The Quality of Abstraction of Philosophical Concepts based on the Foundations of Transcendental Wisdom

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Abstract

Secondary philosophical rationality emerges as a branch of the discussion of science and understanding in Islamic philosophy. This argument can be examined from both ontological and epistemological aspects and there is a close relationship between its ontological and epistemological directions. This debate in Islamic philosophy has been examined more regarding the ontological aspect. One of the long-standing debates between East and West philosophers is the quality of the mind's access to these concepts. This research seeks to prove the direct and immediate perception of these concepts on the basis of some of the foundations of transcendental wisdom, including the conception and validation of philosophical concepts abroad, as well as the existence of the self and the quality of its perception, from outside and from the inside of sensory perception. Although this theory does not exist in the works of Sadr al-Muti’Allihīn, but his philosophical foundations provide the context for such an explanation.

Keywords: Transcendental Wisdom; Philosophical Concepts; Abstraction; Sadr Al-Muti’Allihīn

Introduction

The topics of science and perception can be discussed from two main aspects of ontology and epistemology.

On the ontology dimension of science and perception there are issues such as proving the existence of science, expressing its abstraction, its relation to the world in terms of present or queen, or the unity of the universe with the known, but in the epistemological dimension other issues are discussed such as the way of acquiring science, the value of cognition, its possibility, the quality of its relation to the known, the value of its presentation of reality, the real criterion of the accuracy of thought, the proving criterion for the detection of right and wrong.
It should be known that epistemology is in the position of proof, after many rational issues, because it has many preparations, without which it would be difficult to obtain the knowledge of the problem, but it is precedent for all of them regarding the reality, since if the theory of knowledge is not resolved and if the amount of human achievement in knowing himself and knowing the others is not explained, so mentioning the philosophical and theological issues is never useful.

Thus, as a proof, ontology precedes epistemology, but as a reality, epistemology precedes ontology. (Jawādī Āmulī 1379: 13/21-24)

In the discussion of science and perception, three issues form the basis of philosophical issues due to epistemology.
1. Value of information
2. Way of obtaining science
3. Determining the limits of science

The disagreement in the first issue is that it separates the philosophers from the Sophists, and the disagreement in the second is that it divides the philosophers into two categories of rationales and empiricism, and the disagreement in the third is that the ideas and theories of scientists has been different about rational philosophy, whose most obvious instance is the former philosophy, so that a group has considered the research in this regard and judgment about it out of the capability of the human mind, and some in the contrary have considered this technique the most certain one. (Motahhari, 1386: 6/245)

The purpose of this study is to explain the way of acquiring the science about some of the imaginations namely the philosophical concepts. Therefore, the subject of this research is specifically related to the second problem of the three mentioned issues, because by explaining this problem the fate of the other two issues will be clarified.

**Plato’s View on the Path to Obtain Science:**

Plato based on his own principles, including:
1. Occurring the soul before the body
2. The primacy of generalities’ perception over details’ perception

He believed that science should be general, fixed, and permanent, so science does not belong to tangible objects because the sensible are partial and deleterious variables. Plato believed that the human soul existed in the abstract world before belonging to the body, observing general facts and then forgetting its former sciences and perceptions as belonging to the body and employing its body, but since the beings of the natural world are the shadow of the creatures of the universe of the intellects, the human soul seeing these shadows understands their origin and remembers the past.

Therefore, all human perceptions in this world are reminiscent of the perceptions that the soul has had in the past worlds, and none of them are new (Copleston, 1391: 1/178; Mulla Sadra, 1390: 8/331).

**Aristotle’s Opinion on the Quality of Emersion of Sciences and Perceptions**

Aristotle, unlike his master, Plato, did not believe in the pre-body reality and realization of the self and considered existence of the self as simultaneous as existence of the body, according to which he did not believe in the presence of the soul in the world of pre-body abstraction and observation, and thus
he negated the existence of former sciences and the primacy of generalities’ perception over details’ perception.

Aristotle believed that the human soul at its inception was devoid of any existence and it is in the purest form of talent and that all the sciences and perceptions were gradually acquired in the same world. Aristotle believes that understanding the details is prior to the understanding the generalities, that is, the human soul, after understanding the details by the senses, points the abstracts and expands generalities and abstracts the general meanings. (Copleston, 1391: 1/332)

At the same time, there is no evidence that whether Aristotle believed in all perceptions and reasons or not, namely even that part of the rational imaginations which he considered to be primitive perceptions in his logic, and believed that primitive rational perceptions also possesses the perception of a partial sense or has a belief about materialistic things and generalizations that correspond to material persons but believed in the basic perceptions that would gradually and spontaneously be achieved without the mediation and interference of partial sensory perceptions for intellect. Did he believe that the intellect invents these ideas in advance?

Finally, this important part is not clear in Aristotle's theory, and this has led scientists to wonder and state Aristotle's theory on reason and sense differently; some find it sensational and some rational and some accuse him of fluctuation. (Motahhari, 1386: 6/248)

**The Quality of Acquiring the Perceptions from the Viewpoint of Western Philosophers in Recent Centuries**

There are two groups of European scientists on this issue: 1. Rationalism 2. Empiricism

1. Rationalism: This group has two types of mental perceptions. One is the type of perceptions that comes directly from the outside by one of the senses, and the other is the perceptions that are innate and intrinsic to the intellect and invented by it. In the minds of the intellects, the origin of such perceptions is nothing but reason, and these perceptions, first of all, come to the reason before any senses, and the mind itself already possesses these perceptions, even if no sensible form enters the mind. Descartes, the head of the intellects, considers some of the concepts and notions before the existence and unity, and even the dimension and form and momentum as the perceptions that intellect has invented beforehand, saying that these assumptions has no citation to sense and it is innate and intrinsic to reason (Copleston, 1391: 4/108). Kant, on the other hand, believes in innate meanings and called a series of other ideas pre-sense and emotion. In his view, this is the concept of time and place, and what is derived from these two concepts. He also considers all mathematical concepts intrinsic and pre-sense and emotion (Copleston, 1391: 6/253 and 257).

It is noteworthy that according to the rationalists’ theory the basic elements of the human mind are of two types:

First: Concepts that have come to mind through one of the external or internal senses, and the intellect has made a general sense with the power of abstraction.

Second: Concepts that are innate and inherent in reason and have no reference to sense and emotion.

2. Empiricism: This group considers innate and inherent perceptions as meaningless. First they know the mind as the unwritten tablet that is gradually accepting roles through external and internal senses. The work of reason is nothing more than the abstraction or decomposition of what comes to mind through one's senses. They think of all mental facets without exception as the forms that mind is taking pictures through the senses of an external phenomenon such as whiteness, blackness, warmth and coldness ... or of a sensory phenomenon such as pleasure and passion and will and doubt and ...., then
makes general senses through abstraction and generalization, and creates different forms of them with the power of decomposition and synthesis. The head of this school is British John Locke, and he is famous for saying that "there is nothing in the mind that has not existed before in the sense." (Copleston, 1391: 5/84)

According to this theory, the basic elements of human reason are unique to what has come to mind through external or internal senses.

**The Common Consequence based on the Theory of Rationalism and Empiricism**

The result, which is based on the theory of European scientists (both Rationalists and Empiricists), is the discrediting of the first philosophy. It was said that Empiricists, on the one hand, believe that there is nothing in the intellect but what is sensed and that the work of reason is solely conquered in the sensible forms and on the other hand, they understand the limitations of the senses and know that it is only certain things that are felt. From these two premises, it has been concluded that the power of human intellectual judgment is limited to sensory and tangible matters, so that the first philosophy - a technique that relies solely on reason - is nothing but rhetoric and fantasy. In their view, there is no science separated from sense and a philosophy separated from science.

Among the rationalists, such as Kant, in spite of their innate and intrinsic intellectual meanings, deny the validity of the former philosophy. He regards the science of supernatural realities as a product of the co-operation of reason and sense, and claims that sense alone or reason alone cannot produce science. Kant considers the natural sciences authentic because they are the product of the co-operation of reason and sense. He also considers mathematics to be valid because, although he believes that mathematics has nothing to do with senses and it is purely rational, but because mathematical questions are related to the assumptions of the mind itself, it is forcibly correct because reason can judge what it has assumed, but the first philosophy is not valid. For it is neither like the natural things that the sense can interfere and can take a practical shape with the sharing of sense and intellect, nor it is like the mathematics that is merely judgment about the assumptions and creations of the intellect itself (Copleston, 1391: 6 / 257-261; see also Motahhari, 1386: 6 / 255-257).

**The Foundations and Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy:**

The foundations and principles of epistemology in Islamic philosophy are:

1. The Principle of Acceptance of Mind versus Object and Acceptance of Subjective versus Objective Being. If the principle of the existence of the mind and the being of the mind is denied, there will never be a way to epistemology, for no science or matter can be realized without the existence of a subject.

2. The work of the mind is not limited to the external reflection. In other words, the mind is not like a mirror that is merely passive and shows out of itself without any activity or initiative. If the mind has nothing to do except the external reflection and it does not exhibit any activity, it will never be able to percept the outer extinct and never understands the logical and philosophical concepts, and no initiative and discovery of its causal relation will be possible because the mentioned issues either never exist outside, such as logical concepts or their predicted existence never exist outside, such as philosophical concepts.

3. After accepting that the mind has perception and activity other than external reflection, Muslim scholars believe that the other understanding and the activity of the mind is effective in human cognition from the outside and plays an important role in human intellectual development. In other words, these kinds of perceptions have an anecdotal and real-exponential aspect.
4. The mind has no understanding due to knowledge of presence and after discovering the former senses by the senses from the outside discovers their mental devices in the same area of the mind.

If the mind has another pre-conceived understanding, such a scientific form is either not applicable to any external being or is applicable to all objects in the world and there is no third way because no specific external being is obtained.

5. After accepting the four preceding principles, it comes to the fifth principle, that is, the quality of using these mental concepts, both rational and philosophical secondary rationality, to clarify the way they relate to the outside, and the truth of some of them like a sensible secondary rationality on the outside through explaining how they are abstracted., (Jawâdī Ámulî. 1379: 13 / 69-71)

The Quality of Abstraction of Philosophical Concepts in Islamic Philosophy:

Most Islamic philosophers have accepted Aristotle's foundations on the quality of perceptions and do not accept, like him, pre-body confirmation and realization for the soul, and regard the existence of the soul at the same time of the existence of the body (Mulla Sadra, 1393: 8/330; Avicenna, 1383: 1/51; Sheikh Ishrâq, 1373: 201 and 202).

They also believe that the human soul at the beginning of its rise and creation is in the rank of monstrous reason and lacks any perceptual understanding (Mulla Sadra, 1375: 1/66; Avicenna, 1383: 1/65)

And they believe that the beginning of human perceptions is through the senses and partial sensory perceptions precede general rational perceptions (Allameh Tabataba’i, 1428: 2/66; Mulla Sadra, 1390: 3/361).

Also, the important part of Aristotle's theory is dark and vague in the theory of Islamic scholars because they have argued that all evident rational imaginations are abstractions that reason has abstracted them from sensory meanings, but it differs in the abstraction of general concepts that correspond to the tangibles, such as the concept of man and the concept of the tree, and between the abstraction of basic immediate perceptions and general concepts such as the notion of existence, non-existence, unity, plurality, necessity, possibility, and refusal, and the distinction is that abstraction of the first group has been directly acquired for the intellect through abstraction and generalization of tangible details, but the second one has been abstracted from the first one in another way, in other words the first group is just the same form of sensation that came to mind through one of the senses, and then the intellect with its abstraction power has made a general sense out of those senses, but the second group has not entered the mind directly through senses rather, the mind, after qualifying the forms of the senses with a particular activity, and in a certain order, abstracts these concepts from those senses, so that the first group is based on the so-called Islamic philosophy (primary rationalities) and the second one which relies on the first group (second rationalities). And it is the philosophical secondary rationalities that form the basic perceptions of logic and the dominant themes of the issues of the first philosophy, so the Islamic philosophers either primary or secondary intelligible preceded by sensory detailed perceptions. (Motahhari, 1386: 6/248)

In the opinion of some commentators of the holy verse, " It is He Who brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers when ye knew nothing; and He gave you hearing and sight and intelligence and affections: that ye may give thanks (to Allah)” (An-Nahl/78), the human’s perceptual science is negated at the birth time. Allameh Tabataba’i, under this verse in Tafsir al-Mizan, believes that this verse does not
negate the knowledge by presence of the soul itself at birth, but only negates the perceptual sciences\(^1\). (Tabataba'i, 1417: 12/311)

This was the theory of Islamic scholars in this regard, but at the same time in the theory of these scholars another important part is dark and that is related to the quality of the abstraction of philosophical concepts (the basic perceptions of reason) from the tangible.

These scholars, though stating that reason is incapable of inventing an imagination in advance, and even the basic perceptions of the theory that form the dominant issues of early philosophy, are abstract matters and they have not fully expressed the quality of abstraction of these concepts and that how the mind works and in what way these concepts are achieved.

These scholars have always referred to a series of meanings and concepts such as existence, non-existence, unity and plurality in logic and philosophy as "abstract concepts" or "secondary rationalities" and confirm that these meanings and concepts have been abstracted through other meanings including the essences such as (horse, tree, human, white and black.)

But they do not give any explanation as to what this abstraction means and how these meanings are born of those meanings, even though the concepts are opposed to those concepts. Is it really possible for one concept to create another meaning, and a meaning that has already entered the mind through a sense, to pursue another meaning that the mind is unprecedented to it and completely is devoid of it? (Motahhari, 1386: 6 / 250-251)

**Allameh Tabatabai's View on the Quality of Abstraction of Philosophical Concepts**

Throughout the history of Islamic philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i has been the first philosopher to examine the discussion of science and understanding from the epistemological point of view, and has mentioned the quality of the emergence of concepts and the way they relate to the outside in an independent and detailed way. (Motahhari, 1386: 6/251)

Allameh Tabataba'i believes that the quality of perception of each mode is different from that of other beings, so it is necessary to examine the existence of objects both externally and in the mind in order to know how they are perceived.

Allameh divides the concepts into two parts, the real and the credit, according to the nature of their instances.

Real concepts are concepts that have both external entities and mental entities such as the human concept.

**Credit Concepts Are Several Types:**

1. The notion that being an outsider is the essence of an entity and therefore never coming to mind and not being understood by the perceptual sciences, such as the reality of the world that being outsider is the same as its nature as well as the true attributes of existence, such as unity and necessity. The only way to perceive this kind of facts is through the knowledge by presence.

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1. و قوله: "والله اخرجكم من بطون امهاتكم" أشارة الى التولد و "لاتعلمون شيئا" حال من ضمیر الخطاب ای اخرجکم من ارحامهن بالتولد و الحال ان نفوسکم خالية من هذا المعلومات التي احرزتموها من طريق الحس و الخيل و العلم بعد ذلك.

والآية تورد ما ذهب إليه علماء النفس ان لوح النفس خالية عن المعلومات اول تكونها ثم تتنقش فيها ثانيا فحتى و هذا في غير علم النفس بدأنا فلا يطلق عليه عرفه "يعلم شيئا" والدليل عليه قوله تعالى في خلال الآيات السابقة في من برد إلى ارذل العمر لكي لا يعلم من بعد علم شئا، فإن من الضروري أنه في تلك الحال عالم نفسه.
2. The concept that subjectivity is the same as the essence of the subject, and it is impossible to be found outside and find objective existence. Like logical concepts such as type, sex, season, general, etc.

3. The concept that although it does not exist outside, but outside beings are caught in the same container. In such concepts it is said that the container of these concepts is in the mind and that the container connecting other objects to them includes both in and out of mind, such as possibility, plurality, refusal and causality. (Allameh Tabataba’i, 1430: 2 / 177-178)

The common aspect of credit concepts is that they are not directly abstracted from the outside unlike the essences (real concepts) that come directly from outside the mind.

Allameh, based on the foundations of Islamic philosophy, such as the existence of the soul, the emptiness of the self at the emergence of all perceptual sciences, rejection of the innate conceptions believes that the mind initially is empty of all the concepts and gradually acquires different perceptions. He believes that obtaining and abstracting scientific forms should be in such a way that their anecdotal and factual aspects are preserved because the mental forms are independent of the anecdotal and realistic aspects of scientific and epistemic value. (Allameh Tabataba’i, 1430: 2/187)

In other words, communication with the inherent outside is in the scientific form, and in order for the forms and mental perceptions to be realistic, it must somehow be rooted in outside and abstracted from external truth and evidence, because if it is abstracted and cut off from outside, it has nothing to do with outsiders in anecdotage.

On this basis, he believes that the origin of all sciences and perceptions is derived from sciences and knowledge by presence. (Allameh Tabataba’i, 1430: 2/166)

"Due to outward exponential and the discovery of science and understanding, achieving a reality is necessary, namely in every perceptual science, there is a knowledge by presence." (Motahhari, 1386: 271/6)

"Because every given science and perception, in particular, has its outward exponential and outward discovery and it is its face, it must have a relation of its own to the outside, so we must come to the truth of the origin of the works which corresponds to it, namely we have to find the same fact with a knowledge by presence and then obtained it either directly or indirectly, or through the seizure made by it, and the evidence of this awareness is sometimes the tangible evidence that exists with its reality and sometimes the non-tangible evidences. .. "(ibid / 271-274)

It is worth noting that Allameh’s intention from knowledge by presence in this debate is a direct and immediate perception.

The criterion of the knowledge by presence is the existential relation and connection between the reality of the perceived object and the reality of the perceiving object. (Ibid / 276).

As some scholars have argued, the criterion of knowledge by presence is the direct and immediate relation of the perceived to the perceiving. (Mesbah Yazdi, 1393: 383; see also: Yazdanpanah, 1395: 123).

Thus, the starting point of knowledge, whether in the generalities in accordance with senses or in philosophical and logical concepts, is the knowledge by presence.
According to Allameh, therefore, the way of acquainting the mind with the real meanings (essences) is straightforward. Since essences have external entities and the beginning of human perceptual activity is also through the senses, so the real concepts are obtained by human through the senses and direct contact with the reality of the perceptible object (knowledge by presence), then the perceptual powers turns this knowledge by presence and the visible truth into the perceptual knowledge.

"Tangible things exist in the senses with their reality and this is also a form of knowledge by presence" (Motahhari, 1386: 6/283).

"... all human imaginations that are related to nature have been directly produced by the perceptual powers of external nature, and these are conceptions which can be interpreted without neglect and said: "The mental world is a reflection of the objective world" (Ibid. 1386: 6/286)

Allameh believes that when the human soul attains the same reality and found that reality with the knowledge by presence, the intellect (the imagination), or the power of converting the knowledge by presence into the perceptual knowledge, forms it and translates that knowledge by presence into the perceptual knowledge.

"The work of imagination is that it is always photographing and producing a form with whatever reality it connects. So its job is to form partial details and transform the knowledge by presence into the perceptual knowledge. Therefore this power has been called the convertor of knowledge by presence into the perceptual knowledge." (Motahhari, 1386: 6 / 284-285)

Thus, the origin of the real concepts (essences) in the mind is the direct and immediate perception of them from the outside (inward perception), then the translation of this knowledge by presence is in the form of the perceptual knowledge.

But this word is only true for the emergence of transverse essences and abandonment, because Islamic philosophers, including Allameh Tabataba’i, believe that the senses are alert and can only perceive abandonment. Therefore, concepts such as essence, existence, unity and plurality cannot be directly and immediately understood from the outside because some of these concepts are like existence and unity as externalities and never exist in mental existence and only perceived through knowledge by presence.

Quiddity, despite being one of the top ten in the category of essences, but the human mind is incapable of understanding it. (Allameh Tabataba’i, 1430: 2/198)

Therefore, to explain the emergence of concepts such as existence, unity, essence, one has to find something else.

In his various works on the abstraction of the concept of essence and the expression of the quality of the mind’s familiarity with philosophical concepts, Allameh Tabataba’i offers two different analyzes and in both ways tries to keep the relevance of concepts to the outside and to safeguard the epistemic value of concepts and introduce the knowledge by presence as the basis of the emergence of concepts. In his view, concepts are only epistemic if they are somehow related to the outside and derived and abstracted from the outside5. (Allameh Tabataba’i, 1430: 2/166)

1. At first, he states that after perceiving the external senses and photographing them and converting them to mental forms and knowledge by presence, the mind compares between its mental forms and finds some appropriateness among them. And this causes them to carry some over others and to relate the subject and the predicate in the form of a theorem, for example, when one perceives a partial darkness outside of the realm of knowledge by presence and then a partial whiteness to the knowledge

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5 لم نستخدَم القوى المدرّكة في إدراك مفهوم من المفاهيم من الخارج و كان الإدراك بانشاء معناها من غير ارتباط بالخارج استوت نسبه الصورة 
مصداقها و غيره فكان عن الواجب أن تصدق على كل شيء أو لا تصدق على شيء، إصلا والحلان إنها تصدق على مصداقها دون غيره و هذا خلاف .
by presence, he perceives that the blackness has a relation with itself that doesn’t have the same relation to whiteness, thus making two theories:

This black is this black.

This black is not that white.

This "is" is the existence of the interface that is created by the soul itself, and that is the creation of the same affirmation. The mind then transforms the literal meaning of "is" into the nominal meaning of "is" through abstraction and generalization and development. (Motahhari, 1391: 6 / 285-292) "... because our understanding power can re-look at what it has achieved with an independence view, so it has looked at the relations it had conceived as the relationship between the two, with independence for each relationship. Or provides some concept of independence and, in the course of this work, the concepts of existence, non-existence, unity, and plurality that were perceived in the form of a relation to the initially understands through genitive case (existence of predicate for subject, non-predicate of subject, unity of subject and predicate in the rational theorem, plurality of the subject and predicate in the theorem, and perceives it through non-genitive cases (existence, non-existence, unity, plurality) ... (Motahhari, 1386: 6 / 301-305)

**Reviewing the Above Remarks**

Some scholars believe that this analysis conflicts with some definite philosophical principles because:

First of all, the most obvious conceptual concept, and the first meaning, is the concept of existence, and the mind as a perception is first and foremost familiar with the concept of being.

Secondly, the most obvious affirmation is the principle of non-contradiction, which is one of the earliest verdicts, and the mind acknowledges and confesses the principle of non-contradiction before any affirmation.

Third: The predicate presence of everything before it has anything to do with the others, is familiar to the mind, that is, before knowing that "Zaid is standing" it is clear that "Zaid is", "there is an standing", then the existence and the predicate of both sides of the case or at least one side of the case is clear, it is said, "Zaid is standing."

Therefore, "is" before "is" and "being" before "is" will be known: (Jawādī Āmulī, Vol. 13, p. 78)

2. Allameh Tabatabai's second analysis on the quality of the abstraction of philosophical concepts is based on the knowledge by presence of the essence in itself. In this way, man finds himself and his powers in the knowledge by presence. He also perceives the relation between them in the presence and in this observation he discovers the need of senses to the self and the needless of the self to the senses. Then, as a result of this observation and the knowledge by presence, he abstracts the concepts of essence, width, cause and effect from within.

"Our souls and our senses and our verbal acts are present with us and are known in the face of our knowledge by presence and our ability is related to them, so it will inevitably find and capture and photograph them; and the actions and the interactions of the soul will also be clear as it was already evident; inevitably, when we observe this relation, we also observe their existence and need for asylum to the soul and the independent entity of soul, and in this observation, the concept of essence is clear to us because we see that the soul has the characteristic that if we take it from the soul, all of these powers disappear and we see the relation of powers and actions, and we realize that this necessity requires the existence of an independent thing, and we generally accept this sentence, and hence in the cases of tangibles, about whom we know nothing, they were widespread, and we all prove they would be an intrinsic subject, and all of them will turn to a description, i.e. so far we were seeing light, darkness,
coldness, and warmth, and from now on, we also understand light, dark, cold and hot, and the transition
to the general law of cause and effect begins here.” (Motahhari, 1391: 6 / 295-299)

Direct Perception of Philosophical Concepts from the Outside

The perception of philosophical concepts through the knowledge by presence through its essence
and its powers and dignities, although true in itself, is not the only way. There is another way to perceive
philosophical concepts, and that is direct and immediate perception from the outside, just as Allameh
Tabataba’i, in the case of essences (true concepts) believed in direct and immediate perception from the
outside.

It seems that one of the factors that has led to the direct perception of philosophical concepts from
the outside is the famous word about the way secondary philosophical rationality exists and the other
is about the nature of the self and the quality of its perception.

1. The Famous Viewpoint about the Way the Secondary Philosophical Rationalities Exist:

Islamic philosophers, before Mulla Sadra, believed that the outside is the realization of the
essence and that philosophical concepts outside us have no equivalent. In other words, they believed
in philosophical concepts of mental processes and external connections, such as conceptualizations of
the possibility of the nature of the tree that these processes are only in the mind. This is because there
is nothing outside called the possibility because they believed that the realization of possibility and
the necessity and the existence outside required the repetition of their kind, and "all that has been required
is repeated and its type is considered legal" (Suhrawardi, 1396: 1/26)

But the attribute of tree meaning possibility both in the mind and outside. So concepts like
existence, unity and causality are outward and have no equivalent. (Suhrawardi, 1396: 1/346; Allameh
Hillî, 1413: 65 - 67)

2. How the soul exists and the quality of its perception:

As stated earlier, Islamic philosophers believe that the first perceptions of human are sensory
perceptions, and that the senses are only capable of perceiving the effects of the object, so that
perceptions of essence, existence, unity, causality are beyond dignity and senses.

The result is that human even in believing in the principle of tangible objects requires reason and
reasoning; for example, when we look at a tree outside, we only understand its effects, such as color,
shape, and so on. We do not perceive the principle of its existence because the power of the human being
that is directly connected with the outside is the sense and the senses are appeared. (Allameh Tabataba’i,
1430: 2/198)

"Even the belief in the existence of the outside world is neither directly acquired by sense nor is it
obviously rational, but it has also interfered with the development of this belief through experience
and reason (Motahhari, 1391: 6/284)."
The principle of causality is also based on this comparison because on the basis of the aforementioned foundation, the senses only find the sequences of the phenomena and they are not capable of perceiving cause and effect.

"What we face in our daily lives through sense and experience is the context or consequence of the events, not their causality and what has led the empiricists to question the realness of the cause and effect law, is high attention in determining the sense and experience (ibid: 6/304)

But Sadr al-Muti’allihīn disagrees with the celebrity on both the question of how philosophical concepts exist and how the self and the quality of its perception exist, and believes that the popular view is unfinished in both respects.

**Mulla Sadra’s Viewpoint on How the Philosophical Concepts Exist (Secondary Philosophical Rationalities)**

According to his final opinion in Asfār, Sadr al-Muti’allihīn believes that there is relevance between any accident and subject and the relevance is the function of the parties, so how can it be accepted that one side of the relevance, which is subject, exists externally and the other side, which is predicate, exists in the mind? Then the existence of an interface can relate the subjective being to the objective being.

In other words, Mulla Sadra believes that the relation is the relevance and the relevance is the function of the parties, so the relation is the function of its two sides, namely subject and predicate.

This argument provides the necessity of realizing the subject and the predicate within the context of realizing the relation and relevance. Thus in the theorem of (human’s being is possible to exist) just as the human connection to the outside is possible.

"The truth is that the relevance is a relation between two different objects that are incompatible with the existence of the container. So the verdict on one side’s existence and the other’s non-existence, on the container where the connection is taking place, is punishment and bullying. The objects are different in the quality of existence, and each has a special interest in the existence that the other does not have. So for every trait there is a special order of existence that has a special effects, even the non-existence part of queens and powers and talents have poor benefits of being and cannot be connected unless their existence is expressed for for their noun (Mulla Sadra, 1393: 1 / 325-326)

So such meanings must somehow exist outside but not in the form of substance or transverse, but rather in the abstract, which is the source of abstraction, on the one hand, be far from the rule of Sheikh Ishrāq\(^8\) and on the other hand avoid any forms of unrelated existence.

**Mulla Sadra’s Viewpoint on the Way the Self Exists and The Quality of Its Perception:**

According to Sadr al-Muti’allihīn’s principle of "النفس فی وحدتها کل القوی" believes that the soul is a unified truth and manifests itself in all its powers by preserving its unified identity, so that the soul manifests itself in all its features in all its dignities, when we find the soul in its sensory dignity, it is not as if it has left its rational aspect in a higher order and, while it is devoid of rational identity, it is present in the sensory powers, so the soul does not employ only its sensory powers in perceptual perception.

\(^9\) the soul in its unity is all strong
Rather, it deals with the perception of tangible objects with all its power and dignity, and each power acquires its own particular perceptions as well as its own. (Mulla Sadra, 1392: pp. 314-315 and p. 289)

In Avicenna’s sense, the sense of human being is not rational and detached from the rest of the dignities of self. (Avicenna, 1404: 2/162 and 148)

Thus, according to the principle of "النفس في وحدتها كل الفرقة" in the same homeland of sense, the superior dignities of the soul, including the intellect, is also present and perceives its coincidence truths directly and immediately.

Some scholars interpret this direct and immediate perception of reason as rational intuition, and consider it, in addition to sensory and cardiac intuitions, independent of intuition and knowledge by presence. (Yazdanpanah, 1396: 126) Also refer to (ibid, 1391: 1/280-285)

So just as sensory perception belongs to the world of senses directly and immediately and perceives tangible truths in the face of knowledge by presence (as explained in Allameh Tabatabai's commentary on the perception of essences), reason also participates in this perception directly and immediately, and conceives the facts of its own kind such as being, unity, cause and effect, then after the objective observation, it abstracts the notions of existence, unity, cause and effect.

Accordingly, when the soul sees the external tangible objects, it is not merely to perceive the effects of the tangible object, but to understand the existence and unity of the external object, it needs reason. Yes, the senses are merely perceptible, but the human senses, separated from the intellect, do not observe the external object, but the soul with all its dignities is present in the sense, and every dignity has its own particular perceptions due to the necessity of proof.

Thus, just as the senses perceive the color and temperature of the tangible object, reason also perceives the existence and unity of the tangible object directly and immediately.

Mulla Sadra believes that just as man is a truth that, while united and meditated, has different ranks, so the external objects have several origins and levels. (Mulla Sadra, 1392: 253 & 254)

So glory to Him in Whose Hands is the dominion of all things: and to Him will ye be all brought back. (Yā Sīn/83)

Therefore, as necessary to the degree of synergy between evidence and proof, the perception of every dignity and degree of an external object is a particular order of the soul dignities, so as to perceive the effects of the external object to the senses, the perception of the existence and its unity is also special for the intellect. Also, if one has a higher and more subtle perception, one can, by observing tangible objects, observe the fact that it is inherent in and dependence on the origin of the being due to:

"ما رأيت شيئا الا و رأيت الله اقبله و بعد و معه و فيه"
And it abstracts the possibility of the poor from the same tangible fact of the philosophical concept and use it in knowledge by presence.

Many verses of the Holy Quran invite people to look at the tangible objects such as the creation of human, the creation of the sky, how to create the universe, looking at the effects of divine mercy, looking at the stars, looking at the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, etc.; like the:

"Soon will We show them Our Signs in the (furthest) regions (of the earth), and in their own souls, until it becomes manifest to them that this is the Truth. Is it not enough that thy Lord doth witness all things?" (Fuṣṣilat/53)

Allameh Tabataba'i believes that the word (witness) in this holy verse means evident in meaning, not witness. He quotes the following verse of this surah as evidence and proof of his claim.

"Ah indeed! Are they in doubt concerning the Meeting with their Lord? Ah indeed! It is He that doth encompass all things!" (Fuṣṣilat/54)

Accordingly, in all his observations man first finds and sees the almighty God above all, for He encompasses all things. (Allameh Tabataba'i, 1417: 17 / 400-405)

“Do they see nothing in the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and all that Allah hath created?” (Aʻrāf/185)

The purpose of these verses is certainly not to invite humans only to see the effects of things but to invite them to view things for being a sign (the inherent relevance to the almighty God).

"On the earth are Signs for those of assured Faith" (Dhāriyāt/20)

**Conclusion**

Most philosophers believe that philosophical concepts such as existence, possibility, causality, etc. have no way of being proved and realized externally, and they believe that the realization of these concepts is impossible externally. Accordingly, the beginning of the acquaintance of the mind with philosophical concepts is considered to be the product of the activity of the mind, and they believe that the mind, with its special activity, constructs these concepts and carries them on external objects without these concepts having an effect externally. The point is to impose philosophical concepts on the external object. For example, in the theorem of (Zaid is possible) we attribute something to Zaid that he does not have and cannot have.

But according to some principles of Sadr al-Muti’allihīn, such as proving a way of establishing and realizing philosophical concepts externally, the existence of the self, the unity and simplicity of the soul, and the quality of its perception, there is no impediment to obtaining and abstracting philosophical concepts directly from the outside. The epistemological consequence of this statement is that the mind is subject to their abstraction when carrying philosophical concepts outside. In other words, the mind carries a concept on an external object that, in its former rank, has found its truth outside. Accordingly, both the way to acquire philosophical concepts are explained as the most important and fundamental mental concepts, and their relevance to the outside and their epistemic value is preserved, and this is a great step forward and a major advance in epistemology.
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