the necessity-by-something-else because when it is said that the relationship of the action to the free agent is necessity by something else this is to say that the will of the agent turns the action necessary. In other words, existence of will is not separated from the existence of action and this is in conflict with the volition when we know that the will itself is un-volitional.

Shahid Sadr answers this question based on the second meaning of the willpower as follows: relationship of action with the free agent is the relationship of reign not necessity by something else. He means that though free will exists and human soul which is the cause of the action is present but the realization of the action is not necessary. To put it otherwise, according to the theory of reign, human soul despite its being the adequate cause of the action because its relationship with the action is not necessity rather reign then the issuance or non-issuance of the action from him is not necessary and at the same time it is sufficient for the realization of one of the sides. Then, there is no occasion for action necessity and agent necessity.
4- Fourth Objection and Its Answer:

Resorting to intuition for demonstration of reign of soul is not acceptable because intuition is obscure and it can be interpreted in different forms. For example, in this context the soul's reign can be understood as the volitional state of will (Esmaeili, 2013).

The answer to this objection can be found in the work of one of the annotators of the discussions of Shahid Sadr. According to this annotator, in the discussion of determinism and free will we refer to intuition for two times: first, in response to a theological question and in denial of Asharites who believe in determinism it is said that we intuitively understand our willpower and we, for example, understand the difference between the movement of a healthy hand and the movement of a hand that is trembling. Here intuition is restricted to our understanding of us as the agent of some actions. Thus, from this amount of intuitive understanding we cannot infer the soul's reign.

Secondly, in the answer to the philosophical question and also in demonstration of the soul's reign we refer to intuition and we consider this reign as a matter of intuition. Here presential knowledge is concerned with the reign of soul as such (Haeri, 2013, 1/2: 84); this is to say that Shahid Sadr claims that we understand the soul's reign inside us by presential knowledge. It is clear that such knowledge is not blurred and the objection is irrelevant.

Moreover, Shahid Sadr has not tried just to demonstrate the existence of soul's reign in the outside world via intuition rather he has also offered certain proofs. However, as we mentioned earlier, this argument only proves the existence of the reign in the outside world but the existence of reign for man should understood by intuition.

5- Fifth Objection and Its Answer:

Reign cannot be understood by intuition because such concepts as reign, desire and the like, are abstract notion that mind infers from the outside reality and what can be perceived by conscience is not a notion (Esmaeili, 2013).

This objection is baseless because what we understand as regards the reign relationship by intuition is the power and reign of soul over doing action in the outside world. In fact, external action is considered in relation to human soul, and the relationship of reign is inferred. As to the necessity by something else the same is done. In other words, effect is taken into account by adequate cause and the necessity by something else is inferred. Of course, as to the necessary by something else and impossible by something else the title is compatible with the interpretation offered of "what is by something else" but there is no such compatibility as regards the term reign because it is not endowed by "other". However, this verbal point does not cause any problem in the discussion.

6- Final Evaluation:

The quintuple objections as regards Shahid Sadr's theory were raised and discussed and the answers were outlined. Here the author offers certain remarks that can clarify the issue more:

Shahid Sadr's answer to the question of determinism can tackle all objections if a key point is accepted here and it is the denial of this point that will lead to the fall of the whole theoretical system. This point is as follows: "we understand the existence of reign over our actions by intuition and presential knowledge". It should be noted that intuitiveness of reign is exactly tantamount to its being understood via presential knowledge. This is not to say that something has been intuited and Shahid Sadr has interpreted it as reign rather the reign itself is the subject of presential knowledge.

If this claim is accepted there remains no way but sympathy with Shahid Sadr and the structure that has been founded by him is flawless; but if we do not understand this presential knowledge we cannot accept this answer although he has made numerous efforts to provide a proof of the existence of reign, demonstration of reign in the outside world is not tantamount to its being for man rather the
demonstration of existence of reign between soul and volitional actions needs presential knowledge or Sharia and no one can provide any proof for it. Then, we can finally accept the answer of Shahid Sadr only if we accept the existence of presential knowledge and intuition of soul's reign.

**Conclusion**

According to Shahid Sadr, the question of determinism and free will should be analyzed into two theological and philosophical problems. In the theological problem the question is that "who is the agent of actions that are issued from man regardless of the actions being volitional or not? But the philosophical question is that if the agent is free in his action?

Shahid Sadr endorses the stance of other Shia theologians as to the answer of theological problem. However, since he sees the problem of determinism as having its root in philosophical question he shortly discusses the theological problem and leaves it aside fast.

In his response to the philosophical question he criticizes the quadruple answers that have been offered by other scholars and explains his own answer as follows:

1- The reign relation can be demonstrated along with necessity by-something-else and impossible by-something-else based on intuition and rational proofs.
2- Reign is the attribute of an object as compared to its cause.
3- Reign like contingency is of equal status in relation to existence and nothingness but contrary to contingency for its realization one of the two sides is enough; however, contrary to necessity it does not make the realization of the thing necessary.
4- The rule of necessity is not a demonstrative rule rather it is intuitive.
5- The reason says that two things can make something's existence correct: necessity by-something-else and reign.
6- We intuitively understand our relationship with our actions which are of reign type.
7- Rule of necessity is specified and volitional actions of man lie outside it.
8- The correct formulation of the rule of necessity is as follows: "an object cannot exist but by necessity or by reign".

Accordingly, Shahid Sadr has answered the question of determinism by specification of the rule of necessity.

After explanation of Sadr's answer the quintuple objections that have been raised as regards his answer are discussed and retorted. Finally, it is concluded that Shahid Sadr's theory and his answer to the question of determinism can be complete if we accept the presential knowledge of the existence of reign.

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