



Reading Islamic Radical Networks in West Java and Jakarta and Its Relationships with Islamic Trans-National

Naupal

Departement of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia.,Indonesia

Abstract

Radical Islamic movements in Indonesia show a significant face since fall of New Order regime. After fall of the New Order regime began a period of democratic transition that marked the emergence of freedom in various sectors of life. At this time, democracy grows and develops. One of them is marked by the emergence of political parties with various streams, including political parties based on Islam. In addition, there are also mass organizations and radical Islamic movements. Freedom offered by democracy in this time is utilized by Muslims. Since 1998 Islamic political aspirations have been strengthened and manifested in various forms, such as the establishment of Islamic parties. There were eleven Islamic parties competing in 1999 election. Amongst of them such as Crescent-Moon Party (PBB), Justice Party (PK), People Awakening Party (PKU), Nahdlatul Ummat Party (PNU), PUI (Islamic Party), New Masyumi, PP (United Party), and PPP (United Development Party).

Keywords: Islamic Radical; Networks; West Java and Jakarta; Trans-Nationa

Introduction

Radical Islamic movements in Indonesia show a significant face since fall of New Order regime. After fall of the New Order regime began a period of democratic transition that marked the emergence of freedom in various sectors of life. At this time, democracy grows and develops. One of them is marked by the emergence of political parties with various streams, including political parties based on Islam. In addition, there are also mass organizations and radical Islamic movements. Freedom offered by democracy in this time is utilized by Muslims. Since 1998 Islamic political aspirations have been strengthened and manifested in various forms, such as the establishment of Islamic parties. There were eleven Islamic parties competing in 1999 election. Amongst of them such as Crescent-Moon Party (PBB), Justice Party (PK), People Awakening Party (PKU), Nahdlatul Ummat Party (PNU), PUI (Islamic Party), New Masyumi, PP (United Party), and PPP (United Development Party).

Along with growth of Islamic political parties, number of organizations of Islamic religious society began to emerge, especially in West Java and Jakarta. Beginning with Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) established in 1998 in Jakarta, other Islamic organizations emerged, such as Reformist Islamic

Movement (GARIS) in Cianjur, 1998; Tholiban in Tasikmalaya, 1999, Muslims Forum (FUI) in Jakarta, 2005. Number of Islamic organizations that can be considered “radical” in Jakarta and West Java post-reform is interesting to be studied. Even survey conducted by Lazuardi Birru (2011) put West Java into bag of highest radicalism after Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Based on results of research on vulnerability of radicalism in 33 provinces in Indonesia, there are three vulnerable areas to religious-based radical action, namely Aceh with a vulnerability index of 56.8, West Java (46.6), and Banten (46.6) (Khozin, 2013: 292). While in Jakarta the act of religious radicalism manifests in form of rejecting infidel leader in 2017 election. As a result there are polarizations among citizens of Jakarta. Those who choose Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) are considered infidels and hypocrites, while those who do not choose Ahok are considered anti-diversity (Rahadian, 2017). The power of Islamic trans-national also spread to Islamic society in Indonesia, particularly in West Java and Jakarta through salafi movement,

HTI, dan Tarbiyyah Ikhawanul Muslimin. So the idea of chalipathe and Syariah Islam become the trending issues in the last few year. Especially after the radical Islamic movement affiliated to ISIS in Indonesia, such as Ansharu d-daulah and Anshar t-tauhid and HTI voice this idea (Sumandotyo, 2018). Martin van Bruinessen (2001) said that that the roots of most present Muslim radical groups in Indonesia, particularly in West Java and Jakarta can be traced to two relatively indigenous Muslim political movements, DI movement and Masyumi, and to a number of more recent transnational Islamic networks. And according to Jamhari (2003), the presence of radical Islamic groups is triggered by two main causes. Firstly, because of local political issues such as, political failure in the regime and political marginalization. Second, the existence of interworld solidarity. In this research, Islamic radicalism in West Java and Jakarta beside triggered by two cause as mentioned above, it also caused by how the Islam is perceived as an exclusive by it’s embracers as social cohesion in the plural society and look only their claim religion as true, while the other are consider wrong. The exclusive religious practice take places in enclave as a facility used to identify and bonder themselves from the others. This research also aims to analyse the influence of trans-national Islamic network to radical movement in West Java and Jakarta.

Theory and Methodology

There is a distinction between radicalism and extremism. For Schmid, radicalism is still has openness in offering or formulating social and political change, while extremism is closedminded and sometimes always using acts of violence in fulfilling their own dreams (Schmid 2013). Many researchers are in one thought with Alex P. Schmid such as M. Saecan Munchith. Munchith stated that radicalism, radical, and terrorism are different. But, Munchith does not deny that actually, acts of terrorism are born from the radical thoughts (Munchith 2016). Although radical and radicalism are different, but in fact, both of them are interrelated one to another and can be the trigger of acts of violence. According to Abdullah radicalism in this era has dreams in achieving an ideal Islamic governor such as caliphate, even though by using acts of violence. These dreams then are well known as Islamic romanticism. Islamic romanticism appeared in the idea of some Muslim communities because they believe that Islam was ever reached its golden age and brought the progress to this world either in technologies or sciences. (Abdullah, 2016) By observing some definitions above, we can conclude that there is some radicalism, which can be defined as in enforcing an idea or principle that considered as an absolute truth, but without using acts of destruction, such as salafi furist (dakwah) that emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education, And there is a kind of radicalism that acts of terrorism or similar destructive actions, such as salafi jihadis (Olidort, 2016 :4). Hence, this research will map the radical network and distinguish the two kinds of radicalism in Jakarta and West Java and examine traces of radicalism in Indonesia and two regions.

Therefore, the radicalism cannot be separated from the religious movements (Hadden, 1992). It include beliefs, values, forms of organization, types of activities, types of participation, social reactions,

and relationships with agency agents (Beckford, 2003). Since religious movements are present in the midst of struggle of society in the face of problems that are deemed to require a response, religious movements everywhere not only come into contact with aspects of religious teachings but also relate to various aspects of life, such as politics, economics, and social. In this connection, radical Islamic movement as in general religious movement then developed into a form of sectarian response that face each other social groups in life of society. It means that the birth of a religious movement with its various tendencies, including those that show violent puritanism or non violence is often related or formed in dynamics with Islamist groups. Structural and cultural conditions that are perceived as a crisis for religious believers or sectarian groups may form life-politics and self-identity which give rise to radical and fundamentalist tendencies as reflected in the resistance movement (Giddens, 1994).

Genealogy of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia

The essence of Islamic teachings embraced by people of Indonesia is the teachings of Sufi Islam that is able to adapt to existing cultures and traditions, so that Islam can easily be accepted. The early Islamic broadcasters known as the wali songo were able to harmonize the local culture with Islamic teachings. Local culture, such as wayang, is filled with Islamic teachings and used as a means to preach, so that many people convert to Islam peacefully. Even Indonesian Muslims are familiar with religious traditions, such as tahlilan, salawatan, and maulidan conducted in mosques, musahalla, even done from house to house, and have been integrated into Indonesian culture. In fact, Islamic radical movement has no strong roots in Indonesia. Its presence in Indonesia cannot be separated from the influence of Wahabi by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab in Saudi Arabia. These puritan groups are often described or associated with fundamentalist, militant, radical, fanatic called as salafi/wahabi jihadist, although there are a salafi/wahabi purist term. Both tend to be intolerant of pluralist group and regard it as a form of contamination of the true truth (El Fadl 2005, 29).

Wahabi movement wants to restore the Islamic teachings as in the time of Prophet Muhammad and pious of salaf ulama, and forbade traditions or activities of religious rituals that are not exemplified by Muhammad, such as tawasul and ziarah that are generally done in Sufi Islam. Wahabi movement first entered Indonesia in 19th century in West Sumatra through Padri movement (Al-Thalib 2006, 30-31). As Hamka said, Islamic purification movement in West Sumatra cannot be separated from the role of Haji Piobang and Haji Sumanik; they are "Wahabi pioneers in Minangkabau, who returned from Makkah around 1803 or a year earlier" (Hamka 2008). The Padriots under the pretext of Islamic purification forced another group to follow its teachings even if necessary by acts of violence, as it did with the fighting of the adat, even ascribing the cultivators of the deeply rooted Sufi teachings in West Sumatra (Al-Thalib 2006, 94-5). The alumni of Saudi Arabia spread Wahabism under the banner of the movement of da'wah salafi. LIPIA and Middle East alumni play an active role in Tarbiyah Movement which is identical with Ikhwanul Muslimin. These alumni get referrals about IM ideas through their direct interaction with IM activists, when they get a scholarship to continue their studies in the Middle East. In addition to doing tarbiyah in the campus of the country, they also act as a translator, so that most of tarbiyah activists come from public universities can understand IM. Rahman Zainuddin, for example, a Syrian college alumnus became the translator of Sayyid Qutb's Ma'alim fi at-Tariq. The result of the translation became main reference for campus propagation movement in the future. Since then, many works of IM figures have been successfully translated, including Said Hawa, Mustafa Masyhur, Muhammad al-Ghazali and Yusuf Qordawi (Rahmat 2005, 84). Most Middle East alumni directly hold key positions, as educators (murabbi) in various halaqah scattered throughout Indonesia. The peak maturity movement practically controls the intra-campus organization in most prestigious universities in the country. Along with the start of the national crisis in 1998, Tarbiyah activists established the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) and the Inter-Muslim Campus Association (HAMMAS), precisely in April 1998. After fall of Suharto, some key figures of Tarbiyah movement were actively involved in PKS.

In the lead up to independence, Indonesian Muslim presented its plural faces, such as abangan Islam, Islamic Santri, Islam Kejawen, puritan Islam, nationalist Islam, socialist Islam, and so on (Geertz 1960, 27). The leaders of each group have diverse views and continue to polemize in determining the basis of the state of Indonesia, which eventually polarized into radical Islam with national Islam. From the polarization, traces of local radicalism can be traced back to pre-independence Indonesia. There are two local Islamic radical movements that want to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The first is Masyumi continues to strive to establish the Unitary State of Indonesia based on Islamic law through parliament. Masyumi aims to “uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and Islam” and “Implement the ideals of Islam in the affairs of state” (Article 11) and on 6 June 1947, Masyumi issued a Political Manifesto emphasizing the need for a State based on Islam because Indonesia's majority Muslim population within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, resulting in a polemic between the nationalist figure (Soekarno) and figures of Islamism (Efendy, 1998, 108. Natsir, 2000, 17-49. Purwoko, 2002).

The Polemic relation of religion and state in Indonesia between character of Masyumi and nationalism happened several times. For example, in late 1930s polemic between Soekarno and A. Muchlas; also between Soekarno and H. Agus Salim, A. Hasan, and Is in 1925. The polemic was speaking about their postindependence national identity. There was a battle of discourse on how to place religion in the state (Ro'uf 2007, 168). The polemic between Islamism and nationalism continued in the sessions of the Indonesian National Procurement Preparation Agency (BPUPKI), from 28 May to 1 June 1945, 10-17 July 1945, and Indonesian Independence Preparation Committee (PPKI), 18-22 August 1945, in the framework of the drafting and ratification of the 1945 Constitution. Islamist group proposed Islam as the basis of the state, while nationalists wanted a neutral state. The two-sided confrontation was resolved by incorporating the Jakarta Charter (which contains seven words “with the obligation to enforce Islamic law for its adherents”). But in the PPKI session on August 18, 1945, the seven words were removed (Jahroni 2002). The peak of the conflict between Masyumi and the nationalists was when Masyumi was dissolved by Soekarno through Presidential Decree No. 200 in 1960 (Purwoko 2002).

The second is Darul Islam movement led by Kartosuwiryo. In its history, Kartosuwiryo once joined the Sarekat Islam and Masyumi. In Masyumi, he was appointed as a member of executive body and later became commissioner for West Java Region (Efendy 1998, 96). He also led armed forces of Ummah in West Java and trained the youth in Suffah institution in Malangboong, Garut (Noer 2000, 190). Unlike Masyumi who struggled to apply Islamic teachings to Unitary Republic of Indonesia through parliament, Darul Islam took radical path by rebelling against the Government of Republic of Indonesia. Kartosuwiryo's disappointment to Soekarno Government was motivated by the contents of the Renville RI-Dutch negotiations on board the Renville ship which was held on December 8, 1947 and ended on January 17, 1948. This agreement caused Kartosuwiryo to establish Islamic State of Indonesia because according to Kartosuwiryo Renville agreement is very harmful to Muslims (Santoso, 2006: 60). One of the terms of the Renville agreement was that Netherlands only recognized Central Java, Yogyakarta and Sumatra as part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Republican forces had to leave almost the entire area of West Java, Central Java from the border with West Java approximately to Kebumen in southern territory and Semarang in northern territory, and east of Malang. That means troops of Republic of Indonesia must left the area of West Java with its borders and submit it to Netherlands. Kartosuwiryo and two Islamic guerrilla forces, Hezbollah and Sabilillah did not accept the Renville treaty decision and remained in West Java and argued that the struggle against the Dutch should continue. Because of that disappointment, Kartosuwiryo finally proclaimed the establishment of DI on August 7, 1949, in the village Cisampang, Cidugaleuin village, district Leuwisari Tasikmalaya, West Java. DI was finally crushed but still gets a lot of supporters. On 20 January 1952, Darul Islam received support from Kahar Muzakkar and his troops based in Sulawesi, then on September 21st, 1953, Daud Beureueh in Aceh also declared part of Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) Kartosuwiryo. In 1954, Ibn Hajar and his forces in South Kalimantan also joined (Anshori 2006, 21). In the end, the movement was successfully crushed by the pro-government army and never again emerged except through underground movements. In New Order

era, Soeharto did not provide space for radical Islamic movements. Masyumi were banned and the remnants of DI members were hunted. The depoliticization of the Islamic movement caused the Masyumi exponents to regroup in a new organization, the Islamic Dakwah Council of Indonesia (DDII). Due to the depoliticization of the activities of Muslims, DDII chose da'wah path to fight for Islamic ideology in NKRI (Rahmat 2005, 83).

DDII was founded DDII in 1967 which was engaged in da'wah. DDII became first Islamic institution to seriously and organize the sending of students to the Middle East. Before this role was taken over by Ministry of Religious Affairs, DDII became main agent for distribution of scholarship from Rabithah Alam Al-Islami supported by Saudi Arabia to study in Middle East (Rahmat 2005, 83). To facilitate relations with Saudi Arabia, DDII even opened an office in Riyadh in 1970s. Until 2004, DDII has sent 500 students to Middle East and Pakistan and the Alumni of Middle Eastern and Pakistan are what will become main actors of the spread of Islamic salafi movements in Indonesia (Rahmat 2005, 84). DDII also became initiator and mediator of the establishment of Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences (LIPIA) which is the branch of Islamic University Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud in Riyadh. The institute has graduated thousands of alumni who are agents of the Salafi movement. Furthermore, DDII plays an important role in the recruitment of students, which are generally drawn from institutions that have networks with DDII, namely Persis, Muhammadiyah, and Al-Irsyad. Thus DDII also contribute in spreading salafi teachings in Indonesia (Rahmat 2005, 85). The return of LIPIA alumni who completed their studies in Saudi Arabia marked the birth of a new generation of Wahabis in Indonesia, no exception in Jakarta and west Java.

The alumni of Saudi Arabia spread Wahabism under the banner of the movement of da'wah salafi. LIPIA and Middle East alumni play an active role in Tarbiyah Movement which is identical with Ikhwanul Muslimin.. These alumni get referrals about IM ideas through their direct interaction with IM activists, when they get a scholarship to continue their studies in the Middle East. In addition to doing tarbiyah in the campus of the country, they also act as a translator, so that most of tarbiyah activists come from public universities can understand IM. Rahman Zainuddin, for example, a Syrian college alumnus became the translator of Sayyid Qutb's Ma'alim fi at-Tariq. The result of the translation became main reference for campus propagation movement in the future. Since then, many works of IM figures have been successfully translated, including Said Hawa, Mustafa Masyhur, Muhammad al-Ghazali and Yusuf Qordawi (Rahmat 2005, 84). Most Middle East alumni directly hold key positions, as educators (murabbi) in various halaqah scattered throughout Indonesia. The peak maturity movement practically controls the intra-campus organization in most prestigious universities in the country. Along with the start of the national crisis in 1998, Tarbiyah activists established the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) and the Inter-Muslim Campus Association (HAMMAS), precisely in April 1998. After fall of Suharto, some key figures of Tarbiyah movement were actively involved in PKS.

Local and Trans-National Islamic Radical Network in West Java and Jakarta

After Suharto stepped down and started a new chapter for Islamic movement, many radical Islamic movements are emerging in diverse forms. There is a radical Islamic transnational movement. Some of them are, HTI, IM, and Salafi-Wahabi Movement. In addition, there is also a local radical Islamic movement. Some examples may be called, for example, the FPI, Jihadist Soldiers (LJ), Indonesian Jihadist Council (MMI), and so on. Rise of Islamic mass organizations is also characterized by militant and radical (Zada 2002, 3). Fall of New Order has brought significant changes to the development of Islamic movements. Freedom of expression has been the driving force behind growth of radical Islamic organizations. This reality shows that fall of the regime is not only taken momentum by political elites who wanted changes, but also taken momentum by radical Islamic movements. (Zada 2002, 181).

On a local scale, radical Islamic movements in west Java and Jakarta cannot be separated from nation-state issue, such as forbidding Ahmadiyya, because of their deviation from mainstream of Islamic sunni teachings, while on a global scale, radical Islamic transnational movements voiced issues of Muslim social solidarity. They have always responded to international issues such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq or Syria, and the caliphate issue. The kind of response is also difference according to radical movement such as DDII which later gave birth to an organization such as KISDI and forwarded by Tarbiyah IM group as assumed the trans-national movement does not act a violence to respond an international Islamic issues. But the salafi jihadi such as Jama'ah Islamiyah, Ansharul Khilafah or Ansharu d-daulah (the alumni of the battle in Afghanistan) will act a violence to respond this issue. They also voice the daulat islamiyah / state of Islamic In Indonesia (NII) replacing the democratic as secular institution and considered taghut, while HTI voiced the formation of caliphate to exit from all forms of deterioration experienced by Islamic world.

Islamic radical network in West Java can be traced from historical side. In fact, in 1955 election, Masyumi surpassed PNI's vote, Masyumi got 1,844,442 and PNI gained 1,541,927. (Feith, 1999: 114). NU out of Masyumi did not undermine Masyumi's position in West Java. NU people in West Java did not want to turn away from Masyumi so that NU vote in West Java only received 673,552 votes (Feith 1999, 114-5). Strength of Masyumi in West Java became its own character of Islamic politics embraced by Muslim community of West Java. Undeniably also, West Java is one of areas that once became basis of the struggle to seize power and establish Islamic State through DI/TII. Its main base is Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, and Ciamis. DI/TII in West Java is more developed because that is where Kartosuwiryo build armed forces and train the youth in Suffah institution in Malangboong, Garut. No wonder the characteristics of Islam in West Java will also be influenced by DI Movement.

West Java is also known as a resolute and religious society. This condition has grown Islamic organizations. Not only Islamic organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, but also other Islamic organizations born post-reformation, such as the Islamic FPI, MMI, HTI, and JAT. In West Java there are also tactical organizations such as LP3Syi, Anti-Ahmadiyah People Movement (GERAM), Islamic Reform Movement (GARIS), Alliance of Anti-Apostasy Movement (AGAP), Anti-Immigration Movement (GAMAS), Anti-Apostasy Movement and Cults (GAPAS), Ulama and Ummah Council (FUUI), Ukhuwwah Islamiyah Council, and FUI. In West Java there are also many schools and salafi foundations, such as in Bogor stands Pesantren Minhajus Sunnah, led by Ustadz Yazhpd bin Abdul Qadir Jawas preaches salafi to Jakarta and become one of the centre of salafi teachings in Indonesia; Ustadz Badrussalam, living in Cileungsi, he has Al-Barkah Mosque and Da'wah Ahlul-Sunnah Wal-Jamaah and Dakwah Radio (Rodja), which is the center of salafi community and salafi inter-radio collaboration; and he did da'wah salafi to various regions in Indonesia (Suhana 2011, 213). The thing that attracted attention was the birth of HTI in Bogor. It was founded at Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB) in 1982 thanks to the support of Abdullah bin Nuh, the caretaker of the pesantren cottage in the city. Its originated from the activists of Al-Ghifari campus, IPB, then formed a halaqah to explore HTI ideas. By mid 1990s, HTI ideas had begun to spread to various levels of society, through the preaching of cadres in mosques, offices, factories and housing, as well as through the publication of books, Al-Islam bulletins and monthly magazines Al-Wa'ie, which discusses typical themes, which become the reference in various discussion activities, seminars, and even demonstrations (Kurniawan 2003, 49). Even to spread idea of khilafah, students of IPB established Student Council of Muslim Spirituality (BKIM), which became the official organ. BKIM's senior students attract new members on first day of admission. The new member was invited to the organization providing dormitories and college books. Although the Chairman of BKIM 2016-2017, Muhammad Afifuddin al-Fakkar, refused his organization to be associated with HTI directly, but did not object to being said to be sympathizers, although BKIM syllabus was same as HTI's, namely to enforce Islamic law (Tempo 2017). Although HTI has been dissolved by government of Indonesia, but the spread of "Khilafah Islamiyyah" is still carried out through individuals as said by Chairman of DPP HTI, Rokhmat S Labib (Firmansyah 2018). If analyzed from above description, radical

movement in both Jakarta and West Java will not show any decline, even survey or the results of initial research conducted by Malindo Institute shows that some pesantrens in West Java have potential to become the basis for the growth of violent movement. Initial research also shows that JI seeks to establish a chaliphate in Southeast Asia, also makes pesantren one of the bases for the cultivation of their political ideology (Malindo Institute Survey Report 2008, 3). International Crisis Group (ICG) report that JI still holds the ideals of establishing an Islamic State in Indonesia. The report also mentions that JI's strength in various parts of Indonesia will be determined by factors such as the existence of JI-affiliated pesantren, the history of DI rebellion in the area, business relationships and kinship among its members, their success in recruiting cadres from campuses, and recruitment processes that occur from within the prison (Survey Report Malindo Institute, 2008, 3).

While Jakarta as a core barometer of situation and condition in Indonesia makes dynamics recorded in Jakarta are national dynamics. Reality of Jakarta residents are moderate Muslims. In view of the amaliah worship of the native Muslims of Jakarta is close to NU tradition but Jakarta Muslims are also known to be quite fanatical to habaib. His honor is so high to the habibs, so that many majlis science and majlis dhikr of the habibs visited until now. Jakarta does not have an adequate historical argument for the birth of radical Islamic movements. However, since late 1970s up to now the movement of urban Muslim groups has captured the arena of religious contestation in Jakarta, especially with the birth of Islamic organizations, such as DDII, KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity and PPMI (Indonesian Muslim Workers Union). Salafi thinking came to prominence in Jakarta around 1980s along with opening of Institute for the Study of Arabic (LPBA) in Jakarta. The institute was later renamed LIPIA which provided a means for them to know and explore ideas of salaf scholars. LIPIA Jakarta is a branch of Mohammed King Saud University in Riyadh. The opening of a new branch in Jakarta is linked to the movement of Wahabi throughout the Islamic world. LIPIA Jakarta has produced thousands of alumni. Their characteristic, can be seen from side of clothing, as for men wearing long robes (jalabiyah), turban (imama), trousers over the ankles (isbal), and maintaining a beard (lihyah), while among women wear black clothing that covers entire body (niqab) is a phenomenon for development of Muslims in cities and villages.

Salafi movement is not always accompanied by violence, because this movement is divided into two, namely "salafy jihadi" and "salafy da'wah". Salafi Jihadi is a collaboration of Wahhabi and Ikhwanul Muslimin which tends to use violence in spreading its ideology. In Indonesia, they are supported by followers of Darul Islam (DI), especially Ngruki Pesantren network and alumni of Afganistan and Morocco. Their institutions that exist in Indonesia are Jamaah Islamiyah and MMI. Salafi Da'wah, also known as Salafy Surury is an international Wahhabi movement that evolves through a teacher-student network, especially through LIPIA alumni. Their central figures were Bin Baaz, Nashruddin al-Albany, and Shaikh Mugbil. This movement spread their ideological understanding of ideology by purifying aqidah, apolitical, and not accompanied by physical violence. This movement is widely disseminated in pesantren and salafi foundations that are alumni of LIPIA or Middle East, especially from Saudi Arabia ([www.scribd.com/doc/29986686/Trans-national Movements-Islam](http://www.scribd.com/doc/29986686/Trans-national-Movements-Islam)). It is worth noting that not all religious radicalism leads to violence, although religious radicalism triggers violent acts similar to those occurring in Jakarta and West Java. In Jakarta also stands Salafi foundation whose funding is supported by trans-national Islamic institutions such as Al-Sofwah Foundation established on November 25, 1992 AD on Jl. Raya Lenteng Agung Barat, South Jakarta. His stand was supported by Muhammad Khalaf, a businessman from Saudi Arabia through al-Haramain and Jam'iyyat Ihya al-Turats al-Islami. The foundation of al-Sofwah was founded by Muhammad Yusuf Harun, alumnus of Muhammad bin Saud University (Chozin 2013, 16). Jakarta is often become the center of the meeting of radical leaders of both local and trans-national. For example, an international conference on Islamic Caliphate was held in Jakarta senatorial istora year 2002. This conference also marked the birth of HTI. This organization also proclaims itself as a political party that ideology Islam, but refused to join the existing political system.

This rejection is a standard form of HT International. Even the HTI Central Leadership Board Office in Tebet, South Jakarta, before this organization was considered radical and dissolved based on the Decree of the Minister of Justice and Human Rights No. AHU-30.AH.01.08 dated 19/7/2017. In contrast to HTI, the Ikhwanul Muslimin tarbiyah movement is not too radical, although its goal is still to apply Islamic Shari'a, but non-violent way pursued through democracy. Tarbiyah movement of Ikhwanul Muslimin in Indonesia for example manifest in PKS and managed to reach 45 seats in the House. The parliamentarians of the Ikhwanul Muslimin tarbiyah movement joined a forum called International Forum For Islamic Parliaments (IFIP) and successfully held its first meeting on 19-21 January 2007 in Jakarta ([www.scribd.com/doc/29986686/Trans-national Movement](http://www.scribd.com/doc/29986686/Trans-national-Movement)). Jakarta is also the birthplace of FPI, declared on 17 August 1998. The name has its own meaning as an organization that will defend Islamic "values" and "teachings" (Jamhari 2004, 132). It is the pretext of defending Islam that FPI becomes the vanguard in every action to defend the teachings and the value of Islam, as in the year 2014 did the action reject infidel leaders in response to the appointment of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) as Governor of DKI Jakarta, replacing Joko Widodo; in 2015 canceled the national meeting of victims of tragedy of 1965; in 2016 did action to defend Islam 411 demanded Ahok be dragged into prison for involving a case of blasphemy law. This action continued until a considerable mass deployment of Islamic defiance 212; and in 2017 did the Islamic defense action (aksi bela Islam) in waves until finally dragged Ahok into jail and defeat him in Jakarta 2017 election.

Large number of demonstrations conducted by radical Islamic mass movement in Jakarta shows the fact that Jakarta is a battleground of various ideological, political interests, and even basis of legitimacy of many things to gain influence both locally and globally. The Komnas HAM report notes that during 2016, complaints of violations of religious freedom in Indonesia amounted to 97, up from 87 cases in 2015 and Jakarta occupying the second position collecting 19 complaints. In the first position is West Java which collects 21 complaints during 2016 (Florence 2017). Although these radical movements turn out to have views and patterns that are not uniform, but can also find the sides of the equation, which is ideological and literal understanding of sacred text that offers a set of textual reference to support their intolerant theology orientations and undermine the other group that resist them. They quote sacred texts by isolating the texts from their historical and sociological background. Thus they have a high tendency to abolish the others and claim that they are only have divine truth. If we talk further about radicalism in West Java and Jakarta that influence a number of Islamic believers, we have some reason, such as politics, economics, and ideologic. The relation between radical understanding and politics can be seen in its two background causes. The first is their reaction in rejecting infidel leader in 2017 election. The second is their reaction towards democratic systems that are considered as secular and taghut system. HTI, for example, has a motto, "Save Indonesia by implementing sharia" (Yusanto: 2003, 135171). They want the caliphate system. The second reason is in economic sector, the radicalism rejects the secular economic, such bank interest rates as *riba*, and must be replaced with an sharia economic system based on religious values. The third reason is related to the ideological reason.

The radicalism often practice the exclusive teachings and tendency to strict in its' practices. It take the path of fanaticism and some time make a violence to realize their goals. For them, there are only two options, implementing Islamic sharia or to die as a martyr to fight for it. (Jamhari and Jahroni (ed.): 2004, 67-88). In addition to the role of information technology that has made the radicalism ideology has gone globally, there is also the role of agency. This agency helps individuals to interact with certain topics in internet. This agency facilitates people with pre-text knowledge. Even though they are not generally applied, their role is real. They can be in the form of activities of mobile teaching, *halaqahs* in the mosques of schools and campus mosques.

Conclusion

Phenomenon of the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia post-reform 1998 cannot be separated from many interrelated factors. It not only deals with aspects of religious teachings, but also deals with general societal aspects such as politics, economics, social and global conditions that are so messy that it becomes a complex phenomenon. The essence of Islamic teachings embraced by the people of Indonesia is a Sufi Islam that is able to adapt to existing culture and traditions, so that Islam can easily be accepted by the population. The entry of Trans-national Islamic teachings, such as salafi, HTI, Tarbiyyah Ikhwanul Muslimin to Indonesia cannot be separated from the influence of DDII which became the initiator and mediator of the establishment of LIPIA. Even DDII became the first Islamic institution to provide scholarships to Indonesian students to study in the Middle East supported by Saudi Arabia. The alumnus of Middle East and LIPIA education will become the main actors in spreading the Salafi movement, HTI, and Ikhwanul-Muslimin in Indonesia. Radical movements of local Islam metamorphose with radical trans-national movements, and perform their actions in Indonesia. Initial action is usually motivated by religious teachings but then into the local political issues, even voicing global issues and carrying the idea of the Caliphate. These demands ultimately have an impact on acts of violence and even discrimination against minorities, as noted in the Komnas HAM report that during 2016, complaints of violations of religious freedom in Indonesia amounted to 97, up from 87 cases in 2015 and Jakarta occupying the second position collecting 19 complaints. In the first position is West Java which collects 21 complaints during 2016.

There are at least three significant reasons, so radical Islamic movements allegedly continue to grow. First, the genealogy of radicalism has been in Indonesia, especially in West Java in the past. This radical movement appears to purify religious teachings, because according to purist, Islamic teachings that have now mixed with tradition, heresy, and khurāfah. In this context, the puritan movement cannot be separated from the influence of Wahabi teachings, which call it salafi dakwah/purist movement. The kind of this radical movement act no violence. The second is due to socio-political conditions and chaotic economy both locally and globally, because the current government, including in Indonesia does not apply Islamic law. This religious radicalism beside reject the tradition acted by muslim in heresy and khurāfah, they also reject the Pancasila and want to replace with caliphate. And the third, The entry of transnational Islamic networks due to globalization and the development of digital information technology. At this stage, local Islamic radical movements cannot be removed from the influence of trans-national Islamic networks. With help of information technology, radical movements of local Islam can establish relations with trans-national radical movements.

References

- Abdullah, Kurniawan.(2003). Gerakan Politik Islam Ekstraparlementer: Studi Kasus Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Depok: Universitas Indonesia.
- Al-Thalibi, Abu Abdirrahman. (2006). Dakwah Salafiyah Dakwah Bijak, Meluruskan Sikap Keras Dai Salafi. Jakarta: Hujjah Press.
- Badan Intelegen Nasional. Gerakan Islam Transnasional dan Pengaruhnya di Indonesia. n.d. www.scribd.com/doc/29986686/Gerakan-Islam-Transnasional.
- Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme.Kriteria Situs Radikalisme. n.d. <http://www.bnpt.go.id>.

- Beckford, James A. (2003). *Social Theory & Religion*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Efendy, Bahtiar. (1998). *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Paramadina.
- El Fadl, Khaled Abou. (2005). *Selamatkan Islam dari Muslim Puritan*. Jakarta: Serambi.
- Feith, Herbeth. (1999). *Pemilihan Umum 1955 di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia
- Geertz, Clifford. 1960. *The Religion of Java*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. (1994). *Beyond Left And Right: The Future Of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hadden, Jeffrey K. (1992). "Religious Movements" dalam Edgar F. Borgatta and Marie L. Borgatta. *Encyclopedia Of Sociology*. Volume 3. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Hamka. (2008). *Antara Fakta Dan Khayal Tuanku Ra*. Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah Jamhari, Jajang.
- Jahroni. (2004). *Gerakan Salafi Radikal Di Indonesia*. Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada.
- Laporan Survey Malindo Institute. (2008). *Agama sebagai Potensi Konflik dan Kekerasan (Studi Terhadap Pandangan Pimpinan Pesantren di Indramayu, Cirebon, Kuningan, Majalengka dan Ciamis tentang Jihad , Kekerasan dan Kekuasaan)*.
- Natsir, Mohammad. (2000). *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara*. Jakarta: DDII Noer, Deliar. 2000. *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*. Bandung: Mizan.
- Purwoko, Dwi. (2002). *Islam Konstitusional VS Islam Radikal*. Depok: Permata Artistika Kreasi Rahmat, M. Imdadun. 2005. *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Gerakan Revivalisme Islam ke Indonesia (1980-2002)*. Jakarta: Erlangga.
- Santoso, Kholid O. (2006). *Jejak-Jejak Sang Petualang Pemberontak (Pemikiran, Gerakan dan Ekspresi Politik S.M Kartosuwirjo dan Daud Beureueh)*. Bandung: Segaorsy Suhanah. 2001. "Gerakan Dakwah.
- Salafi di Indonesia: Kasus Aktivitas Dakwah Salafi di Jakarta dan Bogor" dalam Perkembangan paham keagamaan transnasional di indonesia/Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI.
- Zada, Khamami. (2002). *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Teraju Journals and Proceedings.
- Bruinessen, Martin van. (2001). "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia".
- Paper presented at the international colloquium —L'islam politique à l'aube du XXIème siècle in Teheran, October 28th-29th.
- Chozin, Muhammad Ali. (2013). "Strategi Dakwah Salafi di Indonesia". *Jurnal Dakwah* 14, No.1: 1-25.
- Jamhari, Jajang Jahroni. (2003). "Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia". *Jurnal Studia Islamika* 10, no. 3: 1 -28.

Jamhari, Jajang Jahroni. (2002). "Fundamentalisme dan Munculnya Islam Politik di Indonesia". Paper presented at IIT Jakarta, November 26.

Ro'uf, Abdul Mukti. (2007). "Mengurai Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru". *Ulumuna Jurnal Studi keislaman* 11, No, 1.

Wahid , Khozin. (2013). "Sikap Keagamaan Dan Potensi Radikalisme Agama Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi Agama". *Edukasi* 11, No. 3: 289-304.

Yani Anshori, (2006). "Wacana Siyasa Syar'iyah di Indonesia; Belajar Lebih Bijak". Paper presented at National Seminar "Islamic Political Law". Yogyakarta: Jurusan Jinayah Siyasa Fakultas Syari'ah UIN Sunan Kalijaga.

Article Websites

Firmansyah, Wahyu. Ketua DPP HTI: Pendukung Kami Makin Banyak. May 09, 2018.
<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2018/05/09/ketua-dpphtipendukungkamimakin-banyak>
(accessed May 25, 2018).

Florence, Ursula. Laporan tindak intoleransi beragama dan berkeyakinan 2016 meningkat. January 30, 2017. <https://www.rappler.com/indonesia/sosial/159998intoleransiberagamaberkeyakinan2016> (accessed June 10, 2018).

Rahadian, Lalu. Pilkada Ciptakan Polarisasi Warga Seperti Tahun 1965 dan 1998. April 06, 2017.
<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/kursipanasdki1/20170406215136516205601/pilkada-ciptakan-polarisasi-warga-seperti-tahun-1965-dan-1998/> (accessed May 25, 2018).

Tempo. Apa Hubungan Hizbut Tahrir dan IPB Saat Ormas HTI Lahir? May 17, 2017.
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/876016/apa-hubungan-hizbut-tahrir-danipbsaatormashti-lahir>
(accessed May 25, 2018).

www.scribd.com/doc/29986686/Gerakan-Islam-Transnasional

Copyrights

Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the journal.

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).