Abstract

This paper explains the dynamics of the struggle of local elites in the Gorontalo region. After the formation of Gorontalo as a province, Gorontalo local elites gained their political position in government power. The elite in question is divided into three groups, namely the government elite, non-government elite, and non-elite. These three groups ultimately helped to color the circulation of the elite in Gorontalo in the struggle for power in the government.

Keywords: Local Elite; Gorontalo

Introduction

In the period 1998 to 1999, Indonesia was in the transition from the new order regime to the reform era. The new order regime under Soeharto's leadership, which tends to be authoritarian, will certainly face the spirit of democratization which is the source of the wave of reform. Those two things certainly don't have a meeting point. After that, many academics and practitioners said that democracy had gone too far, this was caused by the New Order regime which still haunted the journey of reform. Not all tyranny in the form of new order political practices disappeared in the political arena both at national and local levels. On the other hand, we know that the grip of the new order does not necessarily make people anxious about any actions taken by the state with its apparatus. Therefore, the state and its apparatus are increasingly active in improving performance in accordance with the demands of reform. The style of the elite of the new order had to adjust to the wave of euphoria post-reform. After that, there was a mapping between the national and the local ones, this was marked by the demand of the community for the livelihoods of local communities which had been limited by the central government. This dynamic has given birth to a new chapter in Indonesian politics, the presence of Law Number 32 of 2004 about the implementation of regional government is one of the products of these demands. The element of recognition of the sovereignty of local communities is valued by the state through regulation of direct regional elections at the regional level. This position illustrates that the local community is given a full role in determining the regional head.

In general, political transformation has contributed to the social changes that have crossed the five periods of time in Gorontalo, namely: pre-Islamic era (1525 AD), Islamic era (1525-1800), colonial era (1889-1942), independence (1945-1997), as well as the reform era (1998 - present). Throughout the historical period, around 627 years to this day people have - at least cared for their memory collectives -
the criteria for transformative works called ilomata. Throughout history, there have also been four transformative masterpieces carried out by four legendary figures, called ilomata wopato (Niode, 2012).

The event of political transformation has certainly updated its own records for Gorontalo, where of course there are no similarities between events in one period and another. However, it should be underlined that from this period to the independence era there was still a strengthening of the oligarchy in the dynamics of Gorontalo local politics. The focus of this paper is to see the reform era up to now more specific to elite oligarchs in local politics. The dynamics in this era are interesting to see, where there is a tendency for the process of transforming elite oligarchs into post-reform political arena. In this arena, it is linked to Kartodirjo's (1981) view of the existence of traditional elites and modern elites can be used in reading the arena of Gorontalo's local political constellation in the post-reform era.

What is Elite?

The word elite has been used in the seventeenth century, where the word refers to ownership of valuables or high quality. Over time, this word was extended not to the concept of ownership of valuables and quality but shifted to superior social groups. This concept was also developed by Pareto in the late nineteenth century, Geutoma Mosca in the era of the 1930s and Mills in the post-World War II. At that time elite theory was used as part of modern sociological theory. At this stage, Varma said that the basic concept of theory born in Europe suggests that within the ruling group besides the ruling elite there are also rival elites who can gain power through the masses if the ruling elite loses its ability (Varma, 2001).

According to Suzzana Keller, elite comes from the word illigere, which means choosing, in ordinary words the word means the part that is the choice or interest of a nation, culture, age group and also people who occupy high social positions. In a general sense, elites refer to a group of people in society who occupy the highest positions. In other words, elites are groups of citizens who have advantages over other citizens, so they occupy social power over other community members (Keller, 1995).

According to Pareto, every society is governed by a small group of people who have the qualities needed for their presence in full social and political power. Those who can reach the center of power are always the best. They are known as the elite. Elites are successful people who are able to occupy high positions in the society. In the stratification side of society, Pareto and Mosca divide into three sub-structures, namely the ruling elite, the non-ruling elite, the non-elite. In line with this view, Keller defines that elites show a minority of individuals appointed to serve a collectivity by means of social value. The elite are an effective and responsible minority, effectively looking at the implementation of the activities of other people's conditions, where elites give their responses (Abbas, 2009).

In understanding the elite context, Mosca (in Etzioni-Halevy, 2011) said that in all societies, both modern and traditional classes would emerge, namely the governing and governed classes. The governing class has certainly monopolized political power and benefited from that power, while those ruled are controlled by the ruling group. In a democratic perspective, the majority should control the minority, whereas according to Mosca the minority is the one who controls the majority. The rulers have never ruled through acts of violence against the majority, but the minority groups always justify the power they have through political regulation through abstract principles such as rights granted by God or popular sovereignty.

Recent elite studies can be seen in the Hover Institute's study of elites who have devoted their attention to the study of political elites. According to him, the political elite consists of holders of power including leadership and social formation which is usually the origin of leaders, and to him given
responsibility, for a certain period of time. This framework is different from the concept of Pareto and Mosca, where the political elite is distinguished from others who are less closely associated with the use of power, although they may have a large social influence, and that the idea of social formation is usually the origin of elites returned into a framework that thought, especially in Pareto theory, the idea of social formation has been set aside, where the idea of the elite was at first at odds with the idea of social class (Bottomore, 2006).

When viewed in various developments related to elite concepts, it can be said that there is often circulation in the elite itself. Pareto, Mosca and Varma also believe in the process of elite change. Among the characteristics of the ruling elite and control can be listened to through leadership skills and their ability to exercise political control. When the minority ruling class loses trust by the majority class which is in fact a class that is not in power, there will be a circulation in the control of access to power carried out by the ruling elite. This elite circulation can be seen in the era of colonial Indonesia, colonial post and reform era. In the perspective of modern Indonesian history, Kartodirjo distinguishes two elite typologies, namely traditional elites who are still influenced by traditional structures, these elites tend to maintain the status quo and see that change is part of the threat, while the new elite tends to make changes (Kartodirjo, 1981).

In this context, Bottomore (2006) outlines the opinions of some experts on elites, namely Robert van Niel who saw how modern elites in the Indies grew in line with the new colonial policies of the 1900-1927 era. Besides Niel, Sutherland also highlighted the formation of bureaucratic elites in Indonesia by seeing the high influence of the Dutch colonial bureaucracy's political approach on the elite of the modern bureaucracy in the post-colonial era, Sutherland noted that the Dutch East Indies were the first to inherit a number of contemporary Indonesian institutional traditions. In addition, Donald K Emmerson saw the style and tradition of traditional elites that would later be used by the Dutch to fill bureaucratic positions. Institutionally, the kingdom (the palace) and the indigenous bureaucracy are very influential, besides their development is also related to political experience in the Volkskraad era, and the emergence of intellectuals in critical political areas.

In Gorontalo, Apriyanto (2012) notes that the influence of the Dutch East Indies in the structure of Gorontalo society encompasses several types of fields, including the political sphere, marked by intensive intervention in internal traditional power. This political intervention can be seen when there is a dualism of leadership in Gorontalo, namely the king of the Gouvernement who is in charge of maintaining relations with the Governor and the raja negorij whose duty is to focus on internal affairs. In the economic field, contact with the Dutch resulted in the increasingly weakening of the traditional elite as the head of the bumiputera region so that the position of traditional elites under the supervision of colonial officials, with such supervision led to labor exploitation in supporting the Indies economy. The socio-cultural field, the expansion of western life in the environment of traditional life of the people of Gorontalo in the 19th century. At this time it has aroused resistance from traditional elites such as ulama, adat leaders and officials of the royal bureaucracy, the source of the resistance resulting from the assumption that Western influence will be able to damage the values of traditional Gorontalo life.

In looking at the above, it can be said that the existence of elites in a community is a phenomenon that has occurred since time immemorial, both in the concept of ownership of special or valuable goods to shift to social classes in society. True what was stated by Aristotle about "humans are political beings". The dynamics of influence and influence, orders and orders, there is an important record in the journey of human life. But past events are not always repeated in the present, the shift of the traditional elite to the modern elite is a sign of conformity to the changing times and generations. Indonesia is part of the most important record regarding the elite, and Gorontalo is the smallest sub-system part of Indonesia which has its own elite dynamics and is different from other regions.
Elite and The Dynamics of the Local Political Oligarchy

When Gorontalo was declared an autonomous region, the arena of constellation was open to the public in filling public spaces that had not been opened up. Elite circulation took place at that time, where those who were governed and governed had the same position in competing. Many things covered this event, traditional oligarchy groups consisting of royal descendants and those who at that time occupied the level of government elites had a great opportunity to fill the vacant structure of the regional bureaucracy. Meanwhile, an non-government elite group consisting of local entrepreneurs, NGOs, party cadres was integrated into the moment of regional expansion. Meanwhile, non-elite have the same opportunity to fight for sources of power in Gorontalo. At this level I will categorize these elite grouping actors in the arena of local political transition that allows the circulation of local elites.

First, government elite. In this section I focus more on seeing the involvement of the bureaucratic elite in occupying the top of power in Gorontalo. Among these key actors was Gusnar Ismail who had a glory in the bureaucratic career as a political official as Deputy Governor of Gorontalo and Gorontalo Governor 2008-2011. Idris Rahim, ended her bureaucratic career as the Regional Secretary of Gorontalo Province and was elected Deputy Governor of Gorontalo for the period 2011-2016. David Bobiohe Regent of Gorontalo who has occupied his two-period power also from the bureaucratic elite with his last position as Regional Secretary of Gorontalo Regency during Ahmad Pakaya's leadership. Iwan Bokings as the two-period regent of Boalemo, nicknamed the Gorontalo podium lion and the "Father of the Poor" also began his career as a bureaucracy. Ismet Mile, Regent Bone bolango began his career as a bureaucracy, as well as Nelson Pamalingo from the campus academic community and also as a figure in the declaration of the formation of Gorontalo province which is now the Regent of Gorontalo. Similarly, the Regent of North Gorontalo and Deputy Regent of North Gorontalo Indra Yasin and Thoriq Modanggu. If observed from the series of events experienced by the bureaucratic actors, it is actually inseparable from the openness of access to power that requires these actors to occupy strategic positions in the region. Government elites in Gorontalo reached the top position when the regional division had created an elite circulation that was so fast. In this area we then say that, if Gorontalo does not dissociate itself from North Sulawesi, the elites as mentioned above will not experience top positions in reaching public positions in the region.

Second, Non Government Elite, this position is carried out by the descendants of nobility as well as businessmen and political party elites. Inevitably, after the expansion, Gorontalo experienced a transitional era, where the strengthening of nobility was still raging in the environment of society at that time. The socio-cultural scope, with the presence of clans from nobility is a reference material in the arena of elite competition. However, it should be acknowledged that Gorontalo's identity as a whole is not mapped in the existence of this group of nobles. On the other hand, the existence of former Gorontalo Mayor Medi Botutihe, Deputy Regent of Bone Bolango Kris Wartabone is not an excuse for the existence of aristocratic descendants in the political event at the Gorontalo level, but the interconnected social capital has made the figure get a position in political office in the region. Apart from the existence of noble descendants, there were also business groups as non-governement elite elements who could master strategic positions. Fadel Muhammad, Governor of Gorontalo Province from 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 was a successful national businessman who was led by the Golkar Party to seize power in Gorontalo. Rusli Habibi who started his political career as North Gorontalo Regent until Gorontalo Governor from 2012-2017 was a local businessman who was also the chairman of the Gorontalo Province Golkar Party. Zainudin Hasan, former regent of Pahuwato, was also a successful entrepreneur, when his leadership as regent he later entered the PKNU Party and served as Chairman of the Gorontalo Province PKNU. Toni Yunus, Deputy Regent of Gorontalo, Hamim Pou as Regent of Bone Bolango. Feriyanto Mayulu, Deputy Mayor of Gorontalo for the period 2008-2013 who is also a well-known businessman in Gorontalo province, and the last is the Regent of Boalemo for the 2018-2022 Period Darwis Moridu who began his career as a corn businessman.
Apart from business groups, political party elites who have held public positions in the region are Rum Pagau and Lahmudin Hambali as Regent and Deputy Regent of Boalemo, who took up their political careers from the Golkar party to take public positions in Boalemo in the 2011-2016 period. In addition, Syarif Mbuinga began his political career as chairman of the Pahuwato Regency DPRD from the Golkar party until he was elected as Pohuwato Regent from 2010-2015. Based on the identification above, it can be seen that the existence of both national and local entrepreneurs is fragmented into political party structures. In the sense that they started their careers as entrepreneurs, of course there were guarantees and capital readiness to plunge into local contestation. Therefore, mastery of political parties is a very effective choice in gaining power. It is very rare for us to find local actors from the elite political parties who actually started their political careers as party administrators who topped power at both the provincial and district and city levels. For this reason, the existence of government elite in Gorontalo is not only controlled by local bureaucracy groups, but more dominated by elite non-government classes after regional expansion, especially entrepreneurs.

Third, non elite. The word non elite refers to the existence of a majority class that has no influence at all in society. This level is those who always follow regulations through government elites and are influenced by non-government elites. If observed from the identification of the data above, it is alleged that almost all non-government elite classes can master access to power at both the formal and non-formal levels. The question is when elite circulation occurs, is there an opportunity for non-elite to control what access the two classes have? In certain cases I say that, in reading Gorontalo there is a tendency for non-elites to control access to available resources. Non-elite actors form social networks through the community component that encompasses community leaders and other students and pressure groups. We see this when Elnino and his social network were able to penetrate the strength of Gorontalo's local elite to occupy the seat of the DPD RI 2009-2014 and members of the DPR RI 2014-2019. Thariq Modanggu took advantage of the opportunity during the expansion of the North Gorontalo Regency area and became the most important actor in the political dynamics of the North Gorontalo region and is now elected the Deputy Regent of North Gorontalo. Dedi Hamzah as a young actor who sits as a member of the Gorontalo Provincial DPRD from the PDIP in 2009-2014. Nasir Giasi as a young actor Pahuwato became a member of the Gorontalo Provincial DPRD for the period 2004-2009 Election District of Boalemo Pohuwato and now as Chairperson of the DPRD Pohuwato.

Apart from the above actors, the figure of Adhan Dambea is also not spared from non-elite groupings. This shows that the strategic position achieved now is part of the arena of local political contestation after the division. The actor before the expansion of Gorontalo became a province, in his daily life he served as a delivery letter and cleaning service in the Golkar party's DPD office. The 1999-2004 election of the actor managed to become a candidate member of the DPRD Kota Gorontalo, then along with the contestation or local political arena could lead him as chairman of the DPRD Kota Gorontalo, to become the Mayor of Gorontalo for the period 2008-2013. Why did I enter the actor at the non elite level? because the actor is not from an elite government group and an elite non government. On the other hand, its position as a non government elite was not the most important actor of the Golkar party, its existence at that time had never been taken into account in the internal party.

**Conclusion**

Based on the previous elaboration, it can be seen that there were two elite circulations in the period of Gorontalo in the era of independence and reform. The era of independence, Gorontalo was a unit and was not co-opted socio-cultural and political. Where, during the Old Order and New Order governments, very few sources of power were carried out by the Gorontalo elite in North Sulawesi, almost entirely controlled by the Minahasa elite. The aspects of the elite and the local political oligarchy in the independence era were marked by the strength of the Minahasa elite oligarchy towards the
Gorontalo elite. In the reform era, it was marked by the demand for regional expansion by Gorontalo people. At the level of the spirit of pemekaran we can use arguments from Pareto, Mosca and Varma about the process of elite change characterized by the existence of a ruling class that has lost the trust of the majority class which is in fact a class that has no power local level, the dynamics will be characterized by circulation in the control of access to power at the local level.

References


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