



Janus Faced of Women's Parliament Family Line: Representation of Women in Politics and Party Oligarchy

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v8i2.2404>

Abstract

The implementation of affirmative quota policies by political structures, especially political parties as one of the elements of the political infrastructure, has provided the widest possible opportunity for women to be directly involved in the political process, such as becoming members of parliament to carry out oversight, budgeting, and legislative functions: the making and policymaking and political decisions. This research examines how women in the family path of the 2019's election results, on the one hand, their faces are seen as political representatives of women in parliament, but on the other hand, they are also seen as representatives of the interests of party oligarchy in parliament. We explored the filling of affirmative quotas for female parliamentary candidates from the family line by political parties which allowed us to identify women parliamentarians from the family line as having two faces, namely as women's political representatives as well as party political representatives. In a stronger party oligarchy, we argue that filling the affirmative quota of female parliamentary candidates from the family line apart from being urged by the affirmative quota policy for 30% women's political representation, is also motivated by the interests of party oligarchy. We adopt the thoughts of Anne Phillips (1991) about the politics of presence which sees that women's representation in parliament starts from the number, not from the policies they produce.

Keywords: *Women Parliament; Family Path; Political Representation; Political Oligarchy*

Introduction

The phenomenon of women in the Indonesian parliament as a family line (political dynasty) is increasingly open after political parties are required to implement an affirmative quota of 30%. The success of women in the family line parliament through affirmative quotas is an initiative of the party oligarchy. Using the typology of representation (political representation) of women, the oligarchic initiative is seen as a symbolic or representation descriptive representation (formalistic representation): acting with authority is more about an effort to take advantage of legal regulations than a sincere intention to realize substantive representation: resembling those who are represented (reflection) (Pitkin, 1967). Law No. 2 of 2008, which requires 30% of women in the establishment of parties, central party

management, and zipper system nominations are the answer to women's political resistance to the policy of recruiting candidates for election participants by parties that have prioritized men- men than women. For oligarchic parties, this policy is still beneficial considering that female parliamentary candidates remain functional for political parties, namely on the one hand the fulfillment of requirements as election participants, and on the other hand, it is still possible to carry out the party's political agenda.

From a result and process point of view, affirmative quota policies represent both resistance and a long struggle for gender and feminism against party policies that have long prioritized men in politics. On the other hand, from the point of view of political democratization, the birth of Law Number 2 of 2008 which requires 30% of women in the establishment of parties, central party management, and zipper system nominations are a form of the willingness of male politicians in implementing the main values of democracy namely freedom, equality and political equality. Although not yet significant, the affirmative quota policy has at least succeeded in encouraging political structures to pave the way for women's political participation in politics, such as being in charge of political parties and becoming members of the central and regional legislatures.

The insignificance of the number of women in parliament does not only have implications for the low political representation of women as shown by some policies (policy drafts) that are in the interests of women which have not been included in PROLEGNAS (*Program Legislasi Nasional*) priority at the 2020 DPR RI, such as the Draft Law (RUU) on Gender Justice and Equality, the Bill on the Elimination of Sexual Violence, The Midwifery Bill, the Social Work Practice Bill, the Fishermen Protection Bill and the Indigenous Peoples Bill.

The low level of substantive representation is partly due to party recruitment that tends to be undemocratic, such as using the family line. Their existence that ignores democratic competition, parliamentary women from the family line are seen as representatives of party interests rather than women's political representatives. This paper departs from the problem of women in parliament, the family path that is seen as a representative of party interests rather than a political representative of women. In addition to ignoring political equality and equality which are important values in democracy, this mechanism also closes the meeting of opportunities for other quality women's political participation to compete democratically in politics, especially in elections. This paper discusses the dual face (face of Janus) of women in parliament, the family line, and the extent to which women in parliament in the family line define the political representation of women in parliament.

Research Methods

This research uses a qualitative approach, a case study research strategy, and a descriptive-analytical research type. The qualitative analysis was carried out using qualitative data in the form of primary data and secondary data that were already available (Sugiyono, 2016). Even though the primary data is classified as sensitive and pro-contra, the author still uses qualitative data collection methods by conducting in-depth interviews with political party elites which Nagara Institute's research (2020) has identified as the party most exposed to political dynasties. Besides, the use of secondary data in the form of documents, research results, and other publications obtained through a website search helps deepen and strengthen the analysis.

The Analysis Framework

The analysis of this research uses the definition of political representation women's in parliament (Phillips, 1998), and the definition of political party representation in parliament (Whibley, 2016)). Phillips (1991) introduced the term *politics of presence (the politica of presences)* to explain women's political representation as in parliament, which must start from quantity. As a process of struggle, Anne

Phillips asked all parties to not question the presence of women in parliament whether they could act as women's political representation or not. Phillips considering that women parliamentarians are also party representatives, and representatives of other components of society, and not all of them understand the details of women's needs, the presence of women in parliament is absolute for one purpose and objective, namely to provide a driving force or inspiration for the community, especially women, to continue to strive to increase the number of their representatives in parliament (Phillips, 1998).

Referring to the definition of Whibley (2016: 15), the nomination, filling, and/or placement of female parliamentarians from the family line for the benefit of the party are included in the oligarchy category. He defines oligarchy as a form of a power structure where power effectively lies in the elite class, one of which is distinguished by family ties. The use of power for oligarchy is primarily to maintain, monopolize, control, or control access to policies for political and economic resources. While suppressing the middle class in society, the oligarchy tries to prevent the emergence of an alternative power group that can get rid of it (Whibley, 2016). Alwine (2018: 235) sees oligarchy as more effective in decisions than democracy by setting restrictions on participatory rights to maintain stability (Alwine, 2018). Adapting to Paul Johnson's (1994) definition of oligarchy into the context of the power of Indonesia's New Order political regime (1966-1998), Hadiz and Robison (2004: 40-41) define oligarchy as a system of government with all power in the hands of a small group of rich people who make public policy for their financial gain (Hadiz & Robison, 2014).

The operational definition of political parties referred to refers to the emphasis that is of concern to every expert such as Budiardjo (1988), which defines a political party as an organized group and its members have the same values and ideals with the aim of gaining political power and also seize political position (usually) by constitutional means to carry out their various policies (Budiradjo, 2000).

Referring to the definition of oligarchy and party, women in the family line of parliament are part of the party oligarchy. A *party oligarchy* is a political party controlled by a handful of officials who will act on behalf of their interests. *Family line* women parliamentarians are women parliamentarians whose nomination by political parties is based on the consideration of family relationships with party officials or political party cadres.

Results and Discussion

Women Parliamentary Family Pathways

Various terms are applied to identify family line parliamentary women from differences in the origins of candidates in party recruitment, such as political dynasty, nepotism, collusion, and kinship. Derichs and Thompson (2013) use the term dynasties: *dynasties and female political leaders in Asia*, to designate blood-related political leaders. This is very different from the notion of political oligarchy where the family line is only one aspect of the origin of the recruitment of candidates for legislative elections by political parties. In general, the public identifies the family line of parliamentary women as the practice of recruiting political officials participating in elections: the legislature and the executive by political parties based on close family considerations: often husband, wife, and children, but rarely blood relations from distant families (Derichs & Thompson, 2013).

Since the 30% affirmative quota was implemented, the political representation of Indonesian women has progressed from election to election. The results of the 2019's election of the 575 elected legislative candidates, as many as 458 (80%) were men, and the remaining 117 (20%) were women. Previously, in the 2014 election, out of 560 elected candidates, 463 were male and 97 were female. Elected female legislative candidates experienced an increase of 3% from 97 (17%) to 117 (20%). Even in the 2019's election, Nasdem Party was able to fulfill the quota of 30% (32.2%) of women who passed

to parliament. However, progress became a problem after political parties nominated women from the family line. In the 2019's election result, there were 44 female DPR RI members from the family line for the 2019-2024 term. The 44 female members of DPR RI are spread across the major parties participating in the 2019 elections, such as PDIP, Nasdem, Golkar, Gerindra, PKS, PPP, and PAN.

Women's Political Representation

Using the formula of Philipps (1991:74) and the representation of women's political representation (descriptive or formalistic) from Pitkin (1967: 61), the existence of women in the family line in parliament 2019's election result is still a political representation of women even though the process of nominating them is by oligarchic parties in elections. The political thinking that underlies women in parliament, including from the family line, is still seen as a political representation of women. In a representative government, only a small proportion of citizens elected through elections (political representatives) can act as representatives in serving the interests of political aspirations (political representation) of the most citizen as representatives (Philips, 1998; Pitkin, 1967).

Nevertheless, political representation has become a public discussion after being questioned if the recruitment process of women parliamentarians is questioned because the function of political representatives as political articulators and aggregators in conveying, sorting, and selecting interests that are in line with preferences, and the beliefs of their voters are not as expected. In the case of women parliamentarians from the family line 2019's election result, they also appear to be political representatives' party facilitated by political representatives of the mandate model and the delegation model.

The extent to which women's political representation in parliament can be observed by examining Heywood's (2013) model of political representation, namely the guardianship model, the delegation model, the mandate model, and the equality model. Regarding the existence of women parliamentarians who will act as representatives of the interests of women's political groups, the equality model of political representation theory explains this. In the equation model, the representatives elected in the election are those who have similarities or resemble the groups they claim to represent. According to the equation model, only people who belong to the group and who have similar experiences with the group can fully identify the interests of the group. This model argues that the low representation of groups, such as women, rational minorities, and others, causes their interests to be marginalized or completely ignored. Meanwhile, the representative political delegation model and the mandate model explain the oligarchy party. According to the delegation model, an elected person will act to represent others based on clear guidelines and instructions. However, this model does not leave room for representatives to follow their considerations. Likewise, in the mandate model, politicians in serving their constituents cannot act on their wishes, unless they are loyal to party policies. This model is based on the idea that in winning elections, the party gets the mandate of the people to carry out any policies and programs that have been outlined during the election campaign (Heywood, 2013).

Starting from the numbers to move to the side of content, Anne Phillips (1991) introduced the concept of politics of presence (*the aspect of the politica of presences*), whose substance is that the presence of women in parliament is absolute starting from the number. As a process of struggle, Phillips said the presence of women in parliament, there was no need to question whether they could act as women's political representatives for women's political representation (Philips, 1998). Philipps (1991; 74) considering that women parliamentarians are also party representatives, representatives of other components of society, and not all of them understand the details of women's needs, the presence of women in parliament is absolute for one purpose and goal, namely to provide encouragement or inspiration for the public, especially women, to continue to strive to increase the number of their representatives in parliament (Philips, 1998).

Oligarchic Party Political Representation Political Parties

Political oligarchy and political dynasty are different, but they are related, influence each other, and determine each other. An oligarchic party is a pathological political party, characterized by the presence of a handful of highly influential party elites, effectively dominating party power, distinguished by its role in party formation, seniority, and access to economic resources, especially financial. To maintain political and economic access, especially financial sources, the party's oligarchic elite recruits their female family or other female party oligarchic families. Broadly speaking, there are three motives for party oligarchs to recruit female candidates for the family line, namely: (1) to fulfill affirmative quotas; (2) women in parliament in the family line apart from having political loyalty to their relatives, can also be relied on in maintaining their access to political and economic resources; (3) prevent the emergence of alternative power groups that can get rid of it; Oligarchy and party oligarchy are political forces that are not only very decisive in the nomination of legislative members but are also very strong in controlling and controlling the political actions of parliamentarians. As a political force that owns or controls potential power, such as money, goods, services, and others, party oligarchs can determine which party members can participate in the election to become members of parliament like a female parliamentary candidate from the family line.

Women in the family line parliament who are under the control of the party oligarchy, apart from being unable to carry out the output function of the political system are also unable to act as political representatives of substantive representation. Parties elect and determine women from kinship pathways closely related to the political recruitment function (Mair, Muller, & Plasser, 2004). Then women in parliament as representatives of the family line will not act much as women's political representatives.

In parliament, the party oligarchy organizes its interests through an institution known as the party faction. This institution is an extension of the party oligarchy. Initially, this institution existed as a realization of the underlying political thought, namely that an instrument was needed that could be a link between: (1) members of parliament as representatives in parliament; (2) the party receiving the mandate of the people's aspirations in the election; and (3) voters (constituents) as representatives who have political aspirations. At the beginning of its formation, this institution tried to run according to the agreed objective, namely to bridge the party and its members regarding the party's promises to its constituents at the time of the election but was diverted by the party's oligarchic elite towards oligarchic goals. Akbar Faisal (2020), a senior politician from Nasdem Party, admitted this by saying:

"The objective of the good faction was diverted by party oligarchy to oversee: control and control all political attitudes of its members in parliament. Whereas for members of parliament who are deemed difficult to regulate, apart from being given subtle sanctions starting from being transferred to a commission that does not give him space to move to be placed in an electoral district (DAPIL) that is difficult to be elected in the legislative elections. The interests of party oligarchs in Parliament can be seen in addition to the placement of party cadres in commissions that do not match their talents, abilities, and desires, as well as the lack of transparency and accountability of all party political decisions. Within the party, apart from the always visible management elite, there are also small factions that are very powerful and can decide policies on behalf of the party without going through the party's internal democratic mechanisms. "

It is difficult to argue that the presence of women in kinship pathways in parliament is to ensure that the interests of party oligarchs remain safe. Becoming party delegates and mandates in parliament to carry out party policies both to secure political coalitions and secure the interests of parties and to block policies that do not benefit them is not a real task and function of women in parliament. These duties and functions are a deviation from the political ideal for women as political representatives, which is caused by the oligarchy of political parties.

The duties and functions of entrusted parties would never have existed if the party oligarchy existed, which also meant that the party no longer had an extension of arms in parliament for the benefit of a few elites. It is difficult for parliamentary women to escape from unnatural and unscientific duties and functions as long as factions become instruments to control compliance for parliamentary women, including men and women. Therefore, it is irrelevant to accuse women of parliament from the family line of failing to become women's political representatives, and unable to produce satisfaction for women's political representation.

Becoming a Political Representative of Equality Model

Inequality model political representation applies mandatory requirements, namely that the representatives (members of parliament) and represented (constituents) must be women so that women members of parliament are representatives of women constituents. Assumptions and general argument that carried and presented by the political representative model is only women that can fight for constituent's women because only the many similarities between representatives and those they are representing that allow political representation is achieved. However, based on the same condition, oligarchic political parties use it to hide behind this priority, namely by nominating women from the family line to fulfill the affirmative quota.

However, in some cases, such as the Bill on the Elimination of Sexual Violence (RUU PKS) which was issued from the 2020 PROLEGNAS, it is as if this is the most obvious form of failure for women in parliament to signify women's political representation. The issuance of the bill from PROLEGNAS is not only a sign that parties rejected it from the start because they do not see it as something important for oligarchic parties even though it is important for women, but also as an affirmation that the number and quality of parliamentarians remain meaningless as long as political parties are still oligarchic. In terms of numbers, women in parliament also cannot be used as a pile of political mistakes and irritations, because in Commission VIII, for example, what pulled the PKS Bill out of the program, actually had more male members than women. Thus the real context is in the oligarchy party, and not on male or female members of parliament.

However, beyond the context of the quantity and quality case, if we use Whibley's definition of oligarchy, women parliamentarians from the family line belong to the party oligarchy (Whibley, 2016). Its presence in parliament is not only meant to strengthen the power structure that is effective in the hands of the oligarchic elite class, it is also distinguished by family ties that have access to political resources. As part of the oligarchy, women from the line of the power of course cannot act as political representatives of women: representatives of women's groups to produce policies according to the aspirations of represented (women's groups). Women in parliament from the results of oligarchy appear to be powerless in facing party domination, such as placement in commissions that are not by their education and experience, namely 70% of women in parliament from oligarchy are placed in commissions that are not according to their educational background. The role that can be played by women, including men, is limited to carrying out party orders, which ultimately leads to maintaining, monopolizing, controlling, or controlling access to political and economic resources. The presence of women in the commission which is not their field is also a sign that women are only in the commission to act on behalf of the interests of the party oligarchy. Through the representation model of delegation and mandate, women's parliament including men is deployed by the party into the commission to make policies quickly in the framework of two goals at once, namely: to become party spokespersons and to prevent alternative power groups from becoming competitors.

Some pieces of evidence can be appointed to confirm that women in parliament from the family line are part of the party oligarchy, three of which are the most important, namely: (1) the placement of women in parliament in commissions that are not carried out based on competence (education)

considerations or is related to appropriate policies with political representation; (2) determination of candidates and the determination of electoral districts for women members of parliament is not carried out according to the party's internal democratic mechanisms, (3) determination of the serial number of legislative candidates in the list of candidates for election participants. In addition to being determined by party elites, there are also some facts based on considerations of their proximity to party elites or have relatives who are currently or have served in their constituency. Akbar Faisal acknowledged this by saying that there were some cases in which election candidate candidates, new party cadres appeared to the determination of party management, especially in the regions, which were not carried out according to party mechanisms.

Some reasons and reasons why political parties elect women parliament from the family line, including: (1) parties that do not prepare female cadres from an early age have difficulty getting cadres to fulfill the affirmative quota obligation. The party that chooses women from the family line is to fulfill this obligation; (2) the choice for women from functional kinship lines with party political attitudes which only want members of parliament to be limited to the function of spokespersons for party interests; (3) women from the family line can strengthen the party elite's belief in the need for political loyalty. The loyalty of women to party elites is believed to be able to strengthen party oligarchy, and this is very possible because the closeness of women's families to party elites makes party elites believe that women parliamentarians from kinship lines can be trusted to protect party interests; (4) the presence of women in parliament from the family line is in line with the choice of parties for political representation of the mandate and delegation model, which gives them more space as spokespersons for party interests than as spokespersons for women's group interests; (5) kinship line women have sufficient political and social capital to participate in elections. Popularity and electability not only allow him to be elected, but also can guarantee loyalty to party officials or elites. Akbar Faisal confirmed the six reasons by saying that the party chose candidates from the family line because of the difficulty of finding candidates who had popularity and electability, which cost a lot of money.

In addition to confirming the existence of a party oligarchy, it is also emphasized that women in the family line of parliament are instruments of party oligarchy. Without a party oligarchy, it is difficult for women parliamentarians to enter the parliament, not to say it is impossible. With this confirmation and affirmation, it is not appropriate if prejudice / bad judgment is placed on women in parliament from the family line. It is also difficult to argue that the presence of women in parliament from the family line apart from strengthening the party oligarchy, is also not by democratic political mechanisms because it violates the main values of democracy: freedom, equality, and political equality by blocking access to competition for other women. However, these cannot be used as a basis for arguments against women and the affirmative quota policy. As a product of party oligarchy, women parliamentarians from the family line are only a consequence (downstream) of the abuse of affirmative quotas by oligarchic parties, so to improve it must also start from the upstream: party oligarchy (upstream). Thus the presence of women in parliament from the family line is not a failure of affirmative quotas.

As long as political parties are still oligarchic, which means they do not have a high commitment to women's political representation, so long as women's political representation is always a problem. Therefore, if it is highlighted from the perspective of *politics of presence*, Phillips' which carries the concept of symbolic representation, then the existence of women in the family line of parliament does not need to be questioned. Instead, it must be seen in the orientation of the number. Meanwhile, the existence of women in the family line of parliament is more of an extension of the interests of party oligarchy rather than women's political representation, this is because women are placed in the frame of political representation in the mandate and delegation models, not the equality model as they should be.

As party delegates and mandates, women parliamentarians, including men parliaments, are supposed to act on behalf of parties based on clear guidelines and instructions. In theory, both models of

political representation are very beneficial for party oligarchs because they do not provide space for women in parliament to follow their considerations or considerations of women's representation. Both the delegate model and the mandate model do not provide space for parliamentary women to act on their own accord apart from being loyal to the party's policy line. Parliamentary women can only act on behalf of parties that have the mandate from the elections to implement party policies and programs that are conveyed in the election campaign.

Therefore, even though they appear to be political representatives, the presence of women from the family line in parliament is not the political will of women. Therefore, the inability of parliamentary women to produce political products in the form of policies or political decisions that meet the needs or demands of women's groups is not a measure of the failure of women in parliament or the gender and feminism movement. The limitations of the political movement of women in parliament so that they cannot produce political products that are in line with the expectations of women's groups are not only caused by the political representation model chosen by the party, but also by the party oligarchy. Emphasizing the equality model that only women - who come from women's groups - can fully identify the interests of women's groups cannot be done considering that the party has determined policies that remain to be voiced by parliamentary women. Therefore, the argument of the equation model that the low number of women in parliament will cause the interests of women's groups to be marginalized or ignored is groundless. This is because, as long as the party is oligarchic, the high and low number of women in parliament or through family or non-family channels will still not affect the interests of women's groups. After all, even if the number is high it still only carries out the party's agenda.

Thus the concept of her symbolic representation, Phillips becomes relevant for parliamentary women from the family line considering that it is the initial process for the presence of women in parliament which will be a sign or symbol of equality between women and men in the political world (Phillips, 1998). Regardless of whether or not it can influence policy, politics of presence remains relevant because the presence of women at the policy-making level is the identity of the representatives (women in parliament) from the representatives (constituents/groups of women) who will make representatives as their message. Considering that women in parliament are identical to messages from women's groups themselves and cannot be transferred, then at this level the status of women in parliament from the family line can be equated with political representation of the equality model.

In line with Phillips, Dahl implicitly included women parliamentarians from the family line as part of a systematic effort to increase women's participation from the bottom up which did take a long time. Following Dahl's view, women in parliament from the family line are not a problem that arises from women themselves, because they sit in parliament through an appropriate basis, namely affirmative quotas, and they are considered incompetent because their placement is regulated by the oligarchic party, and their entry path from the family is determined by an oligarchic party that should embarrass the men in the party. The case of women in parliament from the family line automatically disappears if the internal democratization of the party in the form of a democratic mechanism in the selection of women parliamentary candidates is part of the seriousness of implementing the affirmative quota (Karam, 1999).

Conclusion

Women's parliament from the family line is a product of party oligarchy. In the parliament or legislative body, female parliamentarians from family lines are the same as other parliamentarians who act as representatives of party interests through the delegation model of political representation and mandate models that do not allow them to fight for the group they represent (equality model) other than those of the party policy. The presence of women in parliament from the family line who act as

representatives of party interests is only a consequence of the oligarchic party, so to fix this must start by eliminating the oligarchy in the party.

Women parliamentarians from the family line are not to be blamed, and the gender and feminism movements need not take over since the issue is not an internal problem for women or a problem arising from the gender and feminism movements. The problem will be resolved by itself if the causes are resolved, such as party oligarchy, the use of delegation model political representation and mandates by parties that should use the equality model, and use affirmative quotas for the benefit of parties in elections. In addition to the need for improvement in the body of the party, in the future, there is also a need for political will to encourage the quantity and quality of women in parliament to realize women's political representation (political representation and political representation) significantly by preparing female cadres early and transparent, accountable, credible political recruitment and participative.

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