



## Discrimination Against Minority Religious Adherents in Madura: Belief Intervention, Worship Places Closure, and Political Rights Denial

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### Abstract

This study focuses on examining the existence of minority religious groups in Madura, along with the various forms of discrimination they experience. The minority groups in question are (former) Shia Muslims in Sampang and the *Sunni Salafi* Muslim group in Pamekasan, both of which have been recorded as having experienced discrimination from the local community, both culturally and structurally. Starting from the intervention of beliefs that led to the initiation of Shia Muslims into *Sunni*, the forced closure of places of worship, and the denial of their right to political participation in the 2023 General Election. This study is a field study conducted based on a qualitative approach. Two types and sources of data are used: primary and secondary. After analysing field data, this study found that the existence of minority Muslims in Madura has tended to experience discrimination. The discriminatory treatment includes the intervention of beliefs, such as forcing Shia Muslims to abandon their beliefs and convert to *Sunni*, closing down places of worship (mosques) of *Sunni Salafi* Muslims in Pamekasan, and finally, the pressure or mobilisation of the masses containing messages rejecting the use of political rights of (former) Shia Muslims to participate in the 2024 general election (Pemilu), both legislative and executive elections.

**Keywords:** *Discrimination; Minority Religions; Intervention; Places of Worship; Denial of Political Rights*

### Introduction

In the last decade, issues and cases of discrimination and exclusion against minority religious groups in Madura have been widely discussed by many groups. In 2011 and 2012, the issue of discrimination against minority religions surfaced along with the terror and expulsion of minority Shia Muslims in Sampang (Sudarto, n.d.). In 2021, this case became even more widely discussed after the intervention of faith, where hundreds of Muslims took oaths of allegiance, abandoning their beliefs as Shia followers and converting to *Sunni*. For (former) Shia Muslims of Sampang, taking oaths of allegiance and converting to *Sunni* teachings is the only way and solution that they must do, with the hope of being able to return home after almost ten years of being expelled and displaced to areas outside Madura. Furthermore, sure enough, after taking an oath of allegiance in 2023, hundreds of (former) Shia

Muslim residents of Sampang were allowed to return to their hometowns, even though, at the same time, they had to sacrifice their religious beliefs (Eben Lumbanrau, 2020).

Two years after taking their oath and choosing to be loyal followers of the *Sunni* teachings, the hope of enjoying a normal life with residents like ordinary citizens has not yet been fully felt by them. Not long after they returned and lived in their residence, there was pressure or mobilisation from certain individuals through messages on billboards, which contained an invitation to reject the political participation of (former) Shia Muslim residents of Sampang in the upcoming 2024 general election (*Pemilu/ Indonesian: Pemilihan Umum*). Ironically, as information spread in the media, the pressure and rejection were known to have come and originated from the surrounding community, who were considered to have not yet fully accepted the return and presence of (former) Shia Muslims in their residence (Syah, 2023). At this limit, the behaviour and discriminatory actions of residents against the political rights of (former) Shia Muslim residents of Sampang, whether acknowledged or not, have not only worsened the dark record of the discourse on freedom and civil rights in Madura but more than that have also confirmed some academic theses, which claim that the culture and religious typology of Madurese society tends to be discriminatory against minority religious groups, especially those motivated by (Islamic) sects (Radio, 2014).

Meanwhile, at the academic level, studies around the issue of discriminatory actions or behaviour against the lives of (former) Shia Muslims in Madura and minority religious groups in general have been carried out. Based on tracing previous studies, the general tendency of studies on it so far can be grouped into three: first, acts of discrimination against minority religious groups in Madura occur as a logical consequence of the strong tradition and paradigm of religious conservatism of the Madurese people, both at the level of understanding and practice (Ida & Dyson, 2015; Masykuri, 2017). Related to this, Najib Burhani (2019) provides a fairly interesting description. According to him, although religiously, the Madurese people are known to be quite attached to the religious traditions of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), the NU religious culture generally applicable in the local community has certain characteristics; namely, NU feels conservative (Burhani, 2019). Second, studies on discrimination against minority religious groups in Madura have so far been more associated with the *Sunni*-Shia conflict case in Sampang, especially the bloody events in 2011 and 2012. In this case, the issue of discrimination is associated with restrictions on their religious rights, most dominantly the expulsion and efforts to relocate them from their place of origin to the location of expulsion. Disclosure of discrimination at this level is relatively minimal and normative (Humaedi, 2014; Khoiri & Chamankhah, 2021). It has not touched on many current issues and cases, especially since the oath of allegiance to (former) Shia Muslims of Sampang in 2021 and the rejection of their political rights in 2023.

Based on the description of the previous study above, this study has a special interest and purpose in complementing several shortcomings or weaknesses in previous studies. Suppose previous studies mostly correlated the issue of discrimination against minority religions in Madura with the *Sunni*-Shia conflict in 2011 and 2012. In that case, this study takes a focused perspective by analysing some issues and cases of discrimination that occurred in a recent and contemporary time. For example, the initiation of Shia Muslims into *Sunni* and the rejection of their political rights in the upcoming 2024 General Election. In addition, another differentiating factor lies in the type of study that focuses more on its study based on a specific social context and is empirical in the form of a more complex case study, not only cases of discrimination against (former) Shia Muslims in Sampang but also cases of discrimination against other minority religions, for example, the forced closure of houses of worship (mosques) of the *Sunni Salafi* Muslim group in Pamekasan.

In general, the urgency and significance of this research are based on the argument that so far, there has been no field research that specifically examines the issue of discrimination against minority religious groups in Madura in the case of the initiation of (former) Shia Muslims in Sampang, the rejection of their political rights after the initiation, and the case of discrimination against *Sunni Salafi*

Muslims in Pamekasan. This is also a new dimension of this research that has not been revealed and exposed in some previous studies. To reveal, trace, explore, and answer many important issues above, at least two research questions have been attempted to be raised in this research: How is the existence or presence of minority religious groups in Madura? What are the discriminatory treatments that have been experienced by minority religious groups in Madura? How have discriminatory actions against minority religious groups in Madura operated and been carried out so far?

## **Result and Discussion**

### **Socio-Religious Description of Madurese Society**

Madura Island, popularly known as Salt Island, is located northeast of Java Island with coordinates of around seven degrees south latitude and between 112 and 114 degrees east longitude (Ma'arif, 2015, p. 24). Based on Hubb De Jonge's explanation (1989), Madura Island can be divided into West Madura and East Madura (De Jonge, 1989, p. 21). However, despite dividing Madura into two regions, Hubb De Jonge did not explain further the differences in the social systems, especially those concerning the cultural system, values, and norms. This fact then gave rise to the conclusion that, although territorially, Madura Island consists of many islands, in terms of socio-culture, Madurese society is still dominated by a local cultural system guided by religious values (Rifai, 1993). Sociologically, these religious values are depicted in the strong religious symbols on Madura Island, especially those centred on socio-religious movements and organisations in the local community.

An interesting fact about the existence of Islamic boarding schools in Madura lies in their Islamic characteristics and typology. Based on data collection in the field, although so far the religious traditions of the Madurese community have been strongly influenced by the NU, in reality, not all religious cultures in Madura are affiliated with the NU Islamic organisation; some others base their religious traditions on other Islamic mass organisations. Thus, NU is not the only Islamic mass organisation in Madura; several Islamic mass organisations also exist and develop to colour the religious dynamics of the local community, both Islamic mass organizations that carry the spirit of modern, classical, or traditional religious understanding to social security organizations that carry the spirit of progressive religion. Likewise, based on the dimensions of understanding, many Islamic religious understandings are developing in Madura (Dzulkarnain, 2016).

Although most Muslims in Madura are known as adherents of the teachings of Islam *ahli sunna wal jamaah*, outside of that, other Islamic understandings or teachings have also developed, even including mainstream Islamic understandings, such as Shia understanding example. In Madura, Shia Islam is classified as a minority; the number of their followers is relatively small and rarely found. Unlike *Sunni* in general, Shia Muslim groups in Madura are only concentrated in a few places, where their existence is centralized in Sampang Regency, precisely in Karangpenang District. Like minority religious groups in general, the lives of Shia Muslims in Madura are often faced with complex and problematic social situations, all of which reflect the existence of unfair practices against them in accessing their civil rights as legal citizens in Indonesia. Some of these unfair practices include discrimination, intimidation, and terror, and in certain situations, they have even been expelled from their homeland. Most recently, they have also experienced rejection from residents to exercise their political rights in local elections. A further and in-depth explanation regarding the practice of discrimination against minority Muslim groups in Madura will be described by the author in the next sub-discussion.

### **Discrimination Against the Shia Muslim Minority in Madura**

The conflict between *Sunni* Muslims and Shia Muslims in Sampang Madura occurred in 2012, and this conflict was marked by the local community's rejection of the presence of Shia in Sampang, which was then followed by acts of intimidation, terror, and destruction (Hamdi, 2014). Based on the

chronology, the bloody conflict between *Sunni* and Shia in Sampang has a fairly long series of events. Symptoms in that direction have begun to be seen since 1998, precisely when the preaching of Ustaz Tajul Muluk as the leader of Shia received a warm welcome from the community and increased the number of Shia followers in Sampang from year to year (Afdillah, 2016). According to the results of an investigation by the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), the disharmonious *Sunni*-Shia relationship in Sampang, Madura, began to lead to physical and open conflict in 2004, which was marked by acts of terror and intimidation against Ustaz Tajul Muluk as the local Shia leader, Shia residents, Tajul Muluk's house, and also his Misbahul Huda Islamic boarding school. The terror and intimidation continued in the following years, in 2006, 2009, and 2011, and reached its peak in 2012 (KONTRAS Surabaya, 2012).

The conflict between *Sunni* and Shia Muslims in Sampang-Madura is perhaps the worst precedent in the history of religious life in Madura, especially in the discourse on freedom of religion or belief. The reason is that in this incident, there were various negative treatments and actions against Shia Muslims in Madura, who are a minority group in Madura. These negative actions include intimidation, terror, expulsion, and coercive actions in the form of forcing them to abandon their Shia understanding or teachings and to become followers of *Sunni* teachings, as are Muslims in Madura in general. As a result of this bloody incident, one Shia resident died on the spot after being slashed with a sharp object, dozens of Shia Muslim residences in Sampang were burned down by the masses, as were places of worship and Islamic boarding schools which were the centers of their daily educational and religious activities. Not only that, since this conflict erupted in 2011, Shia Muslims in Sampang have had to leave their hometowns. They were forced to leave their homes and belongings because of rejection and threats from residents. In 2013, after living in the Sampang Regency Sports Hall (GOR), the Shia residents of Sampang were then relocated to Sidoarjo. In 2021, some Shia Muslims in Sampang received permission to return to their hometowns after they were willing to take their oath of allegiance, leave Shia teachings, and enter *Sunni* teachings (Rachman, 2012).

On November 5, 2020, the handling of the Shia Sampang case entered a new phase, precisely after the willingness of many Shia groups to take a pledge, abandon their beliefs as Shia adherents, and become *Sunni* Muslims. Based on field data tracing, in this pledge process, more than 270 Shia Sampang residents led directly by Tajul Muluk took a pledge as followers of the *Sunni* teachings. After almost ten years in the refugee camp, there was no way for them to be able to obtain their rights and freedoms in life. Becoming *Sunni* was the only way for their existence to be accepted by the residents, living a normal life like the lives of society in general (Eben Lumbanrau, 2020).

A polemic arose in the community and several social institutions regarding the oath of allegiance. Some of them saw the oath of allegiance of Shia Muslims of Madura as a step forward in handling the Shia-*Sunni* Sampang case in Madura, which had been going on for years in place. Moreover, as acknowledged by the Shia Sampang Madura group conveyed by its leader, Ustaz Tajul Muluk, the oath to leave the Shia teachings and enter the *Sunni* understanding was a personal decision, a decision they took based on self-awareness, not because of coercion or pressure from other parties outside of them. Apart from that, another view also emerged that was against it, that the oath of allegiance to Shia Muslims of Sampang in Madura was a form of violation of the right to freedom of religion. The state seemed weak in guarding the existence of Shia Muslims of Sampang, so the fate and existence of Shia Muslims of Sampang dragged on and went nowhere. Therefore, in the view of this group, the oath made by the Shia Muslim group of Sampang was an act of their desperation to be able to access justice when the state tended to let go. Moreover, as commonly understood, there is an impression that the initiation of Shia Muslims in Sampang in Madura tends to be forced, even having a series of systematic and structured events involving many parties and certain groups. Ironically, a source states that this coercive practice involves state officials and local religious elites, such as the local government and kyai or ulama circles (BBC News Indonesia, 2020).

In the context of the religious conflict case involving *Sunni* and Shia Sampang in Madura, starting from the conflict to their initiation, it is impossible to exclude the case from political issues, both national and regional politics. Even ahead of the 2024 General Election, based on field data tracing, some large billboards or banners appeared that prohibited Shia Muslims from using their political rights to participate in the 2024 General Election. This fact was revealed through the confession of Mr. Kholik, one of Team 5 handling the Shia-*Sunni* Sampang conflict, who then received a report on the existence of the banner or billboard.

### Rejection of Political Rights of Minority Shia Muslims in Madura

Discrimination against Shia Muslims in Sampang Madura has been a long-standing problem, with reports of violence and persecution against this minority group. Despite being Indonesian citizens, Shia Muslims in Sampang Madura continue to face challenges in exercising their political rights and freedoms. Discrimination against the minority Shia Muslims in Sampang, Madura, has various dimensions, including political rights. This situation emphasizes how the problem of discrimination against them occurs in a fairly complex and comprehensive space. Although initially, the big issue was about religion or belief, in its development, it also spread and expanded to other dimensions, even in the most substantial realm of nation and state, namely political rights.

Based on the results of field data tracing, efforts to discriminate against Shia Muslims in Madura in terms of political rights can be seen from the emergence of some mobilizations and campaigns, which contain messages rejecting the use of political rights for minority Shia Muslims. This fact was revealed through the confession of Kholik, one of Team 5 handling the Shia-*Sunni* conflict in Sampang, who at that time received a report of the banner or billboard. In practice, the Shia minority in Sampang faces various forms of political discrimination, such as restrictions on the right to vote and be elected. Some members of the Shia community have difficulty exercising their right to vote due to social or administrative pressure. Injustice in political representation, the absence of representatives from the Shia community in local government structures makes it difficult for them to voice their interests. Stigmatization in political participation: Members of the Shia community are often considered a religiously deviant group, so their political participation is ostracized or hampered.



Figure 1. Banner rejecting the use of political rights for former Shia Muslims in Sampang in Madura  
Source, field documentation (11/21/23)

### Forced Closure of *Salafi* Minority Muslim Mosque in Pamekasan

One month after the case of the forced disbandment of Hanan Attaki's religious study group in Pamekasan in 2023, a case of discrimination with religious motives occurred again in Pamekasan. The only difference is, this time, it is more about the forced closure of a public place of worship, namely the *Sunni Salafi* Muslim mosque in Pamekasan (Agency, 2023). Based on field data collection, this case began with allegations of defamation against a great figure and founder of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), Kyai

H. Hasyim Asy'ari, which was carried out by a *Salafi* religious figure, Ustaz Yasir Hasan, in a religious assembly activity at a mosque that was broadcast live via the internet (streaming) on the social media channel, Youtube. In his presentation, Ustaz Yasir stated that the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad's Birthday, as usually done by some Muslims in Pamekasan, is heresy, and the founder of the Islamic mass organization *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) KH Hasyim Asy'ari according to the Ustaz did not allow such activities. The religious statement immediately went viral and invited pros and cons in the community, not only protests but also mass action (Efendi, 2023).

The peak was the mobilization and mass movement, especially from the Nahdiyyin community (the term for NU followers) of Pamekasan. They demanded that Ustaz Yasir apologize openly and urged the police to immediately process the law because they considered the perpetrators to have committed hatred and blasphemy. Not only that, along with the action, the community also forcibly closed the *Salafi* mosque, which was the place for their daily religious activities. Interestingly, the village head also participated in this mosque closing action. Even a few hours before the action took place, the local village officials had already gone to the field, ordering the mosque to be sterile from all forms of religious activities. To ensure this, local village officials removed all facilities, such as electricity and loudspeakers. They blocked all entrances to the mosque so that religious activities could no longer function and run as usual (Ferdian, 2023).

### **Analysis of Actors in the Practice of Discrimination Against Minority Religions in Madura**

Reflecting on the experience of previous cases, almost all practices of religious discrimination in Madura are accompanied by social conflicts, ranging from horizontal to vertical. Interestingly, based on their mode of operation, most religious conflicts have the same instruments and patterns, namely both relying on and utilizing religious elements at the discursive and structural or institutional levels. At the discursive level, religious conflicts are built by certain parties by building negative narratives that lead to claims of heresy and deviation. Meanwhile, at the institutional level, conflicts or disputes in religious discrimination cases in Madura usually involve community organizations and local religious figures. The big question is whether these instruments and patterns are also found in religious discrimination cases in contemporary Madura. If so, who are the parties or actors often involved in violating the right to religious freedom in Madura?

To answer the above question, one interesting and quite relevant theory is cited in this study: Freeman's grand conception of stakeholders. In particular, this theory does not present a theoretical review that examines the dynamics of acts of religious discrimination or conflict. However, at a certain level, Freeman's formulation and thoughts regarding the interactive relationship between groups, individuals, and interests with organizational goals in society's structure or social institutions strongly connect with this study (Freeman et al., 2021). Moreover, as explained by Heiner Bielefeldt, the practice or act of religious discrimination, whatever the motive, absolutely requires the existence of interests and the presence of certain parties as intellectual actors behind it (Bielefeldt & Wiener, 2021, pp. 26–29). As in conflict, the terminology of interest here contains a dynamic meaning but is not far from the element of subjective desires or desires that must be fulfilled in the form of material, such as natural resources, or immaterial, such as self-esteem and thoughts. Power is included in the category of immaterial interests; arguably, this aspect is the most dominant variable triggering conflict and the practice of acts of religious discrimination (Susan, 2010).

Another keyword in understanding Freeman's stakeholder theory is the concept of an actor. Etymologically, in the popular sense, an actor is identical to a person or party who plays an active role in an important event. In addition, it can also be understood as the brain behind various deviant acts such as riots, arson, and murder (Stieb, 2009). Based on their level of importance, Freeman divides actors into three groups: the main actor group, supporting actors, and key actors. The main actor is the party directly connected to the source of interest. Usually, the main actor plays a dominant role as a subject that

produces and controls every dynamic in the field. Because of this central role and position, the existence and movements of the main actor are difficult to detect. He rarely appears on the surface except in certain situations and conditions (Fernando, 2021). Borrowing Adam Smith's language, the main actor is the power of invisible hands that can produce and reproduce to control the situation (Efendi, 2023).

How do you understand the existence and role of the main actor in the context of religious discrimination cases in Madura? It is quite easy to answer because, reflecting on many religious cases in Madura, the groups or parties that often appear on the surface are often religious parties or groups with quite a large social capital influence, both in terms of political power and mass. Based on field data tracing, at least two local religious structures are identified as playing a role as the main actors in cases of religious discrimination in Madura, namely religious organizations and the existence of kyai as influential local religious figures in Madura (Abd Hannan & Zainuddin Syarif, 2020). In practice, at the level of religious organizations, the concrete form of the role and involvement of religious organizations as the main actors in cases of religious discrimination in Madura can be traced to the role and involvement of the Pamekasan Islamic Community Movement (GUIP) organization in the alleged blasphemy case committed by Kyai Fathor in Pamekasan. Likewise, in the case of religious discrimination against Shia Muslims in Sampang, the role and religious organizations were identified through the involvement of the Indonesian Ulama Council in the Sampang region, which at that time issued a fatwa on heresy and deviation against Shia adherents in Sampang. In addition to the MUI institution (Susan, 2018).

Interestingly, based on field data findings, structurally, most of the above religious organizations were established and operated under the leadership and control of local religious figures in Madura, starting from kyai and Lora (special terms for young kyai in Madura) Hannan & Syarif, 2022). This finding also serves as an explanatory variable for the involvement of kyai as one of the main actors behind the practice of violating the right to freedom of religion or belief in Madura. This thesis is also strengthened by some previous studies that specifically examine the correlation of the role of kyai with religious issues or conflicts in Madura that lead to the practice of narrowing public rights at the religious level, one of which is a study conducted by Abd A'la (2018), *Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism to Authoritarianism*. In this study, A'la explains that the massive development of Islamic organizations among kyai, especially those with right-wing leanings such as the *Madura Young Kyai Forum* (FKM) and the *Madura Ulama Alliance* (AUMA), to certain limits, has triggered an increase in religious constellations within Muslims in Madura (A'la et al., 2018). From the constellation at the level of interests (political), the struggle for influence, and social movements to the constellation of religious thought that leads to claims of misguidance and deviation against other religious groups or organizations outside it.

According to Freeman, the second actor cluster is the supporting group, which helps or encourages handling and resolving cases. According to Freeman, different from key actors, groups or individuals who play the role of supporting actors do not have a direct connection to interests, only that they are bound by a sense of care and concern so that they also speak out (Freeman et al., 2021). What needs to be emphasized here is that supporting actors can emerge from two different directions, simultaneously representing interested parties in polemics or conflict. Like two sides of a knife, within certain limits, as long as they can present objective and professional views, supporting actors can positively impact clarifying and handling cases. Likewise, if supporting actors are not clear in reading the situation or even colluding with the main actors, their role and existence can make practices or cases of violations even more complicated and difficult to control.

Related to this study, who are the parties or groups of supporting actors in the case of religious discrimination in Madura? Based on field data collection and observing the roles and functions of various parties who at that time took part in the dynamics of religious discrimination cases in Madura, the role and existence of supporting actors are often dominated by several non-governmental organizations, which institutionally focus on following and overseeing issues of freedom and Human Rights (HAM). In the

case of the *Sunni-Shia* conflict, for example, the role of supporting groups in this incident was demonstrated by the *Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence* (KONTRAS) and the Surabaya Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) (KONTRAS Surabaya, 2012). This refers to the active role of both in providing legal protection and defense for Shia Muslims in Sampang in Madura as objects or victims of the restriction of the right to freedom of religion or belief in Madura. In addition to non-governmental organisations, the regional People's Representative Council is included in this group of supporting actors. Through its functions and authorities in several related commissions, the DPR can actually exercise control. However, in many cases of violations in Madura, they often do not speak up much and tend to be silent. This is because most practices and acts of religious discrimination in Madura often overlap with the political interests of the majority group.

The last actor cluster in handling religious cases, according to Freeman's stakeholder theory, is the key group. Based on a review of its popular meaning, the term key is identical to a door opener, the main determinant of whether something works. Normatively, Freeman defines the term key actor as a party or group with the authority to make decisions in certain cases according to their level (Mahajan et al., 2023). Based on this understanding, it is clear that key (actors) play a fairly central and vital role in handling and resolving certain problems, including in religious discrimination cases. Because of this vital role and position, the role of key actors cannot be operated by just anyone but is limited to certain groups or groups with institutional legality and authority.

Likewise in other cases of religious discrimination, for example, the closure of the *Sunni Salafi* mosque in Pamekasan, the forced dissolution of Hanan Attaki's religious studies, accusations of blasphemy against Kyai Fathor in Pamekasan, rejection of the construction of a Christian Church in Ketapang Sampang, the burning of the MWCNU Lenteng Office in Sumenep, rejection of KH.H. Imamuddin al-Bantani in Pamekasan, all the series of practices of religious discrimination assume the weakness of key actors (the state) in carrying out their responsibilities in society. Ironically, in the case of the closing of the *Sunni Salafi* mosque in Pamekasan, the state apparatus should play the main role as the key actor in carrying out the functions of supervision, handling, and providing a sense of security and comfort for its citizens to carry out teachings and rituals of worship according to their beliefs and religion, the facts on the ground show a reality that is still far from the truth.

In many cases, the state, through several of its apparatuses, is clearly and known to be involved in carrying out acts of religious discrimination against its citizens, as shown by the village head (Kades) of Nyalabuh Laok Pamekasan when sealing the mosque in Madura. The thesis on state involvement in acts of religious or belief discrimination in Madura resonated with the findings of the Setara Institute, where out of 422 violations of religious freedom in 2020, 238 acts, or 56.4%, were carried out by state actors. The state actors who committed the most religious violations were the local government and the police, each with 42 acts. The prosecutor's office was recorded as having committed 14 violations of religious freedom (Lidwina, 2021).

## Conclusion

Based on the reading above, several main points are the conclusions of this study. First, since the outbreak of the bloody conflict between Shia Muslims and *Sunni* Muslims in Sampang Madura, a series of discriminatory events against minority Muslim religious groups in Madura have occurred from time to time. One of the cases of discrimination that has attracted a lot of public attention in the last two years is the case of the oath of allegiance of Shia Muslims in Sampang, the rejection of political rights of (former) Shia Muslims in Sampang in the 2024 Election, and no less crucial is the forced closure of public places of worship (mosques) of *Sunni Salafi* Muslims in Pamekasan (2023). These acts of discrimination clearly illustrate that the reality of social life in Madura is not completely free from practices of violations and restrictions on the principles of freedom, both freedom of religion or belief and civil liberties to obtain



political rights like citizens in general. Second, from the perspective of human rights law, the strengthening of discriminatory practices against the existence of minority religious groups in Madura is a crucial issue, not only for the sustainability of social stability in the local community but also for the order of national and state life. Thus, it is clear that the aspects of religious civil, political, and political freedom are all part of the basic rights of every citizen who has received a clear legal umbrella, both national and international law. The right to freedom of belief and a particular religion and the right to obtain civil and political freedom are given; both exist naturally since humans are born, so their existence cannot be disturbed, let alone intervened, by anyone, even the state.

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