Reinforcing Indonesian National Identity Based on Inclusiveness of Pancasila as a Way to Deal with the Identity Politics in Indonesia

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Abstract

History recorded that since the beginning of its independence, Indonesia has faced the problem of identity politics based on ethnicity, religion, race, and even ideology. It was only during the New Order that the Suharto regime succeeded in controlling identity politics by making Pancasila the only principle of society and organisation. However, at the same time, Suharto used Pancasila as a tool to perpetuate his power by monoplisising the definition of national identity based on Pancasila. So, any form of interpretation that does not follow the views of the state is considered subversive. Under Suharto, Indonesia's national identity based on Pancasila became an exclusively national identity. After Suharto's fall, identity politics strengthened again and led to conflicts between ethnic and religions. It proved that repressive measures are not appropriate for dealing with identity politics. What is, then, the appropriate way to deal with identity politics in Indonesia. This article discusses John Titaley's socio-historical perspective as a discourse to deal with identity politics in Indonesia. Based on a socio-historical perspective, Indonesia is a reality with two identities: the one is a primordial identity before Indonesia was formed; the second one is the Indonesian national identity based on Pancasila, which was formed based on the agreement of all groups with their respective primordial identities. So, the nature of Indonesia is in its diversity, not homogeneity. Based on this socio-historical perspective, the most appropriate to deal with identity politics in Indonesia is by reinforcing Indonesian national identity based on the inclusiveness of Pancasila as initiated by the founding fathers of Indonesia.

Keywords: Identity Politics; Pancasila; Primordialism; Indonesian National Identity; Socio-Historical Perspective

Introduction

Since the downfall of the Soeharto military regime, Indonesia has implemented fundamental democratic practices. Respect for human rights has increased, direct elections of presidents and regional heads have been conducted, constitutional and legal provisions have allowed free speech, and freedom of the press has been legally written into the constitution. As much of the literature on democracy routinely notes, these practices are expected and predicted due to the decentralisation of the government and democracy. However, at the same time, decentralisation and regionalism have also raised some critical issues to be discussed, namely the politicisation of ethnoreligious and regional-based identities, the spread
of regional and communal violence, and the evolution of local-level political actors into local 'kings' (Arjon 2018: 173).

The strengthening of identity politics in the reform era is a challenge for the democratisation process in Indonesia. The rise of identity politics based on religion, ethnicity, and race has resulted in ethnic and religious conflicts on several islands in Indonesia. Clashes between Christians and Muslims broke out in Posso in 1998 and Ambon in 1999. Implementing Islamic sharia regulations in several districts and cities also shows the strengthening of identity politics, including the efforts of several Islamic fundamentalist groups who propagated a desire to replace the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila with the ideology of the Khilafah (caliphate). In addition, identity politics based on ethnicity and religion is also engaged by political actors in electoral contestation, which results in sharp polarisation in society and can cause horizontal conflict among the contestants' supporters. Identity politics in electoral political contestations potentially produce leaders who are not credible because the basis for voter choice is often not based on the ability of the contestants but on their ethnic or religious identity. Fukuyama (2018b) opines that when identity groups based on ethnicity or religion have access to state power, they will often use it to benefit their own group.

Furthermore, what is the appropriate way to deal with the strengthening of identity politics in Indonesia? Based on Titaley's sociological perspective on the history of the formation of Indonesia, the author tries to build an argument regarding the appropriate way to deal with the strengthening of identity politics in Indonesia.

**John Titaley's Socio-Historical Perspective on Indonesian National Identity**

According to Titaley (2013, 157), to understand Indonesian national identity, it is crucial to pay attention to the socio-historical aspects of the dynamics of the formation of Indonesia. Indonesia has two identities: first, as a primordial identity before Indonesia was formed, including cultural and religious diversity with Javanese, Acehnese, Minangkabau, Batak, Balinese, Timorese, Moluccans, et cetera. This diversity of primordial identities creates Indonesian pluralism. Furthermore, from the diversity of these primordial identities, they agreed to create a new identity that unites them into a nation, namely Indonesia. Indonesia is a new phenomenon founded in 1945 by people with different primordial identities. Titaley stated,

The proclamation of Indonesian independence occurred on August 17, 1945. The name Indonesia was entirely new and was used first for political reasons by students coming from the Dutch East Indies in 1922 in order to designate the people in the archipelago under Dutch colonial rule. The name later on gained political support in the archipelago when the youths from various parts of the archipelago met in a congress in 1928. They pledged the unity of one people of Indonesia, one fatherland of Indonesia, and admired the unified language, the Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language). Since Indonesia, as a nation, had not existed previously, the unification of diverse ethnic groups was assisted by Pancasila (five basic principles). The principles are: (1) kebutuhan yang maha esa (belief in one and only God); (2) kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab (a just and civilized humanity); (3) persatuan Indonesia (unity of Indonesia); (4) kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmah kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan (peoplehood based on the wisdom of deliberation and representation); and (5) keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (social justice for all people of Indonesia). (Titaley 2008: 77)

The Pancasila formulation contained in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution is a formulation that has undergone several changes. Soekarno first put forward Pancasila during a speech at the Investigating Agency for the Preparatory Work for Indonesian independence (BPUPKI). The Pancasila formulation made by Soekarno on June 1, 1945, included: (1) Indonesian nationality; (2) internationalism or humanity; (3) consensus or democracy; (4) social welfare; and (5) belief in one God. To formulate Soekarno's Pancasila, BPUPKI formed a committee of eight chaired by Soekarno. Six representatives of
the nationalist group and two representatives of the Islamic group: Soekarno, M. Hatta, M. Yamin, A. Maramis, M. Sutardjo Kartohadikoesmo, Oto Iskandardinata (nationalists), Ki Bagoes Hadikoesmo and K.H. Wachid Hasjim (Islamic group). Soekarno took the informal initiative by forming the Committee of Nine, which was in charge of formulating Pancasila as the foundation of the state. The nine people are: Soekarno (chairman), Mohammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, A.A. Maramis, Soebardjo (nationalist class), K.H. Wachid Hasjim, K.H. Kahar Moezakir, H. Agoes Salim, and R. Abikusno Tjokrosoejoso (Islamic Group). The committee of nine, chaired by Soekarno, was formed to unite the two groups' views. The committee of nine succeeded in agreeing on the draft of the preamble, in which there was the formulation of Pancasila, which was then signed by each member of the Committee of Nine on June 22, 1945 (Latif 2018). The Jakarta Charter contains Pancasila as the basis of the state, which is a reformulation of Soekarno's version, which was delivered at the BPUPKI session on June 1, 1945. Latif explained the changes as follows,

After passing through the consensus, the June 1 version of Pancasila was improved in sequence and editorial. The phrase "Ketuhanan" (belief in God Almighty) was transferred from the last principle to the first. Furthermore, in response to the aspirations of the Islamic group, this phrase was expanded with the following clause "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law". This clause came to be known as "the seven words." The principle of 'international humanity' remains in the second principle, but its edition was refined to be a "just and civil humanity." The principle of 'Nationhood of Indonesia' changed its position from the first principle into the third. It became "the Unity of Indonesia." The principle of 'Mufakat or democracy' changed its position from the third principle to the fourth. It read, "democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives." The principle of 'Social Welfare' changed its position from the fourth principle to the fifth. It read "Social Justice for all Indonesians." (Latif 2018, 232)

The formulation of the Jakarta Charter raises a sharp debate over the inclusion of the "seven words, "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law"." as the clause in the principle of God Almighty, with all its derivative. The objection to the inclusion of "seven words" was not only coming from the nationalists but also the Islamic group. For nationalists, the "seven words," which contained special treatment for Muslims, was not suitable as fundamental law presiding over citizens as a whole. Finally, in the formulation of Pancasila, which was stipulated on August 18, 1945, the phrase was omitted (Latif 2018).

According to the history of Pancasila and its changes from Soekarno's version to the Jakarta Charter version, and finally, Pancasila, which was enacted on August 18, 1945, it has had a significant impact on this nation. It places all adherents of religion, ethnicity, and class equally. The founding agreement of the nation's founders on the identity of the Indonesian nation based on Pancasila is the foundation for a pluralistic Indonesian state, including the concept of diversity that has created a new civilisation for Indonesia. Pancasila guarantees the recognition of equality between all Indonesian citizens who come from various backgrounds. However, it can also be a basis for recognising the ethical responsibility of each member of the nation to build harmony in life between the adherents of one religion and another. Pancasila is the "ideal reality of a material condition consisting of various ethnic groups with socio-cultural diversity, called Indonesia" (Titaley 2013:159-60). Indonesia, based on Pancasila, was formed by its diversity. So, the essence of Indonesianess lies in its diversity, not homogeneity. However, Although Pancasila was endorsed by the nation's founders and has been deeply accepted among the people, the problem of interpreting and applying these principles in social and political life is not easy (Titaley 2008: 78).
Identity Politics and National Identity

Identity Politics

Fukuyama (2018) stated that over the last several decades, the central axis of politics has shifted from a focus on economic issues to a focus on identity politics and from distribution issues to cognitive issues. Identity politics emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, marked by large-scale political movements, such as second-wave feminism, Black civil rights in the USA, and gay and lesbian liberation. Taylor (1989) argued that modern identity is characterised by an emphasis on the inner voice and its capacity for authenticity – the ability to find ways of being that are somehow self-righteous. Identity politics rests on the relationship between specific experiences and the subject’s position associated with the social structure. Identity in identity politics appears to be the experiences of subjects in social structures that result in injustice and the possibility of more authentic or self-determined alternatives. These social movements are supported by a collection of philosophical literature that questions the nature, origin, and future of identity. Identity politics as a way of organising is closely linked to the idea that some social groups are oppressed; that is, that because one's identity as a woman or as an African American, for example, makes a person particularly vulnerable to cultural imperialism, violence, exploitation, marginalisation, or powerlessness (Young 1990).

Therefore, Williams (1998) argues that the identity of legislators strongly influences fair representation and whether some of them are actually members of the historically marginalised groups most in need of protection in our society. The distinctive voices of these groups must be heard in the legislative process. Self-representation of these groups is necessary to maintain their confidence in democratic institutions. Memories of state-sponsored discrimination against these groups, together with a continuing pattern of inequality along group lines, provide grounds for recognising group claims and a way of distinguishing stronger from weaker claims. On a philosophical level, a liberal understanding of the subject of politics and its relation to collectivity does not appear to be sufficient to ensure the representation of women, gay and lesbian men, or racial-ethnic groups. For example, Zilis (2022: 179) found that the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy depends on the group that benefits from a decision and that public acceptance of the decision is conditioned on group judgment. These findings raise fundamental questions about the health of the rule of law in the USA today. This shows that a group with a specific identity also influences the political processes of legal products. Moreover, Zill explained that:

From the perspective of strategic judicial behaviour, these findings link with recent advancements that suggest that social group cues influence the rulings handed down by the Supreme Court and its justices. A similar influence, it seems, operates on the mass public. This suggests that not only political elites but also ordinary citizens care about the group-based implications of court rulings. The results also offer insights when it comes to the judiciary’s strategic protection of legitimacy. This is because, as much as sound legal reasoning and desirable policy implications, group considerations influence public support for the Supreme Court. What might the Court do with this information? One possibility is to shy away from decisions in favour of highly unpopular groups, which of course, stands at odds with its mission of protecting minority rights. More innocuously, courts may be forced to consider framing their decisions in such a way as to blunt their implications with respect to identity politics. (Zilis 2022: 197)

Psychologically, identity politics arises due to the natural need in humans to be publicly recognised that they are worthy and equal to others. Fukuyama explained how the need to be respected turns into identity politics:

The inner self is the basis of human dignity, but the nature of that dignity is variable and has changed over time. In many early cultures, dignity is attributed only to a few people, often warriors who are willing to risk their lives in battle. In other societies, dignity is an attribute of all human beings, based on their intrinsic worth as people with agency. And in other cases, dignity is
due to one’s membership in a larger group of shared memory and experience. Finally, the inner sense of dignity seeks recognition. It is not enough that I have a sense of my own worth if other people do not publicly acknowledge it or, worse yet, if they denigrate me or do not acknowledge my existence. Self-esteem arises out of esteem by others. Because human beings naturally crave recognition, the modern sense of identity evolves quickly into identity politics, in which individuals demand public recognition of their worth. Identity politics thus encompasses a large part of the political struggles of the contemporary world, from democratic revolutions to new social movements, from nationalism and Islamism. (Fukuyama 2018: 18-19)

This implicit explains the continuing historical failures of liberal democracy to achieve full inclusion in power structures for members of marginalised groups. Although liberal democracy normatively guarantees all citizens' equality, it does not guarantee that all citizens are respected equally in democracy, particularly in a group that has experienced being marginalised (Fukuyama, 2018a). Therefore, when there are still social groups in a country who still feel oppressed and experience violence, exploitation, marginalisation, or powerlessness, there is a fertile field for the growth of identity politics. In this context, identity politics is understood as a political activity and theory based on the experience of injustice among members of certain social groups that aim to fight for the political freedom of specific marginalised constituencies in a broader context (Heyes 2020, 1).

The struggle for recognising equal dignity by disenfranchised groups in society drives contemporary identity politics. Unlucky, that desire can quickly become a demand to be recognised as a superior group - megalothymia (Fukuyama 2018:29). Identity politics gives a very firm line to determine who will be included and rejected. That line of determination certainly appears immutable. Therefore, the status of both a member and a non-member will be seen as permanent. Identity politics also often arise due to the struggle for resources between different identity groups. In this context, political identity must be reconfigured to support social cohesion rather than strengthen inter-ethnic and religious divisions whose exclusivity encourages fragmentation and conflict (Phillips 2016). In order to maintain a secure political order amid the threat of identity politics, Fukuyama (2018b: 7) stated that it is necessary to reaffirm an inclusive national identity. A strong national identity is needed to increase security, build good governance, improve the economy, foster mutual trust among citizens, increase social safety nets, and maintain the development of liberal democracy. Identity politics based on ethnicity, religion, and even ideology will always exist in various forms and become a growing phenomenon in the global political landscape, including in Indonesia.

National Identity

A nation is a human population that shares historical territories, common myths and historical memories, masses, a public culture, a shared economy, common legal rights, and obligations to all its members (A. D. Smith 1991, 14); the psychological bond that binds fellow citizens together, and which is considered to be the essence of national identity. This psychological bond is usually called 'ownership' (Connor 1978). Meanwhile, Triandafyllidou (1998, 593) stated that the national identity is defined not only from within, namely from the features that fellow nationals share in common, but also from without, that is, through differentiating the nation from other nations or ethnic groups. National identity becomes meaningful only through the contrast with others. These expressions refer to the close relationship between the individual and the collective self, namely the nation. The identity of the nation-state is based on the self-identification of its communities, who consider themselves to have observable sovereignty or identification of the political unit that unites culturally homogeneous groups. In other words, a cohesive nation-state requires a certain degree of homogeneity among its citizens. Homogeneity is created artificially using national identities that distinguish particular nation-states from non-members. Thus, nation-states create national identities based on what Anderson calls 'imagined communities' because they differ 'in the imagined style from the bogus/authentic' (Anderson 1983:33).
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The fundamental propositions of a nationalist doctrine, namely that the world is divided into nations and those nations are the only legitimate source of political power, are accepted as indisputable principles that guide social and political life development. The world organisation in the nation-state not only seems 'natural', but the whole perception by each individual about the world around oneself is based on the distinction between in-groups, i.e. nations and foreigners, those belonging to other communities, and the 'others' (Triandafyllidou 1988). National identity begins with a shared belief in the legitimacy of the country's political system, whether the system is democratic or not. Identity can be embodied in laws and formal institutions that dictate, for example, which language will be considered official, or what will be taught in schools to children about their country's past. National identity also penetrates the realm of culture and values. It consists of people's stories about themselves: where they came from, what they celebrate, shared historical memories, and expectations about what it takes to be a genuine member of the community (R. M. Smith 2015). Furthermore, according to Fukuyama,

National identity has been pivotal to the fortunes of modern states. Weak national identity has been a major problem in the greater Middle East, where Yemen and Libya have disintegrated into failed states and Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia have suffered from internal insurgency and chaos. By contrast, China, Japan, and Korea all had highly developed national identities well before they began to modernise—indeed, prior to the confrontation with the Western powers that all three countries experienced in the nineteenth century. One reason the economies of China, Japan, and South Korea were able to grow in such spectacular fashion in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is that these countries did not have to settle internal questions of identity as they opened up to international trade and investment (Fukuyama 2018b, 7).

There are five essential reasons for a country to have a strong, inclusive national identity: (1) physical security. Without a national identity triggers state collapse and civil war, as happened in Syria and Libya. In addition, a weak national identity creates severe other security problems; (2) national identity is vital for the quality of government. Good governance, which requires effective public services and low levels of corruption—depends on state officials placing the public interest above their own narrow interests; (3) facilitating economic development. A solid national identity produces elites who are very focused on the economic development of their country rather than on their personal or group enrichment; (4) promoting a broad radius of trust, which acts as a lubricant that facilitates economic exchange and political participation; (5) encourage countries to maintain strong social safety nets that reduce economic inequality. Within a society, they feel that they are members of an extended family and have high trust in one another; they are much more likely to support social programs that aid their weaker fellows. Liberal democracy is an implicit contract between citizens and their government and between citizens themselves, whereby they give up certain rights to enable the government to protect other, more basic and important rights (Fukuyama 2018b).

A robust national identity binds citizens constitutionally to recognise equality and pride as part of their nation. However, national identity is dangerous when trapped in exclusivism based on ethnicity, religion, or particular groups. This kind of national identity (exclusive nationalism) led to the persecution of people who were not part of their ethnic, religious or group. Fukuyama (2018) stated that these problems arise not from the idea of national identity itself but the assertion of the identity in a narrow, ethnically based, intolerant, aggressive, and profoundly illiberal form. Therefore, national identity must be built on equality and recognition of every citizen's dignity and human rights regardless of their social background (inclusive nationalism).

The Ups and Downs of Identity Politics in Indonesia

When colonialism, which is considered a common enemy, no longer exists, there are efforts from several groups to fight for their primordial identity to become the foundation of the Indonesian nation. The three major ideologies that developed at that time were Nationalist, Islamic, and Marxist. Nationalism comes from traditional Javanese culture, which is strong, rich, and majority, representing
national identity. Second, Islamic ideology is supported by several Islamic movements, which believe that because most Indonesian people are Muslim, Islam should logically become a national identity. While the third, Marxism, as the face of socialism, was supported by groups with Western educational backgrounds, who believed that the modern state should be based on equality, justice, and democracy (Titaley 2013: 158-59). There was a debate between Islamic and Nationalist groups. The debate was about the form of the state, whether it is a secular state or a religious (Islamic) state.

Regarding this matter, Ma'arif (2006: 193) stated that the contradiction that most marked the struggle for the form of the state at the beginning of Indonesia's independence was between the Nationalist group and the Islamic group. These two groups were fighting for influence to become the state's ideology. This polemic was very visible in the debates at the sessions of BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/ Investigating Efforts to Prepare for Indonesian Independence). The polemic resulted in the agreement of the Jakarta Charter with the content as seen today. Namely, it eliminated the phrase in the first precepts related to the obligation for Muslims to carry out Islamic law. This was a political compromise between those who wanted to establish an Islamic nation and those who desired a secular nation (Yuwanto, 2013). So, two things can unite the primordial diversity in this archipelago, namely psychological bonds as fellow colonised groups and making Pancasila the basis of Indonesia's national identity. Before independence, the archipelago's diversity could be united by the psychological feeling of being colonised and Pancasila after the independence of Indonesia.

Even though there was an agreement between the nation's founders on Pancasila as the basis of the state's ideology, it did not mean that there was no political turmoil after Indonesia's independence. Some identity political movements and even separatism persist in Indonesia, such as RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan/ Republic of South Maluku), GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/ Free Aceh Movement), GPM (Gerakan Papua Merdeka/ Free Papua Movement), and DI (Darul Islam). They use religion as their political identity. In comparison, several other movements use ideology as their identity, including the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) rebellion in Madiun in 1948, the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in the late 1950s to early 1960s in Sumatra and Sulawesi, and the 1965 G30S incident (Maarif 2010).

Furthermore, during the New Order, identity politics could be controlled by Soeharto's military regime. However, President Soeharto used Pancasila as a tool to perpetuate his power. The methods used in the indoctrination of Pancasila: First, through the teachings of the Guidelines for instilling and implementing Pancasila (P4); Second, Soeharto exercised strict socio-political control by monopolising the definition of Indonesian national identity, with Pancasila being the only principle of society and organisation. Everything that is considered an alternative way or interpretation that does not follow the state's view is considered subversive (Yuwanto, 2013). It is coupled with the slogan of social and political stability for economic development so that all forms of social movements that threaten national stability, including identity politics, are 'cleared down'.

However, the repressive approach to controlling identity politics can only control it temporarily because it is not based on mutual understanding and acceptance of a shared identity as a nation. Therefore, after the downfall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, identity politics reappeared. The emergence of identity politics was manifested in various forms, such as:

(1) Inter-religious conflicts occurred in several areas in Indonesia (Poso and Ambon), while conflicts with ethnic nuances also occurred in Kalimantan. The collective violence in Indonesia increased mainly between 1997 and 2001, as about 10,247 people died in more than 2,444 incidents. These deaths mainly occurred due to religious and ethnic fights. Of the total deaths, nearly 9,612 Indonesians died due to ethnic-communal fights in 599 incidents. Half of the victims (5,452 people in 433 incidents) were killed in religious fights between Muslims and Christians. Furthermore, 4,122 people died due to ethnic sentiments and hatred, with most victims (1,259 people in 32
incidents) killed due to violence toward Indonesian Chinese. The fights between Madurese and Dayak/Malay in Sambas and Sampit led to 2,764 deaths in 70 incidents (Arjon, 2018: 178).

(2) There was a rise in Islamic fundamentalist groups' struggle to enforce Islamic sharia both revolutionary and constitutionally. According to Maarif (2010: 21), these movements include MMI (Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia/ Indonesian Mujahideen Council), FPI (Front Pembela Islam/ Islamic Defense Front), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/ Prosperous Justice Party), an Islamic party influenced by the ideals of Islam. The ideals of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), founded by Hasan Al-Bana in Egypt, follow the path of democracy to achieve its goals. Although the expression model of their aspirations is different, these factions share the same struggle for demands, namely the application of Islamic law in Indonesia. They do not recognise the existence of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia as a legitimate and final state and struggle to replace the ideology of Pancasila and the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (Dahlan 2014:19).

(3) There were ethnic and religious-based campaigns in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. Ethnic and religious issues were also used in contestations in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. The use of ethnic and religious-based identity politics in the Jakarta gubernatorial election has divided the community into two groups, namely nationalist and religious ones. According to Arjon (2018: 171), since the fall of President Soeharto and the New Order (ORBA) era, religious sentiments had not been used to attack other religions until the 2017 gubernatorial Jakarta election. The separation of these two ideologies sooner or later will be able to create two dangerous practices that grow in society, namely Islamic exceptionalism and a government that runs with an iron fist. Indonesia has repeatedly experienced segregation between Islam as a religious ideology and a nationalist ideology, and fatal outcomes have resulted, such as the 1965 massacres and the 1998 riot.

Criticising Identity Politics in Indonesia from Titaley's Socio-Historical Perspective on Indonesian National Identity

History records that since the beginning of its independence, Indonesia has faced the development of identity politics based on ethnicity, religion, race, and even ideology. However, during the New Order, Soeharto's military regime succeeded to controlled identity politics. Suharto succeeded in strengthening Indonesia's national identity based on Pancasila. Nevertheless, at the same time, Soeharto used Pancasila as a tool to perpetuate his power by monopolising the definition of Indonesian national identity, with Pancasila being the only principle of society and organisation. Everything that is considered an alternative way or interpretation that is not following the state's view is considered subversive. So, under the Suharto regime, Indonesia's national identity based on Pancasila became an exclusively national identity, and this contradicts the fundamental idea of Pancasila as initiated by the founding fathers of Indonesia that guaranteed equality for all Indonesian citizens regardless of ethnic background, religion, belief, and political orientation.

The development of identity politics in a pluralistic country threatens the unity of the state. It is necessary to consider various ways to deal with its development in the modern political landscape in Indonesia. Various models of approaches need to be analysed and considered for their effectiveness. A repressive approach to resolving identity politics caused by the experience of being marginalised and oppressed is not the best solution because it does not touch the substance of the root of the problem, namely the natural need of human beings to be publicly recognised for their dignity. It will even bring them back to the collective memory of the experiences of being oppressed in the past and strengthen their determination to fight for the interests of their group based on their ethnicity or religion. It can even result in demands to be recognised as a superior group. The dialogue approach to rebuilding an understanding of togetherness as the Indonesian nation based on Pancasila is the better way to touch the substance of the problem at hand. In this context, John Titaley's sociological perspective on the formation of Indonesian
national identity based on Pancasila is critical as a discourse to criticise the strengthening of identity politics in Indonesia.

Titaley (2013) explained that Indonesia has two identities, primordial and national identities. Primordial identity is identity before Indonesia was formed, consisting of various ethnic groups, religions, races, ideologies, and cultures. Then, from the diversity of these primordial identities, they agreed to create a new identity that unites them into one nation, namely Indonesia. Pancasila is the basis of the state that can unite the primordial diversity of the archipelago into one national identity, namely Indonesia. The agreement of the nation's founders on the identity of the Indonesian nation based on Pancasila is the foundation for a pluralistic Indonesian state, including the concept of diversity that has created a new civilisation for Indonesia (Titaley 2013: 156-160). Indonesia, based on Pancasila, was formed by its diversity, which means the essence of Indonesianness lies in its diversity, not homogeneity.

Identity politics that fights for reclaiming its primordial identity, be it religion, ethnicity, or race to become an Indonesian national identity is denying the essence of Indonesia, which is formed from primordial diversity. When the diversity that is a marker of Indonesianness is eliminated, the existence of Indonesia will politically experience shocks; it may even be fragmented again. Pancasila guarantees the recognition of equality for all Indonesian citizens regardless of ethnic background, religion, and belief. In addition, Pancasila is also the basis for the ethical responsibility of every citizen, without exception, to build harmony among Indonesians regardless of their social background, religion, and political orientation. Pancasila is the "ideal reality of material conditions consisting of various ethnic groups with socio-cultural diversity, called Indonesia" (Titaley, 2013).

Considering Titaley's sociological perspective on the founding of the Indonesian national identity based, the author argues that strengthening the Indonesian national identity based on Pancasila, which is inclusive as was initiated by the founders of the Indonesian nation, is the best way to deal with the strengthening of identity politics based on ethnicity, religion, and race in Indonesia.

**Conclusion**

Identity politics based on ethnicity, religion, race and ideology is hazardous in political life in a pluralistic Indonesia, even more so if it develops into a demand to become a superior group (megalothy mia). History of Indonesia has recorded that Indonesia faced identity politics based on ethnicity, religion, race, and even ideology since its independence. History also recorded that identity politics has resulted in conflicts between ethnicities, religions, and even ideologies, which claimed many victims, both property and lives, and the destruction of social cohesion among Indonesian citizens. During the New Order era, the Suharto regime could control identity politics by making Pancasila the only principle of society and organisation. This exclusive interpretation model regarding Pancasila as the basis of national identity has succeeded in controlling identity politics in Indonesia. However, at the same time, it has spawned various repressive actions against those who have interpretations that differ from the regime's interpretation. This repressive approach to dealing with identity politics is not an appropriate solution because it can only prevent it temporarily while the regime is in power. After Suharto's regime fell, identity politics based on religion, ethnicity, race, and ideology strengthened again and led to ethnic and religious conflicts on several islands in Indonesia. Considering Titaley's socio-historical perspective on Indonesia's national identity based on Pancasila, which was formed by the agreement of peoples with their diverse primordial identities, the author argues that the appropriate way to deal with the strengthening of identity politics in Indonesia is re-strengthen the Indonesian national identity based on the inclusiveness of Pancasila as initiated by Indonesia's founding fathers.
References


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