



KSA's Islamic Political Agenda in Indonesia: A Review to the King Salman's visit in Indonesia

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Abstract

Bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabian (KSA) government and the Republic of Indonesia have been established from 1947 to the present, initially their relationship was intended to strengthen cooperation in certain fields, through the principle of mutual respect, respect and benefit. The ultimate goal of bilateral relations based on these principles is to improve the welfare and prosperity of the people for each country. The author considers this interesting to see how Saudi Arabia continues to increase its influence and its state relations to Indonesia. This article was written based on the document data and historical approach. This study is concluded deductively. The historical approach reviews a problem from the point of historical overview towards the KSA's visit, which addresses and analyzes it by using the method of historical analysis. The study is expected to provide information and categorization about the region of *Jamaah Islamiyah*, Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia. It is also necessary to obtain information about the influence of the King Salman visit in early 2017 to Indonesia concerning the growth of terrorism in the South East Asia primarily the Indonesia.

Keywords: Bilateral Relations; *Jamaah Islamiyah*, Al-Qaeda; ISIS; Middle East; Southeast Asia

Introduction

Jemaah Islamiyah is a Southeast Asian militant extremist Islamist of terror group, just as similar as its alliance groups like the al-Qaeda and ISIS which share the same ideologies, although they may have different name of organizations and strategic struggles. As informed by the BIN (acronym for '*Badan Intelijen Negara*' or the National Intelligence Agency) of the Republic of Indonesia, that the fundamentalist Islamic movement (international scale of movement), renown for the trans-national Islamic Movement (the international political Islamic movements), whose ideology is no longer resting on the nation - state, but the racial concept, dominated by scripturalists' shades of thought, fundamentalist or radical, which is partially adapted the idea and modern instruments (BIN: 7). All of them aimed to implement the Islamic system in the state. Ideology is a system of ideas that can be used to rationalize, give warning, and explain beliefs (Efriza., 2009). The Islamic movements impose their ideology to strongly believe by their followers as a doctrine which must be implemented for they will get their glory. Many struggles for the embodiment of the ideology emerged during the Arab Spring. Arab Spring is

arising phenomenon of revolution to struggle for democratic values in the Arab world. This was initiated by Tunisia in the mid-2010 which later has extended to other countries, such as Egypt and Syria until today. The term 'Arab Spring' also means 'the spring in Arab'. This phrase retells the event in 1848 when most of the people's revolution happened in the Arab region². In the context of the Arab Spring here, what blooming is the democratic values which then spread with the speculative impacts to the surrounding countries (Karnaen., 2015).

Arab Spring becomes a political upheaval in the post-revolution of Iran and the Gulf War, political turmoil in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya which lost its political legitimacy, and resulted in the abdication of the leaders like Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Muhammad Bouazizi and Hosni Mubarak. Arab Spring not only leads to the democratization in the Middle East, but also raises the radical Islamic movements. Arab Spring political dynamics that gave birth to Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria (ISIS) have been responded surprisingly different by the youth this time. They are not just devoted to the symbolization of ISIS, but are also involved in the campaign of *khilafah* (caliphate/ Islamic government) via social media, in communal Quran reading, and even to migration to Syria, especially lately the dissemination of *salafi* spread almost in all corners of the world. It is no wonder that ISIS sympathizers come from around the world, such as Australia and Europe. In a very short time, ISIS can collect significant amounts of sympathizers (Syauqillah., 2015). *The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions, spreads across the Middle East throughout 2011. A rhythmic chant echoed across the Arab lands which showed that the people want to topple the regime. It has been widely seen as a watershed event which has irrevocably changed the region and the global political landscape. A main force behind it was the call for a formative political change, with freedom, democracy and justice, and the attack on corruption and nepotism* (Ryantori., 2015). In the last 4 years, ISIS has gained its popularity and supports from hardliner Muslim circles exceeding al-Qaeda.

Methodology

This article is written based on document data by using historical approach. This study is concluded deductively. The historical approach reviews a problem from the point of historical overview, addresses, and analyzes it by using the method of historical analysis. History is the study which is related to past events involving actual events or circumstances. The benefit of this study is to determine the ideology and the spread of *Jamaah Islamiyah*, al-Qaeda and ISIS in Southeast Asia.

Discussion

Brief Introduction to the Ideologies of the Islamic Movements Jamaah Islamiyyah

Jamaah Islamiyya in the book of the God's Country: The Thematic Encyclopedia (Abegebril et al., 2004) putting forward a view of the Indonesian Moslem Scholars Community (IMS.Com), that: a) international radicalism network named al-Qaida and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah are the brainchild of the scripturalistic verbalists who interpret religious texts in legitimizing the violence imposed through actions of jihad by terror "in the name of God" and on behalf of "the Apostles' agenda". al-Qaeda primarily popular for its slogan killing the civilian and military of Americans anywhere and anytime; b) understanding of Islam as a literal scripturalistic attitude to the Islamic texts should not adopt anything without considering the historical correlation (*asbab al-nuzul*) and social; c) based on research of Siyasa Research Institute (SR-Ins: This book's publisher, a research institute of Islamic political studies and international) indicates that al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah is an international network that is not limited by the territory of a country, this organization has prepared *Nidhom Asasi* or the Constitution; d) an understanding of religious literalist-scripturalist often trapped in a space characterized by the subjective, normative, and closed ideologies; e) in the area of socio-political understanding of literalists on the texts

of the Qur'an and Sunnah result in simplification on Islam, which will lead to fundamentalism and often become a political commodity: the Islamic doctrines are often used to obtain even against the existing power, This book contains 13 articles concerning the elaborated ideas and research reports by Muslim intellectuals, this book is now managed to be published in English. Introducing this book, what can be shared here is that most of the articles contained of this volume provide the spotlight on the transmission of ideology and the limited understanding of some Muslims, which require rethinking studies and again more carefully account of thought (Abegebril et al., 2004: xi-xiv).

Regarding the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), there is a controversial view put forward by Sidney Jones, which this organization has a relationship with the Islamic *Jama'ah* network in the Southeast Asia and had contact with Osama Bin Laden and al-Tawakhiri Alman. Alman is the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Al-Jama'ah who joined al-Qaeda. MMI party dismissed the claims (Grace., 2005: 72-73). In the case of the Salafi movement, the alumni of LIPIA Jakarta have a very prominent role. Educational institution which is a branch of the Islamic University Muhammad Ibnu Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia's Riyadh, intended to spread the Salafi's idea (Wahhabism) to Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. The education curriculum which is adopted by the Wahhabi followed the Wahabism based-university. The teachers imported from the Middle East, particularly from Saudi Arabia. Thus, it is surprising if the majority of the graduates become the adherents and proponents of *Wahabiyah-Salafi* thought (cf. Hasan., 2009: 124; Grace., 2005: 74).

The Wahabi, Salafy, and Al-Ikhwani Movements

The Islamic fundamentalist movement in the contemporary world is heavily influenced by the ideology of Islamic purification movement in the 18th century, which was pioneered by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792 AD). This movement gained its power when supported by Muhammad ibn Sa'ud (1747-1765 AD), a local prince of Nejad descent⁶. The followers solemnly cleared various forms and kinds of superstition and heresy and criticized the Muslims who behave un-Islamic. The secret alliance among Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud led to the birth of States of Saudi Arabia which only shortly survived for being under attacks (1819) by the Ottoman Empire of Egypt (Hasan., 2012, Hanafi., 1989). *Ikhwani Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt has inspired the Islamic movements in the other countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia under *Wahabi* ideology opposing and protesting against the power authority of hereditary family of Ibn Saud. The concept developed by the *Ikhwani Muslimin* became the blueprint for the movements of Islamic militant of *Sunni* (Yunanto., et al., 2003). *Ikhwani Muslimin* has inspired the birth of Islamist militant organizations and movements, such as *Hizbut-Tahrir* (established in Palestine, 1953)—this group (HT) voices out loud for the return of the rule of Islam or *the Islamic Khilafah* of Turkey which collapsed in 1924—Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, *Jama'at Takfir wa-'l-Hijrah* or *Jama'at al-Muslimun* (1960) led by Shukri Mustafa (this movement opposed Anwar Sadat's peace treaty with Israel, and were also responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat (6 October 1981) in Egypt (Hasan., 2012). IM has also inspired the birth of the Islamic militant group which are active in resisting the authorities, such as *Hamasin* Palestine, *Hezbollah* in Lebanon, FIS in Algeria, and *Negara Islam Indonesia* (The Islamic State of Indonesia/NII), which later transform into a majority faction of *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI) in Indonesia (Hasan., 2012). The development and the spread of the ideology of political Islam movements in the Middle East quickly reach across countries including Indonesia, as well as ISIS in Iraq and Syria and *al-Qaeda* as the embryo of ISIS.

Political Islamic movements have the following indicators: 1) The political Islam grows as the dynamics of power struggle. It is, in many ways, a political protest that is covered with symbols and religious discourse. The milestone in the development of political Islam itself took place following the defeat of the Arab world from Israel in 1967. With such defeat, many Muslims realized the fragility of

regimes in their countries; 2) The political Islam apparently appear over the failure of such regimes. Political Islam is not a story of success, it is the failure episodes that often end up with fragmentation or paralysis as a result of the brutal repression of the country; 3) The ups and downs of political Islam cannot be separated from the geo-strategic game played in the Islamic world. The influence of *al-Ikhwan* began to spread into many countries in the 1970s which initially piggyback the ambitious campaign of Saudi Arabia in exporting *Wahhabism* as an effort to strengthen the position of geo-strategic center of the Islamic world. This included the protection on the runaway leaders of *al-Ikhwan* from Egypt to Saudi Arabia followed by the execution of Qutb and his friends; 4) The surge of the world oil prices in 1970 gave the opportunity to Saudi Arabia to fill the void of ideology as a result of the war defeat of Arab from Israel in 1967 which eroded the Egypt's nationalism socialist during the Nasser era. In addition, Saudi Arabia was able to facilitate various missionary and education activities throughout the world. Saudi used *Rabita Alam Islami* as a local and international media cooperation; 5) The 1979 Iranian Revolution which brought Iran to be an Islamic State became the blueprint to be the only example of the successful tactics of revolutionary Islamism; 6) The Afghan War gave the opportunity to the convergence of Islamic activists around the world as a volunteers for jihad. It also includes the efforts of *al-Qaeda* led by Osama bin Laden which wanted to fight against Iraq but was rejected by Saudi Arabia.

These protests led Laden marked the emergence of Salafist fighters or *Salafi jihadists*, as stated by Noorhaidi Hasan⁶. The movement is based on *al-Qaeda' Aqīdatu'sh-Shahīhah* (faith/ belief which is true). Their acts are based on Koran, Hadith. *Ijma'* (consensus), and *Qiyas* (Divine Analogy). They often refer to some scholars like Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, *Ulama Salaf*, Imam Shafi'i, and so forth. On the other hand, they deny what is believed by *Shi'ites*, *Kharijites*, and *Murji'ah*⁹. Their ideology of power is that, when a country's legislation is based on rule of infidels, and when the law of infidels dominates the Islamic law, the country is a country of infidels. In this case, they do not accuse all citizens as unbelievers, given the applicable *daulah* is non-Islamic state, and the ruling majority are non-Muslims. According to them the blood, honor, and property of the Muslims is *haram* (sacred). This means that when there are infidels who attacked the holiness of the Muslims, then the laws of war/jihad of everyone of Muslim *isan* becomes obligation/*fard 'ain*. (al-Qurasy., 2009).

The political Islam movements in the Middle East have at least 2 to 3 ideologies:

- 1) to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic Sharia/ law
- 2) to enforce Islamic Sharia/ law or the purification of the teachings of Islam
- 3) to do an act of solidarity for the Muslims, commit the act of war/ jihad against evil doing and the West
- 4) to enforce the purification and to promote the aspirations and political rights both in the peaceful manner and violence (Hasan., 2012, Yunanto et al., 2003, Syarkun., 2004). The group of al-Qaeda and ISIS tend to consider anyone, including their fellow Muslims, to be an infidel for not having the same ideology.

The Network of Al-Qaeda and Isis in Southeast Asia

Al-Qaeda was initiated by the warmonger, i.e. Sheikh Abu Abdillah Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. According to its members, the members of this organization has spread to various parts of the world, especially in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Algeria⁹. Their ideology of power is that, when a country's legislation is based on rule of infidels, and when the law of infidels dominates the Islamic law, the country is a country of infidels. In this case, they do not accuse all citizens as unbelievers, given the applicable *daulah* is non-Islamic state, and the ruling majority are non-Muslims. According to them the blood, honor, and property of the Muslims is *haram* (sacred). This means that when there are infidels who

attacked the holiness of the Muslims, then the laws of war/jihad is an obligation/ *fard 'ain* (al-Qurasy., 2009).

American support for the political Islamic group (rightist) took place since 1973s. Dreyfuss (2007). Says further that around the year of 1950-1960, CIA had not had a great force in Afghanistan, but they have contributed significantly through the Asia Foundation that operates in Afghanistan in the University of Kabul and numbers of small projects associated with the Muslims community in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has prepared relations instructions with various embassies abroad for issuing visas easily for those who will enter Pakistan for jihad in Afghanistan. From the Middle East, the Muslim World League with its office in Saudi Arabia, *Ikhwanul Muslimin* from Egypt and the cells, and also the political Islamic movement from Palestine have been preparing for the recruitment of jihad activists to be sent to Pakistan (Abegebriel., 2004) It is also stated that between the years of 1982 to 1982, around 35,000 Muslim militants have been recruited from 43 countries from the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia, and Far East Asia, including Indonesia. Finally, the number of mujahedeen reached 100,000 personnel, which have the direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have high spirits against the Atheism State, or Communism State in the eyes of the United States.

Jihad activists meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, has taught radical theology and militant actions to the jihad activists from various Muslim countries who become the volunteers of the war in Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen is still perpetuating the spirit of the struggle for revolution to always proclaim jihad against any obstacles to uphold the God's Country (Abegebriel., 2004). As stated by Abegebriel, while the Iranian revolution in 1979 did not successfully carry out the revolutionary style out of Iran, then the "Peshawar Jihad" has successfully influenced the spirit of jihad of the jihad activists after returning to their respective countries.

The Afghan War lasted from December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Kabul to defend the Marxist government led by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan against the jihad activists who wanted to overthrow the government. During this time, the United States was seen as a mortal enemy for the Islamists. With the raging of this Afghanistan war, the US has managed to transform itself from the opponent position to be the fellow of the political Islamic movements (Hasan., 2012).

Oliver Roy said that the war in Afghanistan is the momentum of the activists of political Islamic movements' meetings around the world (Roy., 2002: 148-149). Since the year 1982 - 1992 has been carried out recruitment for 35000 Islamic militants' activism from 43 countries in the world, such as Middle East, North Africa, and East, Central Asia and the Far East after a procession of "allegiance" to engage in the action of *jihad* in Afghanistan. Tens of thousands of cadres who were present elected as representatives of cadres to be educated specifically along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Abegebriel., 2007: xiii). On February 23, 1998, a front was established which is popularly renown for *Al-jabhah al-Islamiyya al-'aalamiyyah Jihaad al-Yahuud li wa al-Salibiyyiin* (the International Islamic Front form the Struggle against the Jews and the Crusaders). This Front immediately issued a fatwa, and was signed by Usamah Bin Ladin, Dr. Ayman al-Zawaahiri as the leaders of *Jamaa'ah al-Jihad*, of the Egyptian, Abu Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Thaha leaders of *Jamaa'ah al-Islaamiyyah* of Egypt, Sheikh Mir Hamzah secretary of the *Jamaat-e Ulema-e* Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman leader of the Jihad Movement Bangladesh, and a commander of Pakistan, this momentum was coincidentally conducted with the presence of Jihaad Jamaa'ah of Egypt in Pakistan (Abegebriel., 2007: xxv-xxvi). The contents of the fatwa is "It is *fard 'ain* (Islamic obligatory) to fight and kill the Americans and their allies whether civil or military wherever and whenever they are.

The writer conducted interviews to a number of students whose subjects concern the Middle Eastern issues, both in Egypt and Saudi Arabia stated that those who live and study there, if they do not have stronger ideology from Indonesia, will easily accept the new doctrine, the *Salafi-Wahabi* in Arabia, and IM or HT in Egypt. In the 1970s thought Al-Banna, Al-Maududi, Sayyid Quthb (translation) very interesting read by students of Indonesia, even Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) himself fascinated in the thoughts of Al-Banna, since Gus Dur has had his own ideology, then his admiration for Al-Banna made him not to take for granted, as was stated in the Wahid Institute 2006 (Mubarak., 2007: xxx).

The involvement of Osama bin Laden in the Afghan conflict that eventually became the movement of international terrorist al-Qaeda cannot be simply separated from his partnership with the Prince of Turkey Faisal, which also embraced the Pakistani intelligence service ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) under the radical commander General Hameed Gull, and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) under the control of William Casey. The comradeship of Osama bin Laden with the CIA did not stop at the superficial policy. It already got into the scope of military training, finance, and weaponry. In 1994, the nationality of Osama bin Laden was revoked by the Kingdom of Saudi as well as his project in Sudan by the Saudi. It was because bin Laden has frequently criticized the Saudi that the information got published in the headlines of mass media. It was also because he criticized Saudi clerics, including bin Baz, with his excessive criticisms and excommunication. The Peshawar Pakistan-Afghan program was the media for more intense introductions and meetings between the hardline Islamic movements, ranging from the Ikhwanul Muslimun, Jama'at al-Jihad, and Jama'ah al-Islamiyah from Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, or Pakistan. Peshawar meeting participants also came from Hamas, Hizb at-Takfir wa 'l-Hijrah, Shukri Mustafa's Jama'at al-Muslimun, Abu Sayyaf's MILF, DI/TII Indonesia and from the other political Islamic movements (Abegebriel., 2007). The jihad activists meetings in Peshawar were the efforts for the unification of vision and mission of the movement in implementing its ideology nationally and internationally. They were there to establish the international networking (Abegebriel., 2007):

Political Islamic Movements in the Middle East, from Iraq and Syria quickly spread to Indonesia. In 2013 to 2014 the media were full of news about the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or *Daisy, Daulah Islaamiyyah fii 'Iraaqi wa Syaams*), which is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from Iraq. Abu Bakr previously served as a chairman of the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda (he is the follower of Osama bin Laden), that eventually established ISIS on April 9, 2013 in Iraq. This ISIS action has been seen as brutal as terrorists. As reported by Trans TV, on the rubric "*Berita Islam Masa Kini*" (Islam News Today), the natures of ISIS are similar to *Khawarijat* the time of *Khulafaaur* Raasyidiin (Trans Tv., 2014). As stated by Nasaruddin Umar (the Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs), ISIS potentially divides the Muslims¹⁵. The Chairman of BNPT (National Counterterrorism Agency), Ansyad Mbai argues that ISIS has spread (quickly) to Indonesia, and its activities are of jihad in Iraq and Syria. Those who went to the Middle East are those who have been involved in the terrorism cases. According to Ansyad, ISIS is seen to be more dangerous than al-Qaeda (Tv One., 2014):

ISIS has existed since the establishment of AQI (*Al-Qaa'idah 'Iraaq*) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq by the US invasion and its allies. Its primary mission is against the American occupation in Iraq. In connection to this, in 2006 ISI (*The Islamic State of Iraq/Daulah Islaamiyyah 'Iraaq*) was established. The ISIS *da'wah* in Indonesia has become a serious concern of the government, security forces, and religious leaders after the airing of information via YouTube containing ISIS propaganda. The chairman of BNPT, Ansyad Mbaai, says that Indonesian people who sworn or pledged to another country would suffer from the punishment mentioned in the Terrorism Act in the year of 2006 (Hasan., 2012), *Majalah Sabiliku.*, 2014) or the Islamic State of Iraq (not ISIS) emerged in 2006 with the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After he died, he was replaced by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. After his death, he was replaced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS now. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's real name was Abdullah Ibrahim, a former police officer during the rule of Saddam Hussein. At the time of the Syrian crisis, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formed *Jabhah*

Nuhsrah against the regime of Bashar al-Assad (from the Shi'ite group). Finally, in 2013, Abu Bakr expanded ISI (*Islamic State of Iraq*) into ISIS (*Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*) (Majalah Sabiliku., 2014).

The Head of the Indonesian National Counter terrorism Agency (BNPT) Now he serves as the chief of police of the Indonesia Republic) Tito Karnavian says that almost all Islamic organizations have something in common with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in which they want to establish the Islamic state. However, what makes them difference is how they realize it. "ISIS justifies violence, even against their own fellow Muslims," said Tito as *Tempo* interviewed him at his office (Rahayu., 2015). Singapore Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen said that themembers of ISIS in Southeast Asian are those who come back from Syria and Iraq with the mission to establish a caliphate in their respective countries. According to him, this threat is greater because there are many affiliate groups of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf which have stated their oath of allegiance to ISIS. He also said that, ISIS has successfully recruited more people in Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, compared to the other groups of terrorists (al-Qurasy., 2009).

Bahrin Naim is a suspected terrorist who had been arrested by the team of Special Detachment (*Densus*) 88 of Anti-terror on November 2010. He allegedly was the mastermind of the bombings around Sarinah, Jalan MH Thamrin, Central Jakarta on Thursday (14/01/2016) afternoon. "In Southeast Asia, there is Bahrin Naim who wanted to establish *Khatibah Nusantara*. He also wanted to be the leader for the ISIS group in Central Asia," said Tito in a press conference at the Presidential Palace on Thursday evening. Tito said that the radical action was chosen due to becoming the leader of ISIS in Southeast Asia, Bahrin had his competitor in southern Philippines (Asril., 2016, January 14).

Pos-Visit of King Salman Saudi Arabia in Indonesia

The King Salman visit to Indonesia in early 2017 enhance the economic interests in the region, it wants to maintain the socio-political relations with Indonesia, a country whose majority of Sunni Muslim population. Indonesia is internationally deemed important because it has the largest Muslim population in Asia. Related domination political rivalry between the regions of Riyadh and Tehran, this visit is a signal of commitment of Riyadh for Sunni political leaders in Southeast Asia. The Saudi Arabia delegation also engaged religious leaders, who want to establish contact with religious leaders in the countries of Southeast Asia. It will deepen the connections among the Saudi Arabia's Sunni Muslim with the Muslim-majority countries in the Southeast Asia. The idea of Saudi Arabia is to deepen the socio-political support for Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, which will strengthen its position as a leader of the Sunni Muslim bloc (see Saleem., March 2, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/>).

Political leaders saw the visit as bringing the positive impact, because they see the benefits for the economic sector and the political image for themselves. Citizens in general are also seeing the visit of King Salman is advantageous, because this signals that countries with a Muslim majority in Southeast Asia have ties to the Sunni Muslim world. The Saudi Arabia also wishes to establish contacts with the social and religious leaders in the Southeast Asia, and is ready to contribute in large quantities for social and religious projects that are considered beneficial for both countries.

It is important to understand that religious training in that era was used for only political purposes, i.e., recruiting people to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In the current context, such training, it would threaten the position of the Saudi Arabian leaders. This is evident since the 1990s. Therefore, Saudi Arabia's new approach through the reasons of rejecting the extremism ideas advocated by the groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS. But this is the latest and the results will not appear immediately. Meanwhile, the Southeast Asian countries also need to be pro-active in monitoring the given type of Islamic education in their schools (see Saleem., March 2, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/>). The king of

Salman visit to Indonesia shall bring changes in the political map of Indonesia; formerly there was a thought on the growth of Islamic radicalism movement led by Wahhabi movement Saudi Arabia, despite knowing the fact that the King of Saudi is primarily the background of Wahabism. Thus, by the new situation in the context after the King Salman visit will generates the changing perspective in which the Wahabi are the embryo of terrorism as professed by the world community at large.

Conclusion

The development and spread of the Middle Eastern political Islamic movements of ideologies are quickly across countries including Indonesia, along with the ISIS in Iraq and Syria and *al-Qaeda* which is the embryo of ISIS. All Islamic organizations have something in common with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in which they want to establish the Islamic state. However, what makes them difference is how they perform their mission. "ISIS justifies violence, even if they have to be against their own fellow Muslims."

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's real name was Abdullah Ibrahim, a former police officer during the rule of Saddam Hussein. At the time of the Syrian crisis, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formed *Jabhat Nuhsrah* against the regime of Bashar al-Assad (from the Shi'ite group). Finally, in 2013, Abu Bakr expanded ISI (*Islamic State of Iraq*) into the ISIS (*Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*). In Southeast Asia; there is Bahrun Naim who wanted to establish leadership branch/ *Khatibah Nusantara*. The king Salman visit to Indonesia in early 2017 generates a positive impact to the control over terrorism, because he is also eager to cooperate with the Indonesian Police Department to counter against vigilant acts of terrorism.

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