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Feasibility of the Sudden (*Daf'ī*) Revelation of the Entire Qur'an on *Laylat al-Qadr* and Determinism Doubt

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Abstract

One of the important issues of the Qur'anic sciences is the quality of the Qur'an's revelation, which scholars consider to be two types including sudden and gradual. In spite of the sudden revelation of the Qur'an on the heart of the Prophet, it is suspected that all the events during the 23 years of the Prophet's lifetime have been deterministic, the events such as: emigration, wars and other matters mentioned in the narratives of the Asbab al-Nuzūl; therefore, the sudden revelation is unacceptable. So, in this descriptive-analytic study, this question has been answered and the incompatibility of the sudden revelation of the Holy Qur'an on Laylat al-Qadr was proved by the issue of human will with different arguments. Through this research, it was proved that the sudden revelation is a part of knowledge and, first, that knowledge is not the cause of occurrence until determinism is suspected. Secondly, the knowledge of God over the acts of servants is not absolute, but the knowledge of God has been belonged to the authoritative subject issued by the authoritative subject and the compulsory subject issued by the compulsory subject. Therefore, the sudden revelation of the Our'an, which charts future events and issues, demands that the act of authoritative subject be issued by an authoritative subject and that the act of compulsory subject be issued by a compulsory subject, rather than requiring the authoritative subject be forced or a compulsory subject be authorized. In addition, determinism contradicts the spirit of the teachings of the Qur'an which imply responsibility and duty.

Keywords: Revelation of the Qur'an; Sudden Revelation; Determinism Doubt; Knowledge of God; Laylat al-Qadr

Introduction

The issue of determinism and free will is one of the most important religious and theological issues that have long been discussed by theologians and scholars of Islam in various books. (See: Hillī, 1365, p: 27; Hillī, 1378, p. 118; Astar Abadi, 1382, v. 2; p. 414; Halabī, 1404 AH, p. 109; Tūsī, 1341, p. 476.)

Some also have written some independent books in this regard. (Such as: The heart of determinism and destiny-the matter between the two (1418 AH) written by Mohammad Taghi Sobhani; the book of the best effect in denying the determinism and predestination (1379) written by Hassan Zadeh Āmulī; the Book of determinism and authorization and predestination (nd) written by Sayyid Morteza Askari; and the book of determinism and free will (nd) written by Sayyid Sadegh Rouhani).

The question of the quality and nature of the revelation and manifestation of the Holy Qur'an is also one of the most important issues of the Qur'anic sciences that have been dealt with by numerous scholars and thinkers throughout the history of Islam and have proven that the Holy Qur'an has had two revelations: One; a sudden revelation on Laylat al-Qadr (i.e. the Night of Value) upon the heart of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as the Holy Qur'an says:

"We have indeed revealed this (Message) in the Night of Power." (Qadr: 1)

"We sent it down during a blessed night: for We (ever) wish to warn (against Evil)." (Dokhkhān: 3)

And the other is the gradual revelation, as He says:

"(It is) a Qur'an which We have divided (into parts from time to time), in order that thou mightest recite it to men at intervals: We have revealed it by stages." ('Isrā': 106)

(See: Suyūtī, 1421 AH, v. 1: 156; Zarkashī 1410 AH, v. 1, p: 321; Ma'refat, 1415 AH, v. 1, p: 108 -110; Jawādī Āmulī, 1388, p. 69). Here this doubt is mentioned that, despite the sudden revelation of the Qur'an on the heart of the Prophet (PBUH), so all events during the 23 years of the Prophet's life have been compulsory, events such as: Hijra, the battles of Badr and Uhud and the Khandaq, the incidental events and other things mentioned in the narratives of Asbab al-Nuzūl, since the whole Qur'an was revealed at the Night of Destiny (Laylat al-Qadr), and the same verses gradually occurred over the years of the Risālat based on the Sabab *Nuzūl* (i.e. cause of revelation) and the dignity of revelation. (See: Āl al-Bayt World Information Center (http://Qur'an.al-shia.org/en/id/26/4/32.htm))

Therefore, the question arises as to whether the Qur'an's sudden revelation contradicts the human's free will? Does the sudden revelation of Qur'an on Laylat al-Qadr cause a determinism?

Therefore, this research, using descriptive-analytical method and using library resources, seeks to answer this question. Basically, it first deals with the concept of determinism and the knowledge of God, then, by responding to the determinism doubt, proves the inconsistency of the sudden revelation of whole Qur'an on Laylat al-Qadr with the issue of free will.

1. Determinism in Vocabulary and in Term

Determinism: "...is to force a person to do something he doesn't like or even hate it." (Farāhīdī, 1409 AH, v. 6, p. 115; Sahib, 1414 AH, v. 7, p. 97.) Compelled means one who must do something compulsory. Determinism, in the terms of scholars of Islamic beliefs means that the Almighty God has compelled His servants to do what is good or bad, ugly or beautiful, in such a way that the servant has no

free will and authority to abandon the act. (Askari, 1378, v. 2, p. 519) and this is invalid. Determinism is against free will and freedom. A forced man is a man who lacks power, authority and freedom. For example, if a person's hands are tied and wine is poured into his throat, though he does eat wine, he has no free will in doing so because he could not quit. (Mohammadi Reyshahri, 1386, Vol. 8, p. 460)

In the definition of power, Allameh Hillī says: "Power is an attribute that enables the issuance of an act by a subject, and not necessarily the realization of the act, for the capable is someone who has free will in doing or not doing the work (both). Thus, man is capable of a specific action when he has the free will and ability to do it, as well as the ability and the will to abandon it and not to do it, and the forced man has to act against his own power and knowledge.

2. The Knowledge of God

One of the most important attributes of the God is the issue of His knowledge. Knowledge in the word is against ignorance (Farāhīdī, 1409 AH, v. 2, p. 152; Ibn Fāris, 1404 AH, v. 4, p. 110) and its limit is to encapsulate something over what it is. (Ibn Babawayh, nd, P. 128.) As the truth of knowledge is evident, it also means that knowledge is of two kinds: 1. Intuitive 2. Empirical; the way in which knowledge is acquired by objective way, it is known as Empirical Knowledge; In contrast to the Intuitive Knowledge, in which the mode of abstractions' knowledge in its essence is absolute, and the knowledge of every soul and intellect is in itself the intuitive knowledge (Sajjādi, 1379, p. 356) in "The First Kind: We have Knowledge to our existence, will, decision, interest, love, hate, and our thoughts without any intermediary, that is, we are present in our presence, and our spiritual thoughts and phenomena are all present to us, and there is no veil between us and them; these are called the intuitive knowledge. Secondly, we also have knowledge of the creatures that are outside of us, but obviously heaven and earth and stars do not have a place in our souls, but a picture and a role of them reaches into our souls through their works. And, in fact, our real knowledge is the very concepts that are embedded in our souls that we call it the Empirical Knowledge. God's knowledge to all beings in the universe is of the first kind, for He is omnipresent, and He surrounds all things, and nothing is far from Him. He never needs the senses and reflections of the beings in the mind and in the mental concepts; He has no mind at all, and His Knowledge is the Intuitive Knowledge. "(Makarem Shirazi, 1386, Vol. 4, p. 96), therefore, the universe of creation is present in the presence of God with all its mysterious and intricate alien particles and properties, and this presence does not mean that there is an image of the world of creation in the presence of God, rather, the particles of the universe with their external features are present for Him and are not absent from Him, for it is clear that every being at every moment needs grace and that the Great God is granting him an existence at every moment, and in fact, the creation of every instant creature goes on every moment, so every creature, from the beginning of its existence to its end, is the creature of God moment by moment and is always present for Him (Sobhani, 1392, p. 184). The knowledge of God includes all the universe and its pure essence, as Allameh Hillī states:

"Allah the Almighty is aware of all things that is correct to be known, whether it be *wājib* (obligatory) or *momkin* (possible), *qadīm* (old) or *ḥādith* (new)." (Hillī, 1365, p. 13); therefore, no little particle is hidden for the Divine Unlimited Divinity in this world:

"And nothing in the earth or in the sky is hidden from thy Lord; even a particle, neither smaller nor greater, except (they all) are registered in the Obvious Book (and Decrees of God)!" (Yūnus: 61)

3. Lack of Disagreements on the Sudden Revelation of the Entire Qur'an with the Issue of Free Will

The sudden revelation of the entire Qur'an on the heart of the Prophet (PBUH) on Laylat al-Qadr does not contradict the issue of free will, as it relates to the knowledge of the God, meaning that God knew there is some problems and issues in promoting the monotheism and religion for Prophet (PBUH) or there will be some wars like the war of Badr and Uhud and the like, then the knowledge of God about the future does not lead to the issue of Determinism and does not conflict with the free will of the Prophet and his companions. For a more detailed explanation, we will explain the denying answer to this problem.

3-1. Denying Answer

In response to this suspicion, three denying answers can be found:

- 3-1-1. this issue is related to the knowledge of the glorified God, just as God knows the end of things. The Prophet (PBUH) and the Imam and the Messenger of Allah in some cases know that such a person will go to Paradise and such person will go to Hell. While no one considers their knowledge to be determinism or, for example, a classroom teacher knows which students are accepted and which one are rejected at the end of the year, yet no one has stated that teacher's knowledge causes determinism (Mohammadi, 1378, p. 118).
- 3-1-2. if the primordial knowledge of God is the source of the compulsory nature of human actions, God will not be a free agent, since just as God is aware of the actions of humans from the beginning, God has also knowledge of His own actions, and so if the everlasting science causes a denial of the free will and causing a compulsion for the subject, we should also consider God as the compelled creator. While all the atheists regard God as a free agent (Sobhani, 1381, p. 88).
- 3-1-3. If it is said that all that God has knowledge of is obligatory and it must be realized by force, we say that God is aware of His own essence, while that essence is primordial and old, and issuing there makes no sense. God also has knowledge of non-existents that are impossible to exist, while there is no issuance. There is also the knowledge of non-existents that are possible to exist, while there is no issuance and realization, so knowledge does not necessitate issuance. The truth is that the necessity arising from motivation and will is not incompatible with the possibility of self-realization and does not necessitate obligation and force. The act that is possible for the servant is equal regarding the existence and non-existence. When the impetus belonged to its creation and conditions raised and the barriers were removed and the agent capable of performing the action found that it is not harmful, it becomes obligatory to act and this is not a compulsion towards power and action. (Hillī, 1379, p. 137)

Therefore, it is clear from the above that divine knowledge over all events and affairs, the sudden revelation of the Holy Qur'an on the Holy Prophet's blessed heart on Laylat al-Qadr is not causing a determinism.

3-2. The Answer of Hillī

There are several reasons to dispel the determinism doubt and to prove the possibility of the sudden revelation of the entire Qur'an at the Night of Destiny:

3-2-1. The Knowledge Over the Object Doesn't Cause Its Occurrence

The sudden revelation is a part of science (the knowledge of God and the Prophet) and knowledge is not the cause of occurrence, knowledge is a matter and the will and the authority are another matters, these two are not intertwined; for example: if two drivers are driving freely or two school students are busy studying, and you know on the calculations of the speed and quality of their studying that they will definitely intersect at one particular point in time or overtake one another, obviously, your knowledge is not the cause of their collision or overtaking one another, and they are not considered as two compelled agents who have no free will (Sha'rānī, nd, p. 399; Gharavian, 1371, Vol. 1, pp. 173-174), because knowledge is subject to occurrence, but it is not effective in it. The function obeys only the followed, and so it is afterwards, while the effective is before the affected. In other words, the subsequent obligation has no effect on the intrinsic possibility and is realized by the assumption of possible occurrence. Any possible - absolutely - assumed existing in the state of existence, its absence is impossible. Because if its non-existence is not impossible, the community of violations will occur, and since in this case its nonexistence is possible, then its existence would be obligatory, while it may be possible to consider its essence. (Hillī, 1379, p. 139) Therefore, the sudden revelation of the Qur'an and the previous knowledge of God and the Prophet on events and affairs will never deprive humans of their free will and does not cause their compulsion, because their knowledge has no effect in its occurrence.

3-2-2. Lack of Attributing the Knowledge of God to the Events and Actions of the Servants

Divine eternal knowledge is not separate from the causal system of the world. The divine knowledge is the knowledge to the system. That is to say, the knowledge to the issuance of effects is one of their specific causes. In the external objective system, the causes and agents are different: one is natural and one is conscious; one is autonomous and one is forced. This is also true in the scientific system, that is, every agent is as it is in the real world, it is the same in the scientific world, but it must be said that it is in the real world as it is in the scientific world. Divine science, which has been belonged to the issuance of a work by a subject, means that it has been belonged to the issuance of the voluntary subject by the voluntary subject and the issuance of the compulsory subject by the compulsory subject. What divine science requires and obligates is that the authoritative act is derived from the authoritative act and a compelled act is derived from the compelled act, not that divine knowledge demands that the authoritative subject be forced or the compulsory subject be authorized. Man in the system of existence has a kind of freedom and free will, and has possibilities in his activities that those possibilities are not for other beings even for animals. And since the objective system is rooted in the scientific system and is the source of the divine world, so the eternal science which is dependent on human actions means that He knows from the beginning who obeys and who disobeys by virtue of his freedom and free will. And what the science requires and obligates is that, the one who obeys, is obeying based on his own free will and the one who disobeys, is disobeying based on his own free will. This is the meaning of the words of those who have said: "Human is autonomous forcibly."

That means, he cannot be non-autonomous. Thus the eternal knowledge does not interfere with the deprivation of liberty and free will; it is permitted in the scientific and objective system to be free and authorized. (Motahhari, nd, Vol. 1, p. 435). For example, God knows that Zaid obeys and Amr will disobey, but He knows that each will do so with his own free will. That is, He has knowledge on His servants, He has knowledge on the causes and devices, and one of its devices is the same free will and authority (Hillī, 1378, p. 118). Thus God knows from the beginning that man uses his authority to perform certain acts, and it is obvious that, in this case, not only God's knowledge contradicts the man's authority, but it also emphasizes it. The result is that the knowledge of God and the knowledge of the Prophet are assigned to the act of its agent, preserving all the attributes in the agent, if the subject lacks the intelligence (such as the fire that is the source of the heat), divine science is unintentionally assigned

to its action. That is, God knows from the beginning that such a fire at a particular time and place will invariably be the source of the fire. But if the subject has consciousness and authority (such as man in his voluntary acts), it is up to the divine knowledge to perform the acts with his own free will. (Sobhani, 1381, pp. 89-90) And, on the one hand, because the knowledge of God is real and there is not the slightest wrongdoing in it, the requirement of this realism is that fire is forced in its act, and man is autonomous in his actions. And so, such a prior knowledge about man is not only a matter of man's compulsion, but also of his free will and authority (Mesbah Yazdi, 1370, v. 1-2, p. 176; Sa'idi Mehr, 1377, v. 1, p. 342-343). Allameh Tabataba'i states: God is aware of any phenomenon with all its characteristics and properties, He is aware of the voluntary acts of man with the attribute of being voluntary, and in this case, voluntary acts cannot be done involuntarily, because it requires revolution in the knowledge of God and his knowledge will not be realism (Tabataba'i, 1416 AH, p. 303; Tabataba'i, 1390 AH, vol. 11, p. 21) Thus, "the result of the eternal knowledge over the actions and deeds of the autonomous beings is not determinism, it is against determinism. The prerequisite for eternal science is that the one who is free must be free. As the eternal knowledge has been called in the Holy Qur'an as Preserved Book and Tablet and so on, this world, with all its systems, is both a science of transcendental God and its manifestation, because the Essence of God is surrounding the essence of all things from the beginning to the eternity, and the essence of everything is present for Him; no being can be concealed from Him throughout the entire world. He is omnipresent and with everything:

"Whithersoever ye turn, there is Allah's face. For Allah is All-Embracing, All-Knowing." (Bagarah: 115)

"For We are nearer to him than (his) jugular vein." (Qāf: 16)

"He is the First and the Last, the Evident and the Hidden: and He has full knowledge of all things." (Ḥadīd: 3)

Accordingly, the Holy Qur'an and this world in general, with all its features and systems, are some degrees of God's knowledge. At this stage of science, knowledge and known are one, not two, in which the compatibility and incompatibility of science is assumed to the known, and then it is said that if so, the knowledge of God would be science, and if so, it would be ignorance." (Motahhari, nd, V. 1, p. 435.) The events and things mentioned in the Qur'an before the sudden revelation on Laylat al-Qadr (فرفي عَنْ فُونْ الله (Inscribed) in a Tablet Preserved" (Burūj: 22)) were of divine knowledge. Hence, the sudden revelation of the Qur'an, which outlines future events and issues, demands that the act of an autonomous subject would be derived from an autonomous subject and the act of a compelled subject would be derived from a compelled subject, rather than requiring an autonomous subject to be compelled or a compelled subject would be autonomous.

3-2-3. Negation of Determinism with the Teachings of the Qur'an

The legitimacy of religious doctrine is negating the determinism, because a forced man will have to be like animals and objects, and these beings cannot be spoken of responsibility, duty, sharia, resurrection, and other religious teachings. The mission of the prophets and all orders and negations and invitations to the discipline and observance of the divine laws in the Qur'an by the Prophet (PBUH) and the Imams (AS) is based on the existence of free will and freedom in human beings, so that the caravan of

humanity will be assisted by wisdom and reached the peak of happiness and perfection. Whenever we assume humans lack the freedom and free will and say that all humans continue their life as a machine, so the dispatch of divine prophets and teachers and the legitimacy of Shari'ah will be null and void, and the efforts will not work. The expectation of piety and chastity, the cultivation of values from a man who is not responsible for his act, and just repeats, as a parrot, what the master of eternity says, is very inappropriate. Value and freedom, self-building and authority are intertwined, denial of freedom is the denial of all values and the possibility of self-buildings (Sobhani, 1375, Vol. 4, p. 336 – 342; Mohammadi Ray Shahri, 1386, Vol. 8, P. 468.) Hence the revelation of the Qur'an, which itself is the legislator of religious doctrine, is negating the determinism.

3-2-4. Conscience and the Empirical Knowledge to Freedom in Actions

One of the clearest proofs of the rejection of determinism doubt is the conscience and empirical knowledge of man in himself and his actions. If one turns back to oneself and pays attention to his actions, he realizes that he could do something different from what he had planned and done, or what he had not planed and had not done. On the other hand, the meaning of free will is the freedom to do and leave, and the empirical knowledge is the strongest and most credible science of man. It therefore, besides the nullification of theological determinism, also rejects the social, psychological and philosophical determinism; for though the structure of society and the body and psyche is effecting the human actions, and in some cases the effect is enormous, but the human being realizes by the empirical knowledge that the effect of the above factors is not the complete cause for doing things; rather, he may choose another path, despite his social and psychological needs. In other words, spiritual and social factors may make it difficult to choose an act, but it is not impossible to choose a difficult act and one can also choose the difficult task. The fact is also evidence of this claim, because we see that some people, despite their inferior family and corrupt society, choose the right way of life and, conversely, a number of those nurtured in decent families and healthy environments, who choose the path of corruption and deviation. Philosophical causality is nothing but a set of factors that affect human actions that never cause us to lose our free will. (Mohammadi Reyshahri, 1386, Vol. 8, p. 467.) We do not even find anyone who believes in determinism that adheres to this belief in his daily practice but his behavior to all human beings is as a behavior to free and responsible people. Judicial apparatus have also practically accepted the freedom of will for the punishment of offenders.

All the educational institutions of the world have also implicitly accepted this principle that human beings work with their own free will and that they can be guided and educated and be far from errors and mistakes. (Makarem Shirazi, 1371, Vol. 9, p. 238). For this reason, the question of determinism in the religious teachings is generally rejected, as Imam Sadiq (AS) states:

"No obligation and no delegation of authority, but an affair between two affairs" (Ibn Babawayh, 1398 AH, p. 206)

Imam Ali (AS) states:

"Don't say that God has forced people to commit sins, this word and attribute is a cruelty to God" (Ṭabarsī, 1403 AH, vol. 1; p. 209; Ibn Abi Jumhur, 1405 AH, vol. 4; p. 109). Also narrated from Imam Sadiq (AS):

"God is so just that forces them to commit sins and then punishes them". (Kulaynī, 1429, v. 1; p. 387; al-Arūsī al-Huwayzī, 1415 AH, v. 5; p. 345)

In the early history of Islam, despite the sudden revelation of Qur'an on Laylat al-Qadr, none of the Muslims or the people of the Book and the polytheists had claimed to be deterministic in their actions, and this is a clear reason for rejecting determinism.

Conclusion

Throughout this study, for several reasons, the inconsistency of the sudden revelation of entire Qur'an on Laylat al-Qadr was proved with the issue of free will:

- 1. Sudden revelation is a category of science and science does not cause an occurrence; science is one category and the authority and free will is another category and they do not interfere with each other.
- 2. It is a matter of divine science, and the knowledge of God is not absolute about the actions of the servants. The divine science is the science of the causal system of the world, that is, the science about the issuance of effects by their particular causes. Divine science, which has been belonged to issuing a work by the subject, it means that it has been belonged to the work of a voluntary subject issued by the voluntary subject and to the work of a compulsory subject issued by a compulsory subject. What divine science requires is that the act of an authoritative subject is issued by the authoritative subject and the act of a compulsory subject is issued by the compulsory subject, not that divine science requires that the authoritative subject be forced or a force subject be authoritative.
- 3. One of the clearest arguments for rejecting the determinism doubt is the human conscience and empirical knowledge to himself and his actions. If one returns to his own actions and pays attention to his actions, he realizes that he could do something except what he had planned and done, or could have done what he had not planned and done. On the other hand, the meaning of authority and free will is the same freedom to do and leave an act, and the empirical knowledge is the strongest and most credible science of man.
- 4. Legislation of the religious doctrines denies determinism because the compelled human will be like animals and objects, and there can be no talk of responsibility, duty, sharia, resurrection and other religious teachings regarding these beings.

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